A new space has emerged in the Kashmir dispute. The question is: how should it now be filled?
Pakistan has long adhered, to a considerable extent, to the Bilateral Engagement Doctrine outlined in the Simla Agreement. This compliance, however, was not binding on the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Unfortunately, the Kashmiri leadership too has failed to act within the broader and more empowering framework provided by Article 1(2) and Article 103 of the United Nations Charter. They continued to look away—shielding their inaction behind excuses and delay.
Let it be stated clearly: No bilateral agreement—including the Simla Agreement or the earlier Tashkent Agreement—can override the obligations enshrined in the UN Charter. Article 103 of the Charter takes precedence over all such bilateral undertakings. Even within the Simla Agreement, Pakistan retains the legal room to distinguish between bilateral engagements and its commitments under international law.
Now, a critical shift has taken place.
President Donald Trump, by acknowledging the limitations of the bilateral doctrine and expressing openness to mediation, has effectively overridden the exclusivity of bilateralism. This has created a space—a diplomatic and legal opening. The Government of Pakistan seems poised to prepare itself to fill this space meaningfully. This government, like many before it, has faced trials. Both India and Pakistan understand each other’s diplomatic capacities. The Kashmiri people are no strangers to them either.
In this moment, the burden of responsibility lies heavily on the shoulders of Kashmir’s diverse political schools of thought. If Kashmiris continue to demand recognition as a party to the dispute, they must now act to realize that status. They must seek Pakistan’s formal support under the Karachi Agreement and established jurisprudence, without opening unnecessary new fronts or creating parallel frameworks.
This is not the time for scattered, individual letters to President Trump or the United Nations. Such fragmented lobbying, especially by a splintered Liberation Front, will bear no fruit. Divided efforts, without collective legitimacy or coherence, will fail internationally—even if they hold local relevance.
The ideological camp advocating for accession to Pakistan also faces a serious test. In this emerging space, narrow self-serving agendas like “Koohala Bandh” or “Koohala Open” politics have no place. Both the pro-independence and pro-accession camps must prepare to confront a strong and articulate Indian narrative at the international level. Their success will depend entirely on their legal and political command over the Kashmir case, rooted in the jurisprudence of international law.
It is imperative that both camps remain aligned with the principles enshrined in Article 1(2) of the UN Charter, which guarantees the right to self-determination, and reaffirm their commitment to a UN-supervised plebiscite. Institutions such as the UN Security Council and General Assembly operate under this Charter and are subject to its guidance. If their conduct deviates from this, corrective measures are indeed possible.
The Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir must allocate more than half of its budget towards operationalizing this space. Following the Karachi Agreement, Act 1970, and the 1974 Constitution, the groundwork for a plebiscite framework must be laid. It is a constitutional obligation.
The High Court and Supreme Court of Azad Kashmir must take suo motu notice of the government’s failure to implement the High Court’s April 1999 decision and its continued neglect of constitutional responsibilities. Any citizen of the state can initiate this legal action.
Had the AJK Government implemented the 1999 decision, appointed a Plebiscite Advisor, and built a clear plebiscite framework, the international discourse between April 1999 and August 5, 2019, would have been significantly different. India’s unilateral revocation of Article 370 on August 5 could have been rendered diplomatically and legally impossible. The world would have been better informed and better prepared.
Let us not forget: “The party that would dare to violate an agreement thus reached would load upon itself a very grave offence against the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to self-determination.” (United Nations)
The 53 members of the AJK Legislative Assembly must be individuals of good faith and conscience. Citizens, too, have a role beyond casting votes—they must act as vigilant guardians of democratic and legal process.
It is the common Kashmiri who now bears the greatest responsibility.
The Prime Minister of Pakistan, who has a constitutional role in the affairs of Azad Kashmir, must step forward to assist in filling this new space in a structured, legal, and purposeful manner.
This moment may not come again.
