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Pakistan’s Antibiotic Resistance Plan Faces an Implementation Test

A new WHO survey finds that only 42 of 183 countries report funded and implemented antimicrobial-resistance plans. Pakistan has a national strategy, but surveillance and implementation gaps remain.

Lahore’s Smog Crisis: What the Test Move Reveals About Pakistan’s Air

The PCB’s decision to move Pakistan’s second Test against Sri Lanka out of Lahore has drawn attention to a wider public-health problem. Recent monitoring points to local emissions, crop-residue fires, weather and regional pollution transport—not one simple cause.

AJK’s Mountain Roads: Why Safer Design Matters After Fatal Crashes

Recent fatal crashes in Neelum Valley and Muzaffarabad underline the need for safer mountain-road design, reliable crash data and stronger post-crash care in AJK.
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Pakistan’s Antibiotic Resistance Plan Faces an Implementation Test

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Only 42 of 183 countries surveyed said their national plans to tackle antimicrobial resistance (AMR) were both financed and implemented, despite 173 countries reporting that they had a plan, according to findings from the World Health Organization’s 2026 global survey reported by Reuters on 16 November. The figures underline a central challenge for Pakistan: turning its own national strategy into sustained surveillance, infection prevention and responsible use of medicines across hospitals, farms and the environment.

The warning comes ahead of World AMR Awareness Week, which runs from 18 to 24 November under the theme “One Health, one action: Prevent AMR now”. Pakistan has a second National Action Plan for Antimicrobial Resistance covering 2024–2028. Its own assessment records progress in laboratory surveillance, but also identifies weaknesses, including the failure of environmental AMR surveillance to advance as envisaged under the previous plan.

Why the latest WHO warning matters

Antimicrobial resistance occurs when bacteria, viruses, fungi or parasites no longer respond to medicines designed to treat them. Antibiotic resistance is one part of the wider problem. When common treatments stop working, infections can become harder to cure and routine procedures such as surgery, cancer treatment and intensive care carry greater risks.

Reuters reported on 16 November that the WHO’s 2026 survey found 173 of 183 countries had national AMR action plans, compared with 79 in 2017. Only 42 countries, however, said their plans were financed and implemented. The survey also found that 69 countries, or 38 per cent, had implemented infection-prevention programmes nationwide. Although 113 countries monitored antibiotic use and 109 tracked resistance, only 21 reported integrating both sets of data.

The distinction between having a plan and carrying it out is important. A strategy can set targets and assign responsibilities, but it cannot reduce infections without trained staff, functioning laboratories, reliable medicines, enforcement, public-health infrastructure and predictable funding.

The WHO’s July 2026 fact sheet says about one in six laboratory-confirmed bacterial infections worldwide was resistant to antibiotics in 2023. In the WHO South-East Asia and Eastern Mediterranean regions, the estimated proportion was about one in three reported infections. Those are regional figures, not a Pakistan-specific rate.

The same WHO fact sheet says bacterial AMR was associated with more than 4.7 million deaths worldwide in 2021, including an estimated 1.14 million deaths directly attributable to resistance. The figures distinguish deaths in which resistance was a contributing factor from those that would not have occurred in the absence of resistance.

What Pakistan’s own data show

Pakistan’s National Action Plan 2.0 cites Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation estimates that, in 2019, 59,200 deaths in the country were directly attributable to AMR and a further 221,300 were associated with it. These are modelled estimates for 2019, not a count of deaths recorded in hospitals in 2026.

Laboratory surveillance offers another view of the problem. The National Institute of Health’s National AMR Surveillance Report for 2021–2022 says 26 laboratories and surveillance sites submitted data for 2022. The report analysed 229,617 non-duplicate bacterial isolates. Among the reported Escherichia coli isolates, resistance was recorded at 77 per cent for cefotaxime and 75 per cent for ceftriaxone. Among reported Salmonella Typhi isolates, 38 per cent were classified as extensively drug-resistant, while more than 72 per cent were resistant to ceftriaxone.

These figures need careful interpretation. They describe bacteria isolated and tested by participating laboratories, not the percentage of all infections or patients across Pakistan. The report covers 2021 and 2022, so it should be treated as an important historical surveillance baseline rather than a current national estimate. More recent, regularly published and geographically representative data are needed to show whether resistance is rising or falling.

Pakistan has a plan, but surveillance remains uneven

Pakistan’s National Action Plan for Antimicrobial Resistance 2.0, covering 2024–2028, adopts a “One Health” approach. This recognises that resistance can emerge and spread across human health, animal health, food production, agriculture and the environment.

The plan says the Pakistan AMR Surveillance System, launched in 2018, is enrolled in the WHO’s Global Antimicrobial Resistance and Use Surveillance System, with 33 participating laboratories. It also describes pilot surveillance in healthy food animals, including poultry and large ruminants, and outlines strategies for monitoring resistance in diseased animals, aquaculture and the environment.

But the plan also records gaps. It says environmental AMR surveillance under the previous national plan did not progress as envisaged. Its assessment notes that there was no regular surveillance system in the environment sector and that infection-prevention work in health-care settings and communities needed more comprehensive implementation. In human health, the plan identifies weaknesses in standard treatment guidance, national antibiogram development and electronic systems for recording prescriptions and medicine sales.

These are not minor technical details. Without reliable local laboratory results, clinicians may have limited evidence about which antibiotics are likely to work in a particular setting. Without records of how medicines are used, public-health authorities cannot easily identify whether changes in prescribing are linked to changes in resistance.

Why livestock and food systems are part of the problem

Antibiotics and other antimicrobials are used in veterinary care and food production as well as in human medicine. Inappropriate or excessive use can select for resistant organisms in animals. Those organisms or resistance genes can then spread through direct contact, food handling, water and the wider environment.

A peer-reviewed study published in Veterinary Sciences in March 2025 examined Pakistan’s livestock and poultry antimicrobial supply chain. It described a fragmented system, a weak regulatory framework and the absence of systematic monitoring of antimicrobial use in the livestock sector. The study drew on a national stakeholder workshop held in March 2020, so it is best read as an assessment of structural gaps rather than a fresh 2025 census of farm practices. Its findings should be read alongside the national plan, which reports that pilot resistance surveillance in some food animals is under way: monitoring drug use and testing for resistant bacteria are related, but they are not the same activity.

Pakistan’s earlier agriculture and food-sector assessment, published in 2024, also found that implementation of the first national plan had been uneven. It assessed 59 per cent of anticipated activities as covered, while only 12 per cent of evaluated activities were fully executed and documented. The assessment was conducted in 2022 and concerned the 2017–2022 plan; it should not be treated as a score for the current 2024–2028 strategy. It does, however, show why implementation needs to be measured rather than assumed.

What needs to change

First, the national plan needs transparent and sustained financing. Governments should publish which activities have received funds, which laboratories are operational, where surveillance is taking place and whether agreed targets are being met. Federal and provincial authorities also need clear responsibilities and regular public reporting.

Second, surveillance should connect laboratory resistance results with data on antibiotic use. The WHO’s latest global survey shows how few countries currently integrate these datasets. Pakistan’s national and provincial systems need consistent reporting standards, quality-assured testing and wider access to diagnostic services, including outside major urban hospitals.

Third, infection prevention can reduce the need for antibiotics in the first place. Safe water, sanitation, hand hygiene, vaccination, clean health-care facilities, food safety and effective infection-control practices in farms all help prevent infections. Better access to appropriate diagnostics also reduces the risk of treating illnesses with medicines that will not work against them.

Regulation matters too. Prescription rules need to be enforced, veterinary use monitored, and the use of medically important antimicrobials as routine growth promoters controlled in line with international standards. Environmental monitoring and the safe treatment of hospital, pharmaceutical and agricultural waste must become part of the national response.

What people can do — and what antibiotics cannot do

Individuals cannot solve antimicrobial resistance alone, but everyday decisions matter. Antibiotics treat certain bacterial infections; they do not treat viral illnesses such as colds and influenza. People should not start antibiotics without advice from a qualified health professional, use medicines prescribed for someone else or keep leftover antibiotics for a future illness. Anyone prescribed an antibiotic should follow the prescriber’s instructions and seek professional advice if they have concerns or experience side effects.

Vaccination, handwashing, safe food preparation and clean water reduce the risk of infections and therefore the need for antimicrobial treatment. Farmers and animal owners should seek veterinary advice rather than using antibiotics routinely or relying on informal recommendations.

Why better local data matter for Kashmir

For Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), the national picture is a starting point, not a substitute for local evidence. The NIH’s 2021–2022 report lists Abbas Institute of Medical Sciences in Muzaffarabad as a public-sector sentinel site in both 2021 and 2022. It also lists Provincial Headquarters Hospital in Gilgit as a sentinel site in 2022. However, the report presents its resistance findings at national level rather than publishing separate AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan resistance profiles.

Hospitals and laboratories in AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan need dependable access to culture testing, referral networks and up-to-date local antibiograms. Smaller facilities in mountainous districts may face practical barriers to transporting samples and receiving timely results. These are reasons to strengthen regional diagnostic links, not grounds for assuming that resistance rates in one part of Pakistan apply to every valley or district.

The Azadi Times has also examined the wider relationship between environmental conditions and public health in its recent report on Lahore’s smog crisis. AMR adds another dimension: the health of people, animals, food systems and the environment is interconnected.

A test of implementation, not another announcement

World AMR Awareness Week begins on 18 November, but awareness campaigns alone cannot preserve the effectiveness of life-saving medicines. The WHO’s updated Global Action Plan for 2026–2036 calls for coordinated action across human, animal, plant and environmental health. Pakistan has already set out a national framework for that work.

The next measure of progress should be visible in funded programmes, better access to diagnostics, stronger infection prevention, responsible prescribing and public data that show what is changing. For Pakistan — including AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan — the challenge is no longer simply to recognise antimicrobial resistance. It is to build a system capable of detecting it early, limiting its spread and ensuring that effective treatment remains available when people need it.

Sources and further reading

Lahore’s Smog Crisis: What the Test Move Reveals About Pakistan’s Air

The Pakistan Cricket Board’s decision on 10 November to move the second Test between Pakistan and Sri Lanka from Lahore to Rawalpindi has brought the country’s winter smog problem into sharp focus. The match will still be played from 17 to 21 November, but at Rawalpindi Cricket Stadium rather than Lahore’s Gaddafi Stadium, the PCB said in its official announcement.

The venue change is a visible consequence of deteriorating air quality. Yet the latest monitoring and research point to a more complicated picture than a single culprit: transport and industrial emissions, agricultural burning, weather conditions and pollution moving across borders can all contribute. The evidence also shows why short-term rankings and competing claims about the source of smog should be treated carefully.

What the latest measurements show

The Pakistan Air Quality Initiative (PAQI), an independent research organisation, reported a Lahore city daily mean of 143 micrograms of PM2.5 per cubic metre on 14 November, based on readings from 53 monitors. That was the third-highest city average on the organisation’s dashboard that day, after Bahawalpur and Multan. The figure is a daily average of fine-particle concentrations, not an Air Quality Index score.

The World Health Organisation’s 2021 guideline recommends that the 24-hour average concentration of PM2.5 should not exceed 15 micrograms per cubic metre, at the specified 99th percentile. Lahore’s 14 November daily mean was therefore about 9.5 times that health-based guideline level. The guideline is not a Pakistani legal limit, but it provides a benchmark based on evidence about health risks. PAQI’s monitoring dashboard publishes city readings and explains that its data combine ground monitors, satellite observations and official statistics.

A separate PAQI assessment covering 1 October to 9 November found that Lahore’s average PM2.5 concentration was 126 micrograms per cubic metre. It said the concentration exceeded Pakistan’s 24-hour National Environmental Quality Standards on all 40 days for which valid data were available. The average was 11 per cent lower than in the corresponding period in 2025, but remained far above the WHO guideline. The findings were reported by Dawn in its account of the PAQI analysis.

The same assessment recorded 18,825 satellite fire detections across Punjab between 1 October and 9 November. PAQI classified 16,714 as likely crop-residue fires, or about 89 per cent of the total. These are satellite detections and classifications, not a count of independently inspected fires. The report found that Lahore’s average PM2.5 was higher on days when air trajectories passed over fire-affected areas, but cautioned that this association did not establish the precise contribution of crop burning. Stagnant weather and reduced atmospheric dispersion also played a part.

Local emissions and weather remain central

A Punjab Environment Protection Agency review of 1 to 10 November, reported by Dawn on 13 November, recorded Lahore’s daily AQI falling from 422 on 2 November to 272 on 7 November before rising to 364 on 9 November. The agency attributed the renewed deterioration primarily to easterly winds carrying polluted air from Indian Punjab. It said its Wagah monitoring station registered the initial increase, with other Lahore stations reaching peaks about six hours later.

The EPA review also identified unfavourable weather conditions: average wind speed was 40 per cent lower and atmospheric ventilation capacity 44 per cent lower than in the comparison period a year earlier. Lahore received no rainfall during the first ten days of November, limiting the dispersal of pollutants. Such conditions can allow emissions to accumulate close to the ground rather than disperse.

Crucially, the EPA’s own emissions inventory identified major local sources. It attributed 83 per cent of Lahore’s emissions to transport, nine per cent to industry and eight per cent to other sources. Those inventory shares should not be confused with a direct measurement of the proportion of PM2.5 in the air on a particular day. They do, however, underline why the city’s pollution cannot be explained by events across the border alone.

What the Diwali debate can—and cannot—prove

Two recent assessments have offered different interpretations of the deterioration around Diwali. The Punjab EPA said easterly winds carried polluted air from Indian Punjab towards Lahore after the festival. PAQI, examining satellite fire detections and air-mass trajectories for the period from the evening of 8 November to midnight on 10 November, said the available evidence did not support attributing Lahore’s post-Diwali pollution to fireworks across the border.

PAQI noted that pollution increases were not greatest in the cities closest to the border, as might be expected if transported fireworks emissions were the main explanation. It also said chemical analysis of particles would be needed to distinguish fireworks emissions from smoke produced by agricultural fires. The two assessments used different methods and examined overlapping but not identical evidence. Their findings should therefore be reported with attribution, rather than presented as a settled scientific verdict on every source of pollution.

The defensible conclusion is that air moves across political boundaries, while much of the pollution burden is also generated within the region. Transport, industry, crop-residue burning and weather all require attention. Blaming only one source risks allowing the others to escape scrutiny.

Why the crisis matters beyond sport

PM2.5 refers to fine particles no more than 2.5 micrometres in diameter. They can travel deep into the lungs and enter the bloodstream, contributing to cardiovascular and respiratory disease. The WHO estimates that ambient outdoor air pollution caused 4.2 million premature deaths worldwide in 2019, with 89 per cent of those deaths occurring in low- and middle-income countries. Children, older people and those with existing health conditions are particularly vulnerable.

The relocation of an international cricket match makes the consequences difficult to ignore, but the daily exposure of residents is the more important concern. Schoolchildren, outdoor workers, street vendors, traffic police and people travelling through polluted urban corridors cannot simply move their routines to another city when air quality deteriorates.

What an effective response requires

Pakistan’s response needs to move beyond emergency measures and headline AQI rankings. Authorities should publish reliable, comparable monitoring data, including the location and type of each monitor, the pollutant measured, averaging period and quality-control method. That would allow the public and researchers to distinguish short-lived spikes from sustained exposure and to compare official claims with independent observations.

Source reduction must be sustained. The EPA’s own inventory points to transport as a major source in Lahore, making vehicle inspection, cleaner public transport and enforcement against high-emitting vehicles important priorities. Industrial units and brick kilns need consistent emissions monitoring and compliance. Farmers also need practical, affordable alternatives to burning crop residue, rather than enforcement alone. WHO guidance similarly identifies cleaner transport, energy, industry, urban planning and waste management as key areas for reducing outdoor air pollution.

Regional cooperation is also necessary. Air pollution does not stop at the Pakistan-India border, and credible cooperation depends on shared monitoring methods, timely data and transparent scientific assessment. Cross-border transport should be investigated where evidence supports it, without allowing it to distract from pollution sources that authorities can address at home.

Why Kashmir needs its own air-quality data

Lahore’s readings should not be treated as a measure of air quality in Muzaffarabad, Mirpur, Neelum Valley or Gilgit-Baltistan. Mountain towns and valleys have different topography, weather patterns, traffic and household energy use. Their exposure needs to be measured locally. PAQI says most of Pakistan’s population lives without routine air-quality measurement, a gap that makes it harder for communities and decision-makers to understand where pollution is occurring.

For Kashmir, the lesson is not that every valley faces Lahore’s smog levels. It is that clean-air policy requires public monitoring rather than assumptions based on landscape or visibility. Regular measurements in towns, schools, transport corridors and valley settlements would give residents a clearer picture of local conditions and help governments target the sources that matter. The region’s wider environmental pressures, including glacier loss and water security, are examined in The Azadi Times’ recent report on Himalayan glaciers.

Sources and further reading

COP31 Climate Finance Talks Put Pakistan’s $348bn Investment Need in Focus

Illustrative view of delegates at an international climate finance conference
Illustrative image: international climate finance negotiations.

Climate finance is emerging as a central test of the United Nations climate talks in Antalya, where governments are meeting for COP31 from 9 to 20 November. For Pakistan, the stakes are substantial: its National Adaptation Plan estimates that about US$348 billion in investment will be needed to address climate and development challenges between 2023 and 2030, including US$152 billion for adaptation and resilience.

The estimate is national, not a funding requirement calculated specifically for Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) or Gilgit-Baltistan. But Pakistan’s adaptation plan names AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan departments among the bodies expected to take part in work on water management, agriculture, watershed protection, health, education and disaster preparedness. Whether global climate finance reaches these local priorities is one of the practical questions behind the negotiations.

COP31 is scheduled to continue until 20 November. Its adopted agenda includes adaptation, long-term climate finance, the Green Climate Fund, the Global Environment Facility and the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage. As of 15 November, the conference is still under way; its final decisions should not be assumed in advance.

A global climate finance target faces a delivery test

Under the climate finance arrangements agreed at COP29, developed countries are to take the lead in providing US$300 billion a year to developing countries by 2035. Countries also agreed to work towards scaling finance from all public and private sources to at least US$1.3 trillion annually by the same year, according to remarks delivered by UN Climate Change Executive Secretary Simon Stiell at a ministerial dialogue in Antalya on 13 November.

Stiell told ministers that reaching a headline target would not, by itself, meet countries’ needs. He highlighted the debt pressures facing developing economies, the complexity of applications to fragmented funds and the importance of finance that is affordable and aligned with national priorities. Grants and highly concessional finance, he said, remain particularly important for vulnerable economies.

The COP30 Presidency presented a report on 8 November setting out pathways that it estimates could mobilise between US$1.27 trillion and US$1.41 trillion a year by 2035. The report examines public finance, private investment and other sources, but the presidency describes it as a voluntary, non-prescriptive contribution — not a negotiated agreement. Its business-as-usual scenario estimates that international climate finance would reach only about US$458 billion to US$461 billion annually by 2035 without further measures.

Reuters reported on 13 November that vulnerable countries were warning that finance was arriving too slowly, while the Turkish host and Australia, which is leading the negotiations, were emphasising implementation of existing commitments rather than a new headline target. Reuters also reported that developed countries met their earlier US$100 billion annual finance goal two years after its 2020 deadline.

What Pakistan’s climate plan says it needs

Pakistan’s National Adaptation Plan, published in 2023, draws on the World Bank’s Country Climate and Development Report. It estimates total investment needs of about US$348 billion between 2023 and 2030 for a comprehensive response to climate and development challenges. Of that amount, US$152 billion is for adaptation and resilience, while US$196 billion is for deep decarbonisation.

These figures are estimates of investment needs, not money already pledged, received or allocated in government budgets. The plan also warns that the estimate may be too low because information is limited for areas such as sustainable agri-food systems, integrated water management, climate-resilient cities and social protection that can respond to shocks.

A United Nations analysis of Pakistan’s climate financing, published in March 2025, points to barriers beyond the size of the funding requirement. It identifies limited access to international climate finance, low domestic private-sector contributions, institutional capacity constraints, slow disbursement and reliance on debt-based finance. Those obstacles matter because an announced fund does not protect a community unless a suitable project can qualify, money is released and the work is completed.

The wider Hindu Kush Himalaya challenge

The funding question extends beyond Pakistan. A climate finance synthesis report published by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) in November 2025 estimated that the eight countries of the Hindu Kush Himalaya would need about US$12.065 trillion for climate mitigation and adaptation over 2020–2050. The report says China and India account for more than 92 per cent of the projected requirement.

That is a regional estimate, not a bill for Pakistan, AJK or Gilgit-Baltistan. It should not be presented as the amount needed by any one territory. Its significance is that climate investment needs across the mountain region are large, unevenly distributed and difficult to meet where governments face limited fiscal space and communities are exposed to multiple risks.

For mountain districts, adaptation can involve practical measures: monitoring rivers and unstable slopes, maintaining early-warning systems, protecting watersheds, improving irrigation and drinking-water supplies, and designing roads, bridges and public buildings to withstand local hazards. The Azadi Times recently examined the implications of accelerating glacier loss for water security and glacial-lake risks in Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.

AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan appear in Pakistan’s adaptation framework

Pakistan’s National Adaptation Plan includes provincial, AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan departments in its proposed implementation arrangements. Its action tables refer to improved monitoring of drought and flood cycles, water and watershed management, ecosystem restoration, climate-sensitive health planning, school preparedness and emergency response.

This gives local departments a place in the national policy framework. It does not, on its own, show that the proposed work has been funded, that money has reached local administrations or that projects have been completed. Public reporting on budgets, approvals, disbursements and results would be needed to assess implementation in AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan.

What effective climate finance should deliver

For mountain communities, the value of climate finance should be judged by what changes on the ground, not only by the size of international announcements. Several priorities follow from Pakistan’s adaptation plan and the risks identified by regional research:

  • Reliable warnings and local risk information: strengthen weather, river and slope monitoring; map exposed settlements and infrastructure; and ensure alerts reach remote communities in languages residents understand.
  • Water and watershed protection: support catchment restoration, safer water supplies, efficient irrigation and locally appropriate measures to manage changing rainfall and river flows.
  • Resilient public infrastructure: assess roads, bridges, schools, health facilities and water systems for local climate risks before damage occurs, rather than relying mainly on post-disaster reconstruction.
  • Preparedness and essential services: fund evacuation planning, emergency drills, climate-resilient health and sanitation services, and protection for households whose livelihoods are exposed to climate shocks.
  • Accessible funding for local institutions: simplify application procedures, strengthen project-planning capacity and involve local governments and affected communities in setting priorities.

The terms of finance matter as much as its volume. Loans may be suitable for some revenue-generating infrastructure, but they can add pressure to already constrained public finances. Grants and low-cost, long-term finance are important for public protections — such as early-warning systems, watershed restoration and emergency preparedness — that may save lives without producing a direct commercial return.

How to judge the outcome of COP31

As negotiations continue, the central test is whether existing commitments become predictable and accessible funding. Governments and institutions should be judged on the amounts actually provided, the balance between grants and loans, how quickly funds are disbursed, which countries and communities receive them, and whether projects reduce measurable risks.

For AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan, that means asking specific questions: Are local risk assessments being updated? Are early-warning systems reaching vulnerable settlements? Are water, health and transport projects designed around local climate hazards? Can local departments access funding without procedures that exceed their technical capacity? Are budgets and results published in a way residents can scrutinise?

COP31 may not resolve every financing dispute. But the conference’s focus on implementation offers an opportunity to move beyond distant targets and examine whether climate finance can reach the institutions and communities expected to turn plans into protection. For the mountain regions of Pakistan, the measure of success will be safer livelihoods, more reliable services and better preparation before the next emergency — not simply another pledge on paper.

Editorial note: This explainer distinguishes national and regional investment estimates from funds actually committed or disbursed. It does not attribute the full Hindu Kush Himalaya financing estimate to Pakistan or to any part of Kashmir.

AJK’s Mountain Roads: Why Safer Design Matters After Fatal Crashes

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A mountain road winding through the green hills of Neelum Valley, Azad Jammu and Kashmir
Neelum Valley Road, AJK. Photograph: Iamabdullahawan / Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0).

Two fatal crashes in quick succession in late October have renewed attention on road safety in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK): four children died in a van crash in Neelum Valley, and seven people were killed when a passenger jeep plunged down a steep slope near Muzaffarabad. The incidents, reported by police and local officials, underline the risks faced by people travelling on mountain roads — and the need to look beyond driver behaviour to the safety of roads, vehicles and emergency services.

The World Day of Remembrance for Road Traffic Victims is observed on the third Sunday of November. Its purpose is not only to remember people killed or injured in crashes, but also to support affected families and press for action that prevents further deaths. In AJK, that means better information about crash locations, safer treatment of bends and slopes, and a more dependable response when a vehicle leaves the road.

Recent crashes show the human cost

In Neelum Valley, a van travelling from Nagdar plunged into a ravine near the Karen Bypass Link Road. The crash occurred near Ghoray Nakkah Curve, a sharp blind turn, and four children from the same family died, according to a report by The Express Tribune citing Neelum Valley police.

In a separate incident the following day, seven occupants of a passenger jeep died after it went out of control on a landslide-affected stretch near Sathra Podemar, north-east of Muzaffarabad. The vehicle fell down a steep slope, according to The Express Tribune’s report, which cited police and local administration officials.

These reports describe two individual incidents. They do not, by themselves, establish the cause of either crash or prove that one factor explains accidents across the region. But they show why blind curves, unstable slopes, road-surface conditions and the protection available when a vehicle leaves the carriageway deserve systematic attention.

What the published figures show — and what they do not

The AJK Police website’s current frequently asked questions page cites 395 traffic accidents and 151 deaths in 2023. Its separate Traffic Accidents page lists annual sections from 2019 to 2023.

A report published by The News in April 2025, citing official statistics, gives a different breakdown: 409 road accidents in AJK in 2024, including 111 fatal crashes and 298 non-fatal crashes. For 2023, the report lists 391 accidents, of which 115 were classified as fatal. A fatal crash is not the same as a death count: one crash can kill more than one person. The 2023 totals also differ slightly between the two published sources, so they should not be combined as though they were one consistent series.

The distinction matters. A useful public dataset should separately record the number of crashes, the number of people killed, the number injured and the severity of injuries. It should also show the district, road segment, time, vehicle type and relevant conditions, such as rain, snow, fog or a landslide. Without those details, authorities and communities cannot reliably identify the locations where preventive work could have the greatest effect.

National figures also require careful interpretation. The World Health Organization’s 2023 Pakistan road-safety profile lists 5,816 reported road deaths in 2021 and a WHO estimate of 27,568 for the same year. These are different measures produced through different methods, and the national estimate is not an AJK-specific count. The gap is a reminder that reported figures and modelled estimates must be labelled clearly rather than treated as interchangeable.

Why mountain roads need a safe-system approach

The World Health Organization says about 1.16 million people die in road crashes each year worldwide. More than 90 per cent of road deaths occur in low- and middle-income countries, and more than half involve vulnerable road users, including pedestrians, cyclists and motorcyclists. The WHO’s safe-system approach starts from a practical principle: people make mistakes, so the transport system must be designed to reduce the chance that an error becomes a death or a life-changing injury.

In mountainous districts, that principle has specific implications. A driver may misjudge a bend or encounter loose material after a landslide, but the consequences are shaped by road design and the protection around it. On high-risk sections, engineering reviews should consider properly designed crash barriers, reflective curve markers, clear warning signs, visible road edges, adequate drainage and measures to stabilise slopes. Barriers must be selected and installed for the location and the vehicles using the road; a barrier that is poorly placed or unsuitable is not a substitute for a safety assessment.

Speed also matters. The WHO reports that every one per cent increase in average speed is associated with a four per cent increase in the risk of a fatal crash. Speed limits should therefore reflect the geometry and condition of each road, especially near blind turns, steep descents, settlements and schools. Enforcement can support safer behaviour, but it cannot compensate for a road that gives drivers too little time or space to recover from an error.

Vehicle safety is another part of the system. Regular checks of brakes, tyres, steering and lights are particularly important for public-service vehicles operating on long or steep routes. Passenger limits, seat-belt use and motorcycle helmets need consistent enforcement. The WHO’s Pakistan profile identifies weaknesses in several areas of road-user protection, including seat-belt legislation and helmet standards; those national findings should inform scrutiny, while AJK-specific compliance data should be published separately.

Five priorities for AJK

  • Map high-risk locations. Publish district-level crash data and identify recurring sites, including sharp bends, steep drop-offs, landslide-prone stretches and approaches to schools or busy settlements.
  • Audit and improve road design. Inspect high-risk sections for barriers, road markings, reflective signs, drainage, slope stability and safe passing space. Prioritise engineering fixes using crash history and road-user exposure.
  • Manage speed and vehicle condition. Set realistic limits for the road, check public-service vehicles and enforce rules on overloading, seat belts and helmets.
  • Prepare for seasonal hazards. Establish clear inspection and travel-advisory procedures for snow, frost, heavy rain, fog and landslides. Temporary closures and reopening decisions should be communicated promptly and consistently.
  • Strengthen post-crash care. Map ambulance coverage and referral routes, train local first responders and publish response-time information. In remote areas, delays in reaching professional care can make injuries more severe.

These priorities do not assume that every crash has the same cause. They are a framework for investigating risk before another family is left waiting for news from a ravine or a hospital. The authorities should also make crash investigations and road-safety audits available in a form that can be scrutinised by residents, engineers and elected representatives.

From remembrance to prevention

The World Day of Remembrance is promoted by the WHO and the United Nations Road Safety Collaboration under the theme “Remember. Support. Act.” Remembering victims must include support for families dealing with bereavement, disability, treatment costs and loss of income. It should also lead to measurable public action.

AJK already publishes some traffic-accident information, but the figures available to the public need to be timely, consistent and detailed enough to guide decisions. A yearly district-by-district record of crashes, deaths, injuries, vehicle types, locations and emergency response times would be a practical starting point. A public list of audited high-risk road sections, with progress on recommended repairs, would make prevention measurable.

For drivers, safe speeds, roadworthy vehicles, seat belts and helmets remain essential. For government, the responsibility is wider: design roads that anticipate human error, maintain them through changing seasons and ensure that help can reach people quickly after a crash. Road safety in AJK will improve when prevention is treated as a shared public responsibility, not simply a matter of blaming the person behind the wheel.

Readers can also consult The Azadi Times’ earlier report on Muzaffarabad’s digital driving-licence verification system and check current licence services through the AJK Police website.

Himalayan Glaciers Are Losing Ice Faster: What the Crisis Means for Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan

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Glaciers across the Hindu Kush Himalaya are losing ice at an accelerating rate, according to new regional assessments. For Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, the findings raise urgent questions about water security, glacial-lake hazards and whether mountain communities are being adequately prepared for a changing climate.

The Hindu Kush Himalaya stretches across eight countries and contains the largest concentration of ice outside the polar regions. Its glaciers, seasonal snow and frozen ground influence river systems that sustain mountain communities and major populations downstream. The Indus basin is among the river systems connected to this high-mountain environment.

Glacier loss has accelerated

Two reports released by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) in March 2026 found that glacier ice-loss rates across the Hindu Kush Himalaya have doubled since 2000. ICIMOD’s regional assessment also reported a decline in glacier area and ice reserves over recent decades.

These are region-wide findings, not measurements of every glacier in Kashmir or Gilgit-Baltistan. Glacier behaviour varies according to elevation, local weather, slope orientation and other conditions. But the overall trend matters because changes in ice and snow affect the timing and reliability of water flows across the region.

The monitoring gap

A major challenge is the limited number of glaciers monitored consistently on the ground. In its regional cryosphere strategy published in August 2026, ICIMOD highlighted significant gaps in long-term monitoring across the Hindu Kush Himalaya. The organisation called for more coordinated observations of glaciers, snow and permafrost, alongside stronger technical capacity and shared data systems.

High mountain areas, including parts of the Karakoram and Zanskar ranges, need sustained observations to help researchers understand local changes. Without reliable measurements, authorities have a weaker basis for assessing water risks, planning infrastructure and preparing communities for hazards.

Why glacial lakes need attention

As glaciers retreat, some meltwater collects in lakes near or below the ice. Where a lake is held back by an unstable natural dam, a sudden release can send water and debris down a valley. These events are known as glacial lake outburst floods, or GLOFs, and can damage roads, bridges, hydropower facilities, farmland and settlements.

Research published online by the Journal of Glaciology on 2 January 2026 examined GLOF susceptibility and potential downstream implications across the Kashmir Himalaya. Such studies help identify where detailed local assessments are needed. They do not mean that every glacial lake is at imminent risk of bursting: danger depends on the condition of the lake, its natural barriers, surrounding slopes and the communities and infrastructure downstream.

What preparedness should look like

For mountain communities, preparation requires more than scientific warnings. Authorities need updated inventories of glacial lakes, hazard maps, river and weather monitoring, practical evacuation routes and early-warning systems that reach remote settlements. Emergency information should be available in languages residents understand, and local administrations should conduct public drills before an emergency occurs.

Water planning is equally important. Changes in the timing and volume of snow and glacier melt can affect irrigation, drinking-water supplies and hydropower. Increased melt in the short term does not guarantee greater water availability in the long term: as glaciers shrink, their capacity to store and release water changes. The effects will differ between river basins and require careful local data.

A shared mountain challenge

Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan are often discussed through political and territorial questions. Yet the mountain environment, river systems and climate risks connect communities across borders. Better scientific monitoring, transparent public information and investment in early-warning infrastructure would benefit people throughout the wider region.

The latest research does not suggest that disaster is inevitable. It does show that the environment is changing while monitoring remains incomplete. The priority is to turn scientific evidence into safer infrastructure, more reliable water planning and warnings that reach people in time.

Sources

Editorial note: This explainer draws on published scientific research and institutional material. It does not claim that a particular glacial lake or settlement faces an imminent flood threat. Local risk assessments and official emergency information should guide decisions on the ground.

Residents Report Five-Day Shutdown and Rising Tensions in Panjeera, Kotli

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PANJEERA, Kotli district — Residents in Panjeera say the town has remained largely shut for five days amid continuing tension and public protests, with reports of intermittent gunfire and disruption to supplies of food and other essentials. The accounts, provided to The Azadi Times, could not be independently verified.

Residents said large numbers of people had gathered in the town and that a public protest was continuing. They also alleged that security personnel were largely confined to government buildings and that food and other basic supplies had been disrupted over the past 48 to 72 hours. The scale of the disruption and the reported security arrangements could not be independently confirmed.

The latest accounts come amid wider unrest in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir. On 10 November, Pakistan’s state broadcaster, Radio Pakistan, reported that five security personnel were injured in a firing incident in the Panjeera Bazaar area of Kotli. Citing a police spokesperson, it said the personnel had been clearing road obstructions when they came under fire, which authorities attributed to members of the Joint Awami Action Committee. That account has not been independently verified by The Azadi Times.

Other reporting has described shutdowns and protests in several parts of the region following deadly clashes in Rawalakot earlier in November. The circumstances of individual incidents and competing accounts of the violence remain contested.

Residents describe an unprecedented mobilisation

People familiar with the situation described the scale of public mobilisation in Panjeera over the past two days as unprecedented in the town’s recent history. Residents also reported that red flags had been raised in parts of the town.

A slogan circulating among supporters of the protest describes the mobilisation as a defining moment in Panjeera’s history. The wording reflects the sentiment of those sharing it, rather than an independently established assessment of the events.

Questions remain over supplies and security situation

The reported disruption to food and other essential supplies raises concerns for residents if the shutdown continues. The Azadi Times has not independently confirmed the duration or extent of shortages, and no verified information was available at the time of writing on any injuries, arrests or damage in Panjeera during the latest period described by residents.

No independently verified statement from the district administration or local police addressing the residents’ latest claims was available at the time of publication. The Azadi Times will update this report if further information is confirmed.

Editorial note: This report is based partly on accounts supplied by local residents. Claims about gunfire, the presence and position of security personnel, and shortages of essential supplies remain unverified. The Azadi Times distinguishes these accounts from information attributed to official sources.

Sardar Umar Nazir Kashmiri Calls for Replacing ‘Azad Kashmir’ with ‘Pakistani-Occupied Kashmir’

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JKJAAC leader urges Kashmiris to reject the term ‘Azad Kashmir’, signalling a sharper shift in political discourse amid escalating tensions in the region.

MUZAFFARABAD, November 10, 2026 — Sardar Umar Nazir Kashmiri, a prominent leader of the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JKJAAC), has called on people to stop using the term ‘Azad Kashmir’ and instead refer to the region as ‘Pakistani-Occupied Kashmir’, marking a significant development in the political rhetoric surrounding the ongoing rights movement.

In a statement circulated on social media on Tuesday, Kashmiri said that the expression ‘Azad Kashmir’ should no longer be used in written or spoken communication.

“From today onwards, Azad Kashmir should neither be written nor referred to by that name. Everywhere, it should be written and called Pakistani-Occupied Kashmir,” he said.

The statement was shared by the social media account JAAC Updates AJK and subsequently circulated by other accounts associated with Kashmir-related political discussions.

The remarks represent a notable departure from the terminology traditionally used by successive political and administrative institutions in the region, where the official designation has been Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

A Shift in Political Narrative

Kashmiri’s statement comes against the backdrop of growing political tensions between the population, the regional administration and Pakistan’s state institutions.

The Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee has been at the forefront of a prolonged public rights movement, with its demands encompassing economic relief, governance reforms, access to public services and greater political accountability.

The movement has also witnessed increasing debate over political representation, the region’s constitutional status and the relationship between the people of Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan’s federal institutions.

By rejecting the term ‘Azad Kashmir’, Kashmiri appears to be challenging the political language traditionally used to describe the territory’s administrative and constitutional arrangement.

The alternative terminology he has proposed reflects his political position that the existing description does not adequately represent the region’s political reality.

Previous Criticism of Pakistan’s Role

The latest statement follows Kashmiri’s recent public remarks questioning Pakistan’s traditional claim of acting as the international advocate and political representative of the Kashmiri people.

Addressing a gathering in Rawalakot on November 9, he argued that Kashmiris should develop the capacity to represent their own political interests rather than depend on external actors.

“There is no one who will be our advocate. We must become our own advocates. We have no big brother,” he said, according to remarks reported from his address.

His comments questioned the established political narrative surrounding Pakistan’s role in the Kashmir dispute and emphasised the need for an independent Kashmiri political voice.

The latest terminology demand appears within the same broader political debate over identity, representation and the region’s future.

Background: The Joint Awami Action Committee Movement

The Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee has emerged as a significant platform for public mobilisation over economic and political grievances in the region.

Its campaign has included demonstrations, shutter-down strikes, sit-ins and demands for structural reforms.

The movement’s demands have included affordable electricity, fair wheat prices, reductions in privileges enjoyed by the political and administrative elite, and improvements in healthcare, education and public services.

However, the movement has also entered a particularly difficult phase following deadly confrontations and security operations in Rawalakot in November.

The committee and its representatives have raised allegations concerning the use of force against demonstrators, civilian casualties and restrictions on civil liberties. These allegations have been disputed in accounts of the security operations, highlighting the need for independent investigations and access for journalists.

The developments have attracted attention beyond the region, particularly among overseas Kashmiris and organisations monitoring human rights and political developments.

A Contested Question of Identity and Political Status

The terminology used to describe the territory has long reflected competing political and constitutional positions.

Pakistan officially refers to the territory as Azad Jammu and Kashmir, while India generally uses the expression Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. International media organisations, including Reuters, frequently use the descriptive term Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

These different expressions are not merely geographical descriptions; they also reflect competing political narratives surrounding the wider Jammu and Kashmir dispute.

Kashmiri’s latest statement therefore raises questions about whether the terminology traditionally used within the region will increasingly be challenged by political activists and representatives of the ongoing rights movement.

His call also places the question of political identity more prominently within the movement’s public discourse.

International Attention and the Road Ahead

The latest remarks come at a time when developments in Pakistani-administered Jammu and Kashmir are receiving renewed international attention.

Recent unrest, allegations of excessive force, communication restrictions and disagreements between the authorities and movement representatives have raised concerns about the protection of fundamental rights and the need for credible accountability mechanisms.

The United Nations and international human rights organisations have also been monitoring developments relating to the rights situation in the region.

Whether Kashmiri’s proposed terminology will be adopted more widely by the Joint Awami Action Committee, other political groups and the wider population remains to be seen.

For now, his statement signals another important dimension of the ongoing political debate: beyond economic demands and administrative reforms, questions of identity, representation and the language used to describe the territory are increasingly becoming part of the public movement.

The Azadi Times will continue to monitor developments surrounding the Joint Awami Action Committee, the political situation in Jammu and Kashmir and the evolving demands of the region’s population.

‘We Have No Big Brother’: Sardar Umar Nazir Kashmiri Challenges Pakistan’s Role as Kashmir’s Advocate

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RAWALAKOT, November 9 — Sardar Umar Nazir Kashmiri has delivered a strongly worded political address at a protest sit-in in Rawalakot, challenging Pakistan’s traditional claim of representing the Kashmiri people internationally and calling on Kashmiris to become advocates of their own political rights and aspirations.

Addressing protesters, Nazir said the narrative that Pakistan was the advocate and big brother of the Kashmiri people had lost its credibility following the recent treatment of civilians in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

He argued that Kashmiris could no longer rely on others to represent their political interests and must instead develop the confidence and capacity to speak for themselves.

“There is no one who will be our advocate. We must become our own advocates. We have no big brother,” he said, according to the remarks reported from his address.

Pakistan’s traditional role as Kashmir’s advocate questioned

Nazir’s remarks directly challenged a long-standing political narrative in which Pakistan has presented itself as an advocate for the Kashmiri people at international forums.

He argued that the treatment of civilians during recent unrest in Pakistan-administered Kashmir had fundamentally undermined that narrative, raising questions about the credibility of claims of political solidarity and representation.

His comments reflect growing political discontent among sections of the population following the government’s handling of protests and the use of force against demonstrators.

The remarks also signal a broader debate over whether Kashmiris should continue to depend on external political representation or assert a more independent voice in discussions about their political future.

‘Kashmir existed as a state before Pakistan and India’

Referring to the region’s history, Nazir emphasised that Kashmir had its own political and state identity before the establishment of Pakistan and India in 1947.

He argued that the political identity of Kashmiris should not be reduced solely to the competing positions of the two countries.

His remarks placed particular emphasis on the historical identity of Jammu and Kashmir and the importance of recognising the Kashmiri people as political stakeholders in their own right.

The argument also touches on a longstanding question surrounding the Kashmir dispute: the extent to which the political aspirations and right to self-determination of the Kashmiri people are reflected in regional and international discussions.

Rawalakot protests and growing political tensions

The address comes amid heightened political tensions in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, where the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee has been leading a protest movement over public demands and governance issues.

Recent confrontations between protesters and law enforcement agencies have resulted in reports of casualties and allegations of excessive use of force.

Leaders of the protest movement have accused authorities of using violence against civilians, while the police have presented their own account of the confrontations.

The developments have intensified public debate over civil liberties, government accountability and the political relationship between Pakistan and the territory it administers.

A wider debate over Kashmir’s political future

Nazir’s address in Rawalakot goes beyond criticism of the government’s handling of the protests. It raises fundamental questions about Kashmir’s political identity, international representation and the role of its people in determining their future.

His call for Kashmiris to become their own advocates reflects a political position that places greater emphasis on independent Kashmiri political agency rather than reliance on external representatives.

Whether this position translates into a broader shift within the region’s political movement remains to be seen. However, his remarks add a significant dimension to the ongoing debate over representation, political rights and self-determination in Jammu and Kashmir.

The Azadi Times will continue to follow developments surrounding the protest movement and the evolving political debate in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

Security Forces Take Control of Rawalakot Bus Terminal After Months-Long Sit-In; Reports of Gunfire and Injuries Emerge

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RAWALAKOT, Azad Jammu and Kashmir (PaJK), 5 November 2026 — Pakistani security forces reportedly took control of Rawalakot’s central bus terminal on Thursday morning, bringing a dramatic escalation to a months-long public sit-in organised by the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JKJAAC), according to photographs, videos and eyewitness accounts circulated by local Kashmiri social media users.

Posts shared on Facebook and Instagram showed security personnel outside the two-storey bus terminal building, where protesters had maintained a prolonged demonstration demanding the implementation of 38 public demands, including relief on electricity costs, employment opportunities and fundamental rights.

The reported operation has raised fresh concerns about the safety of civilians in Rawalakot, as local accounts described heavy gunfire, the movement of armoured vehicles and attempts by security personnel to clear the protest site.

The Azadi Times had earlier confirmed three deaths in connection with the escalating situation in Rawalakot.

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Additional claims of casualties and injuries circulated on Thursday, although the full extent of the reported casualties and the circumstances surrounding them remain independently unverified.

Security forces reportedly occupy the protest site

Several Kashmiri social media accounts shared photographs of the Rawalakot bus terminal on Thursday morning, describing the development as a takeover of the protest site by security forces.

A post attributed to Threads accounts Basharat4230 and @zamikashmiri, shared at approximately 8:27 am, carried the caption: “Rawalakot: Forces’ occupation at the bus terminal, November 5, 2026.”

Similar photographs were subsequently circulated by other local accounts, including Kasher Media Official and Zahid Akhtar Khan.

The images showed the same two-storey concrete structure, an open ground in front of the building and vehicles parked nearby. The photographs were accompanied by Urdu and English captions describing the reported deployment of security personnel and the loss of protesters’ control over the location.

An Instagram graphic shared by account shahidraja3732 also reported that an operation had begun in Rawalakot and that the bus terminal had been evacuated.

Taken together, the posts indicate that security personnel had established a presence at the terminal and that protesters were no longer occupying the site in the same manner as before.

However, the precise circumstances of the reported takeover, including whether all protesters were removed and whether force was used inside the terminal, could not be independently established from the available material.

Local accounts report heavy gunfire and armoured vehicles

Separate Facebook posts attributed to Sardar Hamza Naseer, Tahir Mushtaq Kashmiri, Sehansa Azad Kashmir and other Kashmiri accounts described an operation involving armoured vehicles and heavy machine guns.

One circulating post claimed that security forces were attempting to take control of the bus terminal in the Matialmrah area of Rawalakot, with intense firing reported.

An Instagram account identified as Startup Kashmir Records shared footage filmed from a nearby wooded hillside. The accompanying text described security forces dispersing the Rawalakot bus terminal sit-in and reported multiple injuries. Sounds resembling gunfire could be heard in the footage, although their source and the precise circumstances in which the recording was made could not be independently verified.

Other social media accounts claimed that security personnel were advancing towards the protest area from three directions, identified as Naseem Town, Farhan Chowk and Chandni Chowk.

These accounts also described resistance by local residents and protesters.

Initial reports circulating among Kashmiri social media users referred to at least two injured protesters. The number of injured people, however, remains unconfirmed.

The Azadi Times has not independently verified the reported use of heavy weapons, the direction of the alleged advances or the complete sequence of events during the operation.

A prolonged protest over 38 public demands

The sit-in at Rawalakot bus terminal was organised under the banner of the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee, a coalition that has mobilised public support around economic relief, electricity pricing, employment and wider civic demands in Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

The protest had continued for several months, attracting residents from different parts of the region.

Participants included men, women, young people and elderly residents, according to photographs and videos shared during the demonstration.

The protesters’ demands centred on issues affecting everyday life, particularly the cost of electricity, access to employment and what the committee describes as the denial of fundamental public rights.

Social media accounts have given differing dates and day counts for the beginning and duration of the sit-in. Some posts identify 6 June as its starting date, while others refer to 9 June. Reports circulated in recent days have variously described the demonstration as having continued for approximately 145 to 151 days.

Regardless of the precise count, the protest represented a sustained period of public mobilisation in Rawalakot.

Its reported removal through a security operation marks a significant development in a dispute that had continued for months without a publicly established resolution of the committee’s demands.

Conflicting accounts and the official response

The developments have also highlighted a significant difference between accounts circulating among local residents and the official position.

A spokesperson for the Inspector General of Police in Azad Jammu and Kashmir rejected social media claims of a police operation, shelling and firing at the protest site.

According to the spokesperson, no action had been conducted by police or other law enforcement agencies at the sit-in location at Darik Eidgah. The spokesperson described the circulating allegations as baseless and misleading propaganda.

The statement, however, did not independently resolve the questions raised by photographs and videos showing security personnel at the central bus terminal.

The bus terminal and Darik Eidgah have been identified separately in the circulating accounts, making precise identification of the location and timeline particularly important.

The available material does not establish whether the official statement was referring to the same location and period described in the social media reports.

The Azadi Times has not independently obtained a detailed operational account from the relevant authorities or a complete explanation of the reported security deployment.

Social media becomes a crucial source of information

With reports of disrupted communications and difficulties accessing information from parts of the region, Facebook and Instagram have become important channels through which residents are sharing photographs, videos and updates.

Several local accounts published images of the same bus terminal building, while others circulated footage and written descriptions of the reported operation.

The similarity of the photographs provides a basis for identifying the location depicted, although it does not independently establish when every image was recorded or verify all the claims attached to it.

The circulation of casualty claims has also increased public anxiety.

The Azadi Times had previously confirmed three deaths in its reporting on the Rawalakot escalation. Further casualty figures circulating on social media should be treated separately until the identities, circumstances and number of additional casualties can be independently established.

The situation also raises concerns about the ability of families to obtain information about missing, injured or detained relatives.

Reliable communication and access to medical assistance are particularly important during periods of heightened tension.

A critical moment for civil rights and public accountability

The developments at Rawalakot bus terminal have placed the authorities and the Joint Awami Action Committee at a critical point in their prolonged confrontation.

For protesters, the sit-in was an expression of demands concerning economic security, public representation and fundamental rights. Its reported removal does not, by itself, resolve the underlying grievances that brought people to the streets.

The central question now extends beyond control of the bus terminal: whether the outstanding public demands will be addressed through meaningful dialogue, and whether the circumstances surrounding the reported operation will be transparently investigated.

The safety of civilians, access to medical assistance, freedom of peaceful assembly and the right to express public grievances remain central concerns.

The Azadi Times will continue to monitor developments in Rawalakot, verify emerging casualty information and seek further accounts from residents, protest representatives and relevant authorities.

This is a developing story. Information will be updated as further independently verifiable details become available.

Editorial Note

This report is based on photographs, videos and written accounts circulated by Kashmiri social media users on 5 November 2026. Claims concerning the use of heavy weapons, casualties, injuries and the circumstances of the reported operation have been attributed where possible and have not been presented as independently established facts. The official police response has also been included for completeness.

Three Killed, Dozens Reportedly Injured as Clashes New Escalate in Rawalakot, Azad Kashmir

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Clashes Reported Since Morning

RAWALAKOT, November 5, 2026 — Three people have been killed and dozens reportedly injured amid escalating clashes during an ongoing protest sit-in in Rawalakot, according to local sources. Gunfire and shelling have been reported as tensions intensify across the city.

According to information received by The Azadi Times from local sources, clashes and heightened tensions have been reported in Rawalakot since Thursday morning, November 5, during an ongoing sit-in protest.

Several posts and videos circulating on social media allege that gunfire and shelling took place in the vicinity of the protest. Local accounts have also described scenes of panic and confusion, although the circumstances surrounding the reported incidents remain unclear.

Three Deaths Reported, Dozens Allegedly Injured

Reports circulating on social media claim that three young men were killed and dozens of others injured during the reported violence.

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Some local sources have identified the alleged victims as Ehtisham Younis, Adil Rashid and Atif Jarchis. However, The Azadi Times independently verified their identities and confirmed the reported deaths through hospital records, families or official sources.

The circumstances of the alleged casualties, including whether they resulted from gunfire or other causes, remain unconfirmed.

Communications Blackout Raises Concerns

The situation is further complicated by restricted communications in Rawalakot.

Local sources report that mobile networks and internet services, which had reportedly been operating on a limited basis, have become unavailable again, making it difficult for residents to communicate and for journalists to independently verify developments.

Internet restrictions have affected Rawalakot for months. The Azad Jammu and Kashmir government had previously maintained restrictions on internet services in Rawalakot and Sudhanoti under its phased restoration arrangements.

The renewed reports of communication disruptions have raised concerns about access to information and independent reporting during the unfolding situation.

Drone Activity Claims Await Verification

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Some social media posts have also alleged the presence of drones over Rawalakot and raised concerns about possible aerial activity.

However, The Azadi Times has not independently verified reports of drone attacks, their operators, or whether any such activity resulted in casualties or damage.

Calls for International Attention

Amid the reports, local residents and social media users have appealed to international media organisations, the United Nations, human rights organisations and the wider international community to take notice of the situation in Rawalakot.

They have urged international organisations to monitor developments, seek clarification from the relevant authorities and ensure the protection of civilians.

The Azadi Times Monitoring the Situation

The Azadi Times is following developments in Rawalakot and will update this report as further information becomes available.

At the time of publication, the reported death toll, number of injured people, circumstances of the alleged firing and claims of drone activity had not been independently verified.

The Azadi Times will continue to distinguish verified information from unconfirmed claims as the situation develops.