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Monday, November 16, 2026

Pakistan’s Antibiotic Resistance Plan Faces an Implementation Test

A new WHO survey finds that only 42 of 183 countries report funded and implemented antimicrobial-resistance plans. Pakistan has a national strategy, but surveillance and implementation gaps remain.

Lahore’s Smog Crisis: What the Test Move Reveals About Pakistan’s Air

The PCB’s decision to move Pakistan’s second Test against Sri Lanka out of Lahore has drawn attention to a wider public-health problem. Recent monitoring points to local emissions, crop-residue fires, weather and regional pollution transport—not one simple cause.

AJK’s Mountain Roads: Why Safer Design Matters After Fatal Crashes

Recent fatal crashes in Neelum Valley and Muzaffarabad underline the need for safer mountain-road design, reliable crash data and stronger post-crash care in AJK.
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Jammu Airport Authorities Explore Launch of International Flights to Boost Tourism and Trade

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Authorities at Jammu Airport have initiated discussions to connect the city with international flight routes, aiming to cater to the growing demands of religious tourism, business activity, education, and the region’s diaspora.

To explore the feasibility of the proposal, airport officials held a high-level meeting involving representatives from government departments, commercial airlines, security agencies, and the business and tourism sectors. Participants discussed potential flight routes, passenger demand, and operational requirements.

Chairing the meeting on Saturday, Airport Director Devinder Yadav discussed a proposal to utilize the existing terminal for international flight operations once domestic flights are shifted to a new terminal. Yadav noted that this transition could create pathways for dedicated international arrangements, subject to necessary infrastructure development and regulatory clearances.

Highlighting the region’s profile, Yadav pointed out that Jammu’s strategic and geographic importance, combined with religious tourism, educational institutions, commercial activities, and movement linked to the defense sector, strengthens the case for international connectivity. He added that under the Ministry of Civil Aviation’s “Hub and Spoke” model, Jammu Airport has been designated as a spoke airport.

Rahul Sahai, Chairman of the Jammu Chamber of Commerce and Industry, emphasized the selection of viable routes with steady passenger traffic to ensure long-term service sustainability by airlines. He pointed to potential routes connecting the region to the Middle East, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and Europe, noting strong demand for Umrah pilgrimage, religious tourism, and outbound students pursuing higher education.

Rajesh Gupta, Chairman of the Tourism Federation of Jammu, stated that launching international flights would significantly boost local tourism and trade.

The consultative meeting was attended by representatives from commercial airlines, the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS), the Intelligence Bureau, Customs, the health department, ground handling agencies, and civil aviation and tourism departments.

Srinagar International Airport Lifts Evening Flight Restrictions, Restores Normal Operations

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SRINAGAR — Srinagar International Airport has lifted restrictions on its operational hours, allowing flight operations to resume after 5:00 PM, airport authorities announced.

Previously, the airport’s operational timing was restricted from 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM due to operational reasons, causing difficulties for travelers, local businesses, and students. With the removal of this restriction, flights can now be scheduled beyond the evening cutoff based on operational requirements.

An airport spokesperson stated that the winter schedule for 2026 will come into effect on October 25, 2026. Airlines are currently in the process of filing slots for evening flights departing from Srinagar, a move expected to improve connectivity during the winter months and enhance passenger convenience.

According to sources, the restoration of evening flights is anticipated to strengthen connectivity with major cities, including New Delhi and Jammu. It is also expected to help ease pressure caused by frequent weather-related flight cancellations during the winter season.

Authorities have advised passengers to verify the latest flight statuses and timings with their respective airlines before heading to the airport. The lifting of the operational limit is also expected to provide a boost to local tourism, trade, and students traveling outside the region.

Kashmir’s Saffron Harvest Peak Marred by Falling Yields and Farmer Concerns

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SRINAGAR — The harvest season for Kashmiri saffron, widely known as “red gold,” is currently at its peak across the valley, with farming families actively engaged in collecting the delicate purple flowers. However, beneath the traditional harvest activity lies growing anxiety among cultivators over a noticeable decline in overall production.

In Pampore and its surrounding areas, known historically as Kashmir’s premier saffron town, farmers report that many fields have failed to produce expected blooms during the crucial flowering season. Cultivators attribute the falling yields to multiple factors, including prolonged dry weather conditions, shifting climate patterns, inadequate irrigation infrastructure, a shortage of quality saffron corms, and crop damage caused by rodents and wildlife.

Farmers have also criticized what they describe as a lack of effective official support for the traditional industry, claiming that government-backed initiatives, such as the National Saffron Mission introduced years ago, have fallen short of their intended goals and failed to provide sustained relief.

At the same time, some local observers note that shifting agricultural practices and reduced traditional maintenance of saffron-yielding lands have also contributed to the ongoing challenges facing the historic crop.

Saffron cultivation remains a vital part of the region’s agricultural heritage and local economy, making the current yield deficits a pressing issue for farming communities across the Pulwama district.

Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah Marries Journalist Nidhi Razdan in Delhi

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J&K CM Omar Abdullah shared the personal milestone on social media, drawing congratulatory messages and widespread public attention.

SRINAGAR — Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah announced his marriage to senior journalist Nidhi Razdan, marking a personal milestone that drew widespread attention across social media platforms.

Abdullah shared photographs of the ceremony on X on Saturday, accompanied by the caption, “A new journey began yesterday Nidhi,” along with a ring emoji. The announcement indicated that the wedding took place on Friday, October 30.

The news prompted an outpouring of congratulatory messages from across the political and media spectrum. Abdullah and Razdan have made several public appearances together in recent years. Razdan attended Abdullah’s swearing-in ceremony in October 2024, and the two were later associated with a gathering at Kashmir House in New Delhi in 2025. Their most recent public appearance together took place at the International Film Festival of Jammu and Kashmir in Srinagar in September 2026.

The personal update arrives during a politically active period for the Chief Minister’s administration, which recently underwent a Cabinet expansion following reported internal discussions within the ruling National Conference. Meanwhile, the administration is preparing for the upcoming semi-annual Darbar Move, scheduled for November 3.

How Is Pakistan-Administered Kashmir Governed?

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    On 28 August, Barrister Iftikhar Gilani took the oath as the 17th prime minister of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). He won 30 votes in the Legislative Assembly against 14 for the PPP’s candidate. He had not won a territorial seat. Voters in his own constituency rejected him, and he entered the house through a reserved seat for technocrats.

    In his first speech, the new premier thanked PML-N leaders in Pakistan, including Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Punjab Chief Minister Maryam Nawaz. Pakistan’s prime minister, in turn, congratulated him and promised federal support.

    The scene is a compact answer to a question many readers ask: who governs this territory? On paper, it is a self-governing parliamentary system. In practice, the lines between Muzaffarabad and Islamabad are blurred, and the 2026 crisis has put that blur at the centre of the debate.

    A note on terms. “Pakistan-administered Kashmir” covers two regions: AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan. This article deals with AJK, which has its own constitution and government. Gilgit-Baltistan is governed under a separate arrangement.

    At a glance

    Institution Who or what it is Constitution AJK Interim Constitution Act, 1974 (amended, most recently by the 13th Amendment, 2018) Head of state President, elected by the Assembly for five years. Currently Dr Muhammad Najeeb Naqi Khan Head of government Prime Minister, elected by the Assembly. Currently Iftikhar Gilani (since 28 August 2026) Legislature Legislative Assembly, 53 seats Courts Supreme Court and High Court Federal link Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan, AJK Council, federally posted senior officials

    The formal structure

    The AJK government looks familiar to anyone who knows Pakistan’s. A president elected by the Legislative Assembly serves as head of state, while the elected prime minister is the chief executive. The president’s role is mostly ceremonial: executive powers are exercised by the prime minister and cabinet, and the president is bound to act on their advice. The president also appoints the chief justices of the Supreme Court and High Court.

    The assembly has 53 members. Forty-five are general seats, of which 33 are elected from constituencies inside the territory and 12 from seats reserved for refugees living across Pakistan. The remaining eight are reserved for women, an Islamic scholar, a technocrat and overseas Kashmiris. The refugee seats are the subject of our earlier explainer and a major reason for the 2026 unrest.

    The judiciary has its own apex court. The Supreme Court has a chief justice and two other judges, a number fixed by the 1974 Act.

    “Interim” since 1974

    The word in the constitution’s name matters. The territory’s status is officially unsettled pending the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. The constitution defines AJK as territories of the former state “liberated by the people of that State” and administered for the time being by its government.

    That wording has a practical consequence for how AJK relates to Pakistan. According to Dawn’s reporting on the region and the Al Jazeera account from July, AJK has no representation in Pakistan’s national parliament. A Tribune explainer from 2012 pointed out that AJK is not mentioned in Pakistan’s constitution, unlike other special areas, yet residents carry Pakistani identity documents. Pakistan’s official position is that it supports Kashmiri self-determination under the UN framework, and that AJK’s separate status reflects it.

    Where Islamabad comes in

    Several mechanisms connect the AJK government to the federal one. Their weight is disputed, and some have changed over time.

    1. The Ministry of Kashmir Affairs

    The federal ministry has been central since the territory’s early years. It was set up in January 1949, and defence and foreign affairs for AJK, including dealings with the United Nations, were ceded to it. A history of the ministry notes that until 1970, the fate of AJK governments largely depended on its bureaucrats, who acted as kingmakers.

    The current federal minister for Kashmir Affairs, Amir Muqam, attended the October ceremony for new AJK Council members alongside the AJK president and prime minister. 

    2. “Lent officers”

    The most visible day-to-day link is personnel. The chief secretary and inspector general of police are posted to AJK by the federal government under the 1949 Karachi Agreement, for tenures that rarely exceed three years. They are commonly called “lent officers.” 

    The arrangement was adjusted in 2014. Dawn reported that after a dispute between the then PPP government in Muzaffarabad and the PML-N government in Islamabad, it was agreed that transfers of lent officers take effect only after the AJK administration notifies them with the prime minister’s approval. The federal government still chooses the officers. In February 2026, it posted a new police chief through a notification from its Establishment Division. After the violent protests of May 2024, the federal government replaced AJK’s police chief days later. 

    These officers run the civil administration and the police, which is why critics say elected AJK governments cannot fully direct their own bureaucracy. Supporters of the system would say that it keeps administration professional and insulated from local patronage. We have not found an official defence of the arrangement stated in those terms, and we invite one.

    3. The AJK Council

    The council is the most contested institution. It has 14 members and is chaired by Pakistan’s prime minister. Under the original 1974 design, it was the dominant body. Human Rights Watch wrote in 2006 that the council exercised paramount authority over the Legislative Assembly, which could not challenge its decisions. According to a 2023 summary, it held jurisdiction over fifty-two subjects, including everything of significance, and controlled tax collection.

    The 13th Amendment in June 2018 changed this on paper. Dawn reported that it stripped the council of its administrative, legislative and financial powers, and The News described it as relegating the council to an advisory body while giving AJK major fiscal autonomy. In 2019, the UN human rights office noted that AJK’s political leaders said more powers had shifted to the assembly, while the office itself concluded that the amendment actually transferred the council’s powers to Pakistan’s prime minister. More recently, Al Jazeera’s July reporting described the council as overseeing areas such as electricity, banking and parts of taxation that largely fall outside the assembly’s authority. In October, Pakistan’s prime minister promised to strengthen the council as new members were sworn in.

    We therefore cannot give a single clean answer on the council’s present powers. Readers should consult the amended constitution’s text, and we will report corrections.

    4. The power to remove governments

    A 2006 Human Rights Watch report found that under Section 56 of the Interim Constitution, drafted by the federal law and Kashmir Affairs ministries, Pakistan’s government could dismiss any elected AJK government regardless of its assembly support. That report predates the 13th Amendment, and we could not independently confirm whether the provision survives in the same form. We include it because it shaped how governance in AJK was understood for years.

    What AJK cannot decide

    Under the original design, the assembly’s powers covered the residual areas of governance, with defence, foreign affairs, communications, currency and matters relating to UN resolutions on Kashmir excluded. Those subjects stayed with Pakistan.

    A Tribune explainer quoted an activist who said the elected government’s powers were closer to those of a municipality. That was a 2012 assessment, and it came before the 13th Amendment. It captures a view still heard from AJK critics today.

    The accession condition

    One rule shapes politics in AJK more than any administrative arrangement. Article 7(2) of the Interim Constitution restricts who may take part in public life. (Some sources number the provision differently.) Human Rights Watch summarised its effect: it bars from the political process any parties and individuals who do not support the idea of Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan. Freedom House likewise notes that the constitution bans political parties that do not endorse eventual accession.

    The consequences have been documented over decades. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reported in its review of 2022 that parties supporting an independent state remained excluded from the electoral process, with the election commission rejecting the nomination papers of candidates who did not support accession.

    For a publication that supports self-determination, the contradiction is plain. Pakistan says it backs a UN-mandated plebiscite, under which Kashmiris would choose their future, yet the AJK constitution does not allow candidates to campaign for independence. Pakistani officials argue that the accession option reflects the territory’s historical choice and Pakistan’s declared position. Critics, including historian Anam Zakaria, reject that. Zakaria told Al Jazeera the oath in itself contradicts the right to self-determination and sidelines Kashmiris with a different vision.

    What the 2026 crisis revealed

    The Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) built its protest movement on economic grievances, but its confrontation with the authorities exposed the governance question underneath. Its members told Al Jazeera that real authority sits in Rawalpindi, meaning Pakistan’s military establishment, rather than with civilian leaders, which is why they negotiate through that channel. Researcher Ershad Mahmud argued that Islamabad’s bureaucracy, military and intelligence establishment have reduced AJK’s elected leadership to a largely symbolic role.

    The government’s response, by contrast, stresses constitutional process and law and order. After the unrest, the AJK chief secretary and police chief appeared together to say the state would maintain its writ, and described the JAAC as an outlawed outfit. Both of those officials are federal appointees. That is not evidence of anything improper, but it illustrates how the structure works. The people speaking for AJK’s government were posted by the federal one.

    Why it matters

    Three points stand out.

    The gap between form and practice. AJK has the institutions of self-government, but the personnel, constitutional conditions and fiscal links tie it closely to Islamabad. Reformers describe the 2018 amendment as a real shift of power. Others, including the UN human rights office in its 2019 commentary, say much of that power moved to the Pakistani prime minister instead of the local assembly.

    Legitimacy. The new government came out of elections held during a deadly protest movement, with the JAAC banned and a boycott in place. A Dawn editorial warned that installing a prime minister rejected by his own constituency would reinforce concerns that local autonomy is being undermined. 

    Self-determination. The “interim” label, the accession oath and the exclusion of pro-independence candidates make AJK’s political space narrower than its institutions suggest. That is the strongest reason this governance question belongs in any discussion of Kashmiri rights.

    Frequently asked questions

    Is Azad Kashmir a province of Pakistan? No. It is not a province and is not part of Pakistan’s constitutional framework in the way provinces are, and it has its own constitution. It has no representation in Pakistan’s parliament.

    Who is the head of AJK? The president is head of state (currently Dr Muhammad Najeeb Naqi Khan), and the prime minister is chief executive (currently Iftikhar Gilani).

    Does AJK control its own police and civil service? Its own officers serve in both, but the chief secretary and police chief are posted by Pakistan’s federal government.

    What is the AJK Council? A 14-member body chaired by Pakistan’s prime minister. Its powers were curtailed by the 2018 amendment, but accounts differ on how much influence it retains.

    Can pro-independence parties contest elections? According to HRW, Freedom House and HRCP, candidates must support accession to Pakistan, which excludes pro-independence parties.

    What is the difference between AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan? Both are Pakistan-administered, but they are governed under separate constitutional arrangements.


    Key sources: Dawn (reports on the 13th Amendment and lent officers); Human Rights Watch, “With Friends Like These…” (2006); Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022; HRCP, State of Human Rights in 2022: AJK; Al Jazeera, “Pakistan’s Kashmir votes: Why the election hinges on 12 disputed seats” (27 July 2026); Express Tribune and Geo reporting on the August 2026 government formation.

    The Azadi Times invites comment from the AJK government, the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and legal experts. We will update this article as verified information arrives.

    The 12 Refugee Seats Explained: Why a Dozen Assembly Seats Divide Pakistan-Administered Kashmir

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    Voters who live in Lahore, Rawalpindi and Sialkot help choose who governs Muzaffarabad. Here is how that arrangement began, why it ignited deadly protests, and what it says about who holds power in the territory.

    Of the 53 seats in the Legislative Assembly of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), the territory governed by Pakistan, twelve are not decided by people who live there. They are chosen by Kashmiri refugees settled across Pakistan, in cities such as Lahore, Rawalpindi and Sialkot. That fact, dry on paper, drove one of the most violent summers the territory has seen in years.

    Understanding the refugee seats is the key to understanding the crisis in Pakistan-administered Kashmir in 2026. They are at once a constitutional provision, a diplomatic symbol, an electoral lever and, for thousands of protesters, a grievance. This explainer sets out the history, the numbers and the arguments, including those of people we disagree with.

    What the refugee seats are

    The AJK assembly has 53 members. Forty-five are general seats, of which 33 are elected from constituencies inside the territory and 12 from seats reserved for refugees who now live across Pakistan. The other eight are reserved for women, a religious scholar, a technocrat and overseas Kashmiris. The twelve refugee seats are split evenly: six represent refugees from the Jammu division and six represent refugees from the Kashmir Valley.

    These voters fled or left what is now Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, some during the upheaval of 1947 and the war of 1947–48, others in later decades. Reporting based on Indian sources notes that, like voters in AJK itself, they must hold State Subject certificates to vote or stand. The certificate is a legacy of the old princely state, and it is the legal thread linking refugees to the territory’s claim over the whole of Jammu and Kashmir.

    Where the seats came from

    The arrangement is not new. According to Al Jazeera, it traces back to electoral arrangements in 1960, reinforced by laws in 1964 and 1970, formalised in the 1974 Interim Constitution, and reaffirmed by a constitutional amendment in 2018. A legal commentary in Dawn adds that the seats are entrenched under Article 22 of the Interim Constitution.

    A former AJK chief justice, Chaudhry Muhammad Ibrahim Zia, told Al Jazeera the seats rest on an even earlier foundation: the AJK government’s founding declaration of 24 October 1947, which he said expressed the collective will of the people of the former state. In his view, they have solid historical and constitutional grounding.

    The numbers

    The scale of the dispute is easier to see with figures. According to Election Commission data cited by Al Jazeera, AJK’s electorate was more than 3.8 million this year, and the twelve refugee constituencies account for roughly 439,000 registered voters, scattered across Pakistani cities.

    By our calculation, that means refugee voters make up about 11 to 12 per cent of the electorate but fill roughly a quarter of the 45 general seats.

    The split between the two groups is stark. The Express Tribune reported that the Jammu refugee population is estimated at around 434,000, while the Kashmir Valley refugee population is about 30,000, yet each group gets six seats. Using those estimates, a Valley seat represents roughly 5,000 people and a Jammu seat roughly 72,000. These are population estimates rather than voter-roll counts, so treat the ratio as indicative.

    The imbalance has a long history. Scholarship summarised in a reference on Kashmiris in Azad Kashmir says refugees have historically been over-represented in the AJK legislatures relative to their numbers, and that in 1990 there were about 400,000 refugee voters against 1.2 million residents of AJK. The scholar cited, Christopher Snedden, argues that this gives the central government in Islamabad openings to influence election results.

    Why the JKJAAC wants them abolished

    The Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JKJAAC) began as a campaign over flour prices and electricity tariffs, not assembly seats. Al Jazeera noted that its original charter was almost entirely economic, and the refugee seats first appeared in its expanded charter in October 2025.

    The group’s objection is about jurisdiction and power. JAAC committee member Kashif Abbasi told Al Jazeera that the election is meant for people who live in AJK, and these twelve seats sit outside its jurisdiction. The broader complaint, reported across outlets, is that the seats allow Pakistan-based political parties to influence the AJK government and divert development funds intended for the territory.

    Canada-based researcher Ershad Mahmud, author of a book on Poonch, told Al Jazeera that the seats persist partly because they serve Islamabad’s interests. In his view they let Pakistan argue that AJK represents the entire former state and help Pakistan-based parties shape government formation in Muzaffarabad.

    Notably, the JAAC did not start from a demand for outright abolition. On 30 May, it put two alternatives in writing: keep symbolic refugee representation until the Kashmir dispute is permanently settled, or replace the twelve assembly seats with four seats on the AJK Council. That council is a body chaired by Pakistan’s prime minister that handles federal-facing subjects. An All-Parties Conference in Muzaffarabad rejected both proposals on 3 June.

    The case for keeping them

    The defenders of the seats are not a monolith, and their arguments deserve a fair hearing.

    The core argument is political and symbolic. Supporters say the seats reflect the assembly’s claim to represent the whole former princely state, not just the territory AJK administers. A Geo News analysis summarised the view that because the Kashmir dispute is unresolved, displaced Kashmiris retain a legitimate stake, and the seats acknowledge that displacement.

    Abdul Majid Khan, a former AJK finance minister who comes from a refugee family, rejects the idea that seat-holders form a powerful bloc. He told Al Jazeera that AJK’s annual budget of about 310 billion rupees far exceeds the development funds allocated to the refugee constituencies.

    Pakistan’s government takes a procedural line. Defence Minister Khawaja Asif told the National Assembly on 11 June that the seats’ future should be decided by voters rather than under street pressure. That is the government’s position, and it is worth noting that it comes from the very authority whose interests critics say the seats serve.

    The critics’ reply

    Some commentators challenge the legal framing directly. One opinion piece in Eurasia Review argues that UN resolutions say nothing about refugee quotas in the AJK assembly, and that the legal continuity of Jammu and Kashmir is preserved through State Subject status, not assembly quotas. It also points out that the refugee constituencies are non-resident and extraterritorial, and that many holders have integrated into Pakistan’s political and economic life. This is an opinion piece, but it captures an argument raised by the JAAC’s supporters.

    What the courts have said

    The courts have not rescued the JAAC’s case. In June, the AJK Supreme Court issued an advisory opinion, in response to a presidential reference, finding that the seats are constitutionally protected under Article 22 and cannot be altered through administrative measures, political agreements or public pressure.

    Zia, the former chief justice, said that means the seats cannot be removed without a proper constitutional process, and that no such process was possible until a new legislature was elected.

    Put plainly, the law sends the matter to the assembly, and the assembly is itself elected partly through the contested seats. That circularity is a large part of why the dispute proved impossible to settle by negotiation.

    The self-determination question

    For an outlet that supports Kashmiri self-determination, this is the deepest layer of the story.

    Under a UN Commission for India and Pakistan resolution adopted on 5 January 1949, Kashmir’s final status was to be decided through a free and impartial plebiscite. That vote has never been held on either side of the Line of Control.

    Pakistan’s government argues the refugee seats preserve the principle that the whole former state has a voice. Critics respond that the arrangement protects Islamabad’s influence more than it serves Kashmiris. Historian Anam Zakaria, who wrote a book on Pakistan-administered Kashmir, points to a further contradiction: candidates for public office in AJK must first swear allegiance to its accession to Pakistan, which she says itself contradicts the right to self-determination and sidelines Kashmiris with a different vision. Readers should consult the Interim Constitution’s text on this requirement, and we will publish a separate explainer on it.

    Zakaria also stresses a point that is easy to lose. Nothing Pakistan does in the territory it administers is comparable, she argues, to the long-running violence and human rights abuses in Indian-administered Kashmir. Both things can be true, and an honest account holds them together.

    There is also a view that autonomy and self-determination do not conflict. Lahore-based constitutional lawyer Hassan Kamal Wattoo told Al Jazeera that there is no tension between real autonomy for AJK and an eventual plebiscite.

    What happened at the ballot box

    The election went ahead in phases, with the refugee constituencies voting in the second phase on 2 August. The JAAC, banned since 5 June, urged supporters to boycott. Authorities also barred international media from reporting from the region. Al Jazeera reported that more than 50 people were killed during the protests, according to residents and rights groups. An earlier Al Jazeera count put the toll at nearly 40. The figures differ because no independent count has been possible.

    The result showed why the seats matter. A Dawn editorial said the PML-N emerged as the single largest party, helped by eight seats for Kashmiri refugees in Punjab. The same editorial recorded that lawyer Iftikhar Gillani, who lost in his own constituency, was chosen as prime minister through a reserved seat for technocrats, and that even mainstream parties such as the PPP questioned the legitimacy of elections held amid an uprising.

    Supporters of the seats will say the PML-N’s strength reflects votes cast by a legitimate constituency. The JAAC will say it shows exactly what it warned about. Both readings rest on the same facts.

    What remains unresolved

    Three questions hang over the territory:

    1. Can the seats ever change? Legally, only a constitutional amendment can do it, and that requires an assembly that the JAAC says was shaped by the very arrangement it opposes.
    2. Who actually negotiates? Al Jazeera reported that JAAC members believe real authority sits with Pakistan’s military establishment rather than elected leaders, and Mahmud argues the local leadership has been reduced to a largely symbolic role.
    3. Can the facts be checked? With foreign media barred and communications repeatedly cut, independent verification remains limited.

    Frequently asked questions

    How many refugee seats are there in the AJK assembly? Twelve, out of 45 general seats and 53 in total. Six are for refugees from the Jammu division and six for refugees from the Kashmir Valley.

    Who votes for them? Registered Kashmiri refugees living in Pakistan, roughly 439,000 voters according to Election Commission figures cited by Al Jazeera.

    Why does the JAAC want them abolished? It says voters outside AJK should not decide who governs inside it, and that the seats let Pakistan-based parties influence the government and divert funds.

    Can the seats be abolished? According to the AJK Supreme Court, only through a formal constitutional amendment.

    Is the JAAC still banned? AJK authorities designated it a proscribed organisation on 5 June 2026, and we have seen no report of the ban being lifted.

    The Azadi Times invites the JKJAAC, the AJK government and representatives of refugee communities to respond. We will update this article as verified information arrives.

    What Is the JKJAAC? The Movement, Its 38-Point Charter and the Ban

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    For most of its short life, the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee was known for something unglamorous: forcing governments to talk about the price of flour and electricity. In 2026, the same alliance has become the centre of the gravest political crisis in Pakistan-administered Kashmir in years. It has been banned under anti-terrorism law, blamed by authorities for violence, and credited by its supporters with giving voice to a population long ignored.

    This explainer sets out who the JKJAAC (also called the JAAC) is, what it wants, how it got here, and where its critics and defenders disagree. Where accounts conflict, we say whose account it is.

    Where it came from

    The JKJAAC is a coalition of traders, lawyers, students, transporters and civil-society activists based in Muzaffarabad, the capital of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). One reference account says it was founded on 17 September 2023. The trigger was cost of living. A founding figure told Al Jazeera in 2024 that the movement began after a wheat crisis pushed up flour prices, followed by a sharp rise in electricity rates. The complaint carried particular force because AJK generates its own hydropower. As the group saw it, locals were paying more for electricity than it cost to produce. It adopted a 30-member core committee and issued its first charter of demands in September 2023, alongside a campaign of civil disobedience that included boycotting electricity bills.

    May 2024: the first big test

    The alliance’s first major confrontation came in May 2024. A JKJAAC-led march toward Muzaffarabad began on 11 May, demanding subsidised flour and lower power tariffs. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif approved a Rs23 billion package for power and wheat subsidies, but three people were shot dead and six injured in firing and tear-gas shelling by the paramilitary Rangers in Muzaffarabad on the same day. Arab News reported four deaths overall, including a police officer reportedly killed by protesters’ gunfire. The strike ended after the government met key demands, but the episode set a template. Pressure from the street won concessions, and lives were lost along the way.

    The 38-point charter

    The JKJAAC’s current programme took shape in 2025. According to Kashmir Times, the committee received a six-month extension until 8 June 2025 and then presented a new 38-point charter based on public consultation. The Daily Times dates its formal issue to 29 August 2025.

    The charter mixes cost-of-living relief with structural reform. Published summaries include:

    • Economic relief: subsidised wheat and removal of perks for the ruling elite; lower electricity tariffs; an end to what the charter calls exploitation by mobile phone companies.
    • Anti-privilege measures: an end to privileges enjoyed by judges and civil servants.
    • Governance: action on bribery, corruption and nepotism, empowerment of local representatives, and student union elections. One point reportedly calls for admissions to educational institutions on “open merit.”
    • The refugee seats: the most politically explosive item, covered below.

    Not everyone sees the charter as realistic. A Daily Times analysis called it sprawling, with many aspirational demands and few practical steps for implementation, noting that free medical and education services would need a huge fiscal outlay. Supporters counter that the charter was built from public consultation and that governments themselves have accepted much of it.

    The refugee seats dispute

    One demand has come to define the 2026 crisis. Twelve seats in the AJK Legislative Assembly are reserved for people who migrated from Indian-administered Kashmir. These voters live in Pakistan, not in AJK, and elect representatives to the assembly. The JKJAAC wants the seats abolished. In its view, the arrangement lets Pakistan-based political parties influence the AJK government and diverts development funds intended for the region. The group argues that all seats should go to people who actually live in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

    We did not find the views of refugee-community representatives or parties that benefit from the seats in the sources reviewed for this article. We would welcome them. The dispute has legitimate arguments on more than one side, and the seats have a history rooted in the status of displaced Kashmiris.

    September–October 2025: a deal, then a stall

    In late September 2025 the JKJAAC called a region-wide shutdown. Authorities imposed a communications blackout. Deaths were reported, including in Muzaffarabad on 1 October. A peace agreement was reached on 4 October, with officials saying most demands had been accepted. Figures offered by officials varied. AP reporting cited authorities saying 36 of the 38 demands were accepted and two remained unresolved. The JKJAAC’s side disputed how much had really been delivered. A report carried by IANS said the deal left out key demands such as abolishing the 12 seats and curbing elite privileges. IANS is an Indian news agency, and we note that it is not a neutral party in the India–Pakistan context.

    2026: collapse, ban, bloodshed

    Talks collapsed in late May 2026 over the refugee seats and elite privileges. Then came the decisive step. On 5 June, AJK authorities designated the JKJAAC a proscribed organisation under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Anti-Terrorism Act, 2014. The AJK government justified the ban by citing reports of potential violence, acquisition of weapons, attacks on law-enforcement personnel and plans to disrupt normal life. The JKJAAC denies this and says its struggle is peaceful. Amnesty International called the designation a dangerous escalation in the crackdown.

    Within days the confrontation turned lethal. Clashes in Rawalakot on 7 June between supporters and security personnel left seven dead, and a strike two days later shut cities and towns across the territory. The government’s account stresses attacks on police. AJK’s police chief accused JKJAAC activists of creating barriers and attacking goods-laden trucks, and warned against disinformation. Federal Information Minister Attaullah Tarar went further, saying militant elements inside the banned group pursued a “foreign agenda.” The JKJAAC rejects that and accuses security forces of using excessive force on peaceful demonstrators.

    The toll depends on who is counting. AFP tallied 22 deaths from clashes since the ban, according to official figures, as of mid-July. Al Jazeera later reported, citing residents and rights groups, more than 50 killed during the protests. We know of no single verified count. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, called for prompt, thorough and impartial investigations into the deaths of protesters and security personnel alike.

    The protest took the form of a march. The “long march” toward Muzaffarabad was halted at Rawalakot on 10 June, then repeatedly postponed during talks. According to a report from the exile-based Kashmir Times, it resumed on election day, 27 July, with a rights group alleging unprovoked firing, three deaths and scores injured, though casualty figures were unverified amid a communications blackout. We could not confirm those figures independently.

    The elections and what followed

    Voting for the legislative assembly was staged in phases between 27 July and 10 August. The JKJAAC called a boycott. Dawn noted that the group is not a registered political party and was not contesting, but that its charter had attracted a large segment of the population, particularly young people, even as part of its leadership took what the paper called an extremist posture. That double-edged judgement captures how contested the movement’s character remains.

    After the vote, the PML-N emerged as the largest party, helped by eight seats for refugees in Punjab, and lawyer Iftikhar Gillani was chosen as AJK’s new prime minister through a reserved technocrat seat after losing in his own constituency. The same Dawn editorial warned that the legitimacy of the elections had been questioned even by mainstream parties such as the PPP. Meanwhile, authorities have barred international media from reporting from the region, which limits independent verification of almost everything above.

    The confrontation is still live. On 28–29 October, police in Rawalakot said armed members of the banned group were behind the abduction of a district judge and shooting near a hospital. These are police allegations that we have not been able to verify.

    Why it matters

    Three questions sit beneath the headlines.

    Representation. The refugee-seat dispute asks who should speak for AJK’s residents. It also touches on how Islamabad governs a territory it describes as separate from Pakistan constitutionally.

    Dissent and security law. Pakistan’s government frequently criticises how India handles dissent in Indian-administered Kashmir. Using anti-terrorism law against a domestic protest movement is a problem for that argument, a point made in regional reporting this summer.

    Economic grievance. Underneath the political fight is the same complaint that started it: high prices in a territory that produces its own power. The 2024 package and the 2025 deal both suggest the government can concede on money. The fight over seats and privileges is harder to settle.

    What we don’t know

    There is no verified death toll. The full text of the charter and the status of each demand are disputed. The JKJAAC’s claims and the government’s counter-claims about violence cannot be independently checked while foreign reporters are barred. And no one has yet explained how a banned movement and a newly elected government will talk to each other.

    The Azadi Times invites responses from the JKJAAC, the AJK government and refugee-community representatives. We will update this piece as verified information arrives.

    University of Baltistan and Agriculture Department Successfully Cultivate Oyster Mushrooms in Skardu

    A joint research initiative in Skardu has successfully grown oyster mushrooms using local agricultural waste, opening new avenues for sustainable agribusiness and food diversity in the region.

    SKARDU — In a significant milestone for agricultural research in the region, the University of Baltistan (UoB) has successfully cultivated oyster mushrooms (*Pleurotus ostreatus*) under the local climatic conditions of Skardu for the first time.

    The breakthrough was achieved through a collaborative effort between the university’s Department of Botany and the Agriculture Department of the Baltistan Region.

    The successful experiment formed the core of a BS-level research thesis by Shehnaz Fatima, a botany student at the university, working under the supervision of Assistant Professor Dr. Muhammad Akbar Zaigham.

    According to the research team, the project focused on exploring the feasibility of cultivating oyster mushrooms using locally available agricultural residues, such as maize and wheat straw, as growing substrates. The preparation of the growing medium and the production of mushroom spawn were conducted entirely at the local level through controlled scientific trials.

    Officials and academic leaders noted that oyster mushrooms offer notable nutritional benefits, containing protein, dietary fiber, vitamins, minerals, and antioxidants. Beyond nutrition, local researchers hope that the initiative will support sustainable agricultural waste utilization and create new income generation avenues for small-scale entrepreneurs, local farmers, and the hospitality sector.

    A harvesting ceremony was organized at the university to mark the milestone and recognize the research contributions of Ms. Fatima, while highlighting the importance of cooperation between academic institutions and public departments.

    Project leaders extended appreciation to various contributors, including PhD scholar Zeeshan Hussain for technical assistance, Deputy Director of Agriculture Mr. Raza, Agriculture Officer Hassan Shafqat, and Department of Botany head Dr. Ishtiaq Hussain, alongside family members and support staff who assisted during the trials.

    Researchers involved in the project expressed optimism that the initiative will encourage local farmers, students, and businesses to explore mushroom cultivation as a viable source of sustainable livelihood and economic development in Gilgit-Baltistan.

    Is Pakistan-Administered Kashmir Safe for Tourists? What Advisories, Protests and the LoC Mean Right Now

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    Late on Wednesday night, police in Rawalakot said they had rescued a serving district judge who, they said, had been abducted at gunpoint while travelling towards Muzaffarabad. Police linked the abduction and separate shooting incidents, which left a police officer and a civilian injured and damaged parts of a hospital, to armed members of the banned Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC). These are police allegations, and The Azadi Times could not independently verify them. The JAAC has consistently rejected government accounts of its conduct.

    The episode is a snapshot of a region that many travellers still picture as Pakistan’s gentler alternative to the north: river valleys, pine forests, cool summers. For anyone weighing a trip, the honest answer to “is it safe?” in late 2026 is that it depends heavily on where you go, when, and who is advising you. This article sets out what governments say, what has happened on the ground this year, and what remains unknown.

    What foreign governments advise

    Two sets of advice matter most for travellers: the British Foreign Office (FCDO) and the US State Department.

    The FCDO advises against all travel to within 10 miles of the Line of Control (LoC), the de facto frontier between Indian- and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. It also added a broader warning this summer: according to a tracker of changes to the FCDO page, on 6 June 2026 it began advising against all but essential travel to Azad Jammu and Kashmir. That is the second-highest warning level, and the FCDO notes that travel insurance could be invalidated if you travel against its advice.

    A travel-industry roundup of the US position says Washington kept Pakistan at Level 3, “Reconsider Travel,” in a June 2026 update, and urged Americans to avoid the vicinity of the Line of Control entirely. We relied on a secondary source for the US detail, so readers should check the State Department’s own page. Advisories change quickly, and we recommend reading the live versions before booking anything.

    One practical consequence matters for Kashmir specifically. Except at official crossing points, foreign nationals are not allowed within certain distances of Pakistan’s international borders, including 10 miles of the LoC. Valleys such as Neelum and Leepa lie close to that line, so large parts of the most scenic terrain are simply off-limits to foreigners regardless of personal risk appetite.

    What has happened on the ground in 2026

    The main reason for the upgraded warnings is not tourism-related at all. It is a political confrontation that has hardened over the past year.

    The JAAC is a civil-society alliance founded in 2023 that has pushed a long list of demands. Its platform centres on removing perks and privileges for the political and bureaucratic elite and abolishing 12 seats in the legislative assembly reserved for refugees from Indian-administered Kashmir who live in Pakistan. The group previously staged a major shutdown in late September 2025, which ended after a peace agreement on 4 October 2025.

    This year the dispute broke down. Talks collapsed in late May, and on 5 June authorities designated the JAAC a proscribed organisation under the AJK Anti-Terrorism Act, 2014. The AJK government said it acted over reports of potential violence, acquisition of weapons, attacks on law-enforcement personnel and plans to disrupt normal life. The JAAC denies those allegations. Amnesty International described the terrorism designation of a protest movement as a dangerous escalation in the crackdown.

    The unrest turned deadly quickly. Clashes in Rawalakot on 7 June between the group’s supporters and security personnel left seven dead, and a strike on 9 June brought cities and towns across Azad Kashmir to a standstill. By 19 June, reporting put the toll at more than 20 dead. By August, Al Jazeera, citing residents and rights groups, said violence during the protests had killed more than 50 people. We have not seen a single authoritative official figure, and the number varies by source.

    Elections added another layer. Polling was held in phases between 27 July and 10 August 2026, and the JAAC called for a boycott. Dawn’s editorial pages questioned the process, saying the legitimacy of elections held amid a popular uprising had been questioned even by mainstream parties like the PPP. Federal Information Minister Attaullah Tarar took the opposite view, saying militant elements within the banned JAAC pursued a “foreign agenda” and tried to disrupt voting through violence. The JAAC rejects that characterisation.

    A reporting blackout

    There is a second reason caution is warranted, and it applies to us as a news outlet. Authorities have banned international media from reporting from the region, and Dawn reported that the restriction followed an Al Jazeera report showing violence and low turnout. That makes independent verification harder for everyone, including travellers trying to judge conditions from the news. When information is restricted, the absence of reports from an area is not evidence that it is calm.

    The Line of Control risk

    Separately from internal politics, the LoC itself remains a hazard. The 2021 India–Pakistan ceasefire understanding has held unevenly. Pakistani media reported Indian fire in Leepa Valley and a Pakistani response on 1 August 2026. Indian outlets have reported Pakistani fire in the same sector in late October 2025. Each side blames the other, and we cannot adjudicate those claims. What is clear is that places close to the line can become inaccessible without notice. In earlier tensions, local residents reported that non-locals were barred from areas near the LoC for several days.

    Is anywhere “safer”?

    The answer is relative, not absolute. Reporting this summer described the JKJAAC protests as centred on Rawalakot and nearby Poonch areas, while the rest of AJK was described as tense but calm. That was in the early weeks of the unrest, and conditions have shifted since. Protests also reached other places, including weeks-long road blockades in Neelum Valley in June. Strikes can close shops, halt transport and disrupt communications with little warning.

    We could not find reliable, independent data on current tourist numbers or on conditions at specific hotels and sites. Anyone who tells you a particular valley is “completely safe” right now is likely drawing on older information or offering a sales pitch.

    If you still plan to go

    For readers who decide to travel despite the advisories, practical caution is straightforward:

    • Check live advisories from your own government immediately before booking and again before departure.
    • Confirm access rules with the local administration. Permits for restricted areas change, and some areas will be closed to foreigners regardless.
    • Check insurance fine print. Cover may be void if you travel against official advice.
    • Avoid areas near the LoC and anywhere strikes or protests are announced.
    • Build slack into your plans. Shutter-down strikes can halt transport for days.
    • Use official and local-language sources, but be aware that government and protest-movement accounts diverge sharply. Local police have themselves warned of disinformation and AI-generated content, so cross-check claims.
    • Leave if told to. If officials or your embassy advise departure, do not wait.

    What we don’t know

    This article reflects information available on 29 October 2026. Several questions remain open: how many people have died in total, whether the JAAC and the government will return to talks, how stable the new post-election government will be, and when restrictions on international media will lift. We will update this piece as verified information arrives.

    For now, the plain conclusion is this. Pakistan-administered Kashmir has not stopped being beautiful. But in 2026 it is also a place with an active political crisis, a militarised frontier and limited independent reporting. Travellers owe themselves a more careful look than a scenic photograph can provide.

    Readers with first-hand, verifiable information about current conditions in AJK are invited to contact The Azadi Times.

    Rawalakot Police Claim Recovery of Judge After Alleged Abduction Linked to Rights Movement

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    Authorities in Rawalakot claim an additional district and sessions judge was rescued following an alleged abduction attributed to activists of the Joint Awami Action Committee, amid ongoing public protests in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

    RAWALAKOT — Police in Rawalakot have claimed to have recovered an additional district and sessions judge following an alleged abduction incident linked to activists of the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC).

    According to local police statements, Additional District and Sessions Judge Mohammad Akram was traveling from Rawalakot to Muzaffarabad via Pallandri when he, along with his driver and security guard, was allegedly intercepted and taken by armed individuals.

    Authorities stated that the recovery operation took place during the intervening night between Wednesday and Thursday. Police further alleged that during the ensuing operation near a hospital, firing occurred, resulting in injuries to two individuals, including a police officer.

    The incident comes against the backdrop of sustained public demonstrations across Pakistan-administered Kashmir. The Joint Awami Action Committee, which has led months-long sit-ins and protests involving local residents, workers, and families demanding civic and economic rights, has faced increasing friction with authorities.

    While administration officials have sought to link protest participants to the abduction, representatives of popular movements and local observers maintain that official accounts often mischaracterize grassroots demonstrations. Protesters have maintained continuous sit-ins across various towns for over four months, demanding administrative reforms, utility subsidies, and public rights.

    Independent verification of the circumstances surrounding the alleged abduction and the subsequent police operation remains limited, as local tensions persist surrounding the handling of public dissent in the region.