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Founding Document vs. Recent Crackdowns: Questioning Democracy and Self-Determination in Kashmir

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Founding Document vs. Recent Crackdowns: Questioning Democracy and Self-Determination in Kashmir

Muzaffarabad, Pakistan administered Kashmir — On August 13, more than 200 young people and students in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir (PAJK) were charged under allegations of raising slogans against Pakistan’s accession, desecrating the Pakistani flag, and committing “terrorism.” Over 35 have been arrested, with some placed on 90-day remand. In response, protest demonstrations have been called for this Saturday, where activists say they will announce their next course of action.

This development has reignited debate around the foundational document of the AJK government, the Declaration of Independence (1947). Many question whether the recent cases, arrests, and charges of treason are compatible with the spirit of that founding document — or whether, in fact, they represent its complete betrayal.

The founding declaration, drafted at the time of liberation from the Dogra regime, defined the new government as a temporary authority — tasked only with maintaining law and order until the people of Jammu and Kashmir could freely elect a democratic and representative constitutional assembly. It also envisioned a secular government inclusive of all communities, explicitly emphasizing Kashmir’s distinct political identity and territorial integrity, separate from both India and Pakistan.

Crucially, the document stipulated that any decision regarding accession to India or Pakistan could only be taken through a free and impartial plebiscite, monitored by international observers. Until then, the government’s role was to safeguard self-rule, ensure sovereignty, and prepare the ground for an elected body chosen by the people themselves.

By contrast, today’s political reality in PAJK is starkly different. Following the Karachi Agreement, Islamabad assumed control of key areas including Gilgit-Baltistan, finances, resources, refugee rehabilitation, and oversight of the freedom movement. Later, the 1974 Interim Constitution (Act 74) further institutionalized Pakistan’s dominance: any political activity challenging Pakistan’s accession, questioning its integrity, or advocating for independence was criminalized. Under this act, even candidates for the lowest public office — from peons to prime ministers — are required to sign a declaration of faith in Pakistan’s accession.

This legal framework has effectively outlawed the very principles enshrined in the 1947 Declaration. Talking about independence, autonomy, or self-determination is criminalized, while political parties, associations, and civil groups cannot legally exist if they refuse to endorse accession to Pakistan.

The recent arrests of students and activists in Muzaffarabad are seen by critics as a continuation of this colonial-style arrangement, where the sacrifices of Kashmiris are overshadowed by policies imposed in the name of Pakistan’s national interest. Dissenters argue that treating slogans — whether pro-accession or anti-accession — as treason undermines not just democratic rights but the very foundation upon which the provisional government was created.

The question many now ask is simple: Why has the original spirit of the Declaration of Independence been sidelined for over seven decades? The answer, historians argue, lies in the Pakistani state’s early intervention in 1947, when tribal militias shifted the seat of government to Muzaffarabad under Islamabad’s control. Since then, constitutional documents, from the Karachi Agreement to Act 74, have turned AJK into a de facto dependency rather than the independent, representative government envisioned in 1947.

The way forward, critics contend, still lies in returning to the principles of the founding document: establishing a genuine constituent assembly, enabling free choice through democratic means, ending the rule of colonial-style officers, and allowing the people of Jammu and Kashmir to determine both their internal governance and external relations.

Anything less, they argue, is not only a violation of democratic rights but also a betrayal of the sacrifices made in 1947 for freedom and dignity.

Google Maps in Kashmir: Tool of Convenience or a New Front in the Propaganda Battle?

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Google Maps in Kashmir: Tool of Convenience or a New Front in the Propaganda Battle?

Muzaffarabad, Pakistan-administered Kashmir — Authorities in Pakistani-administered Kashmir, Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) have arrested a young man from Rawalakot’s Khai Galla area on charges of spying for India’s intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), allegedly in exchange for money.

According to a First Information Report (FIR) registered at Thana Panjgran in Muzaffarabad on July 23, the accused — identified as Muhammad Ubaid Jahangir, son of Muhammad Jahangir Shahid and resident of Khoiyan, Khai Galla (Rawalakot) — is accused of sending GPS coordinates and details of Bilal Mosque and Nala Shoai in Muzaffarabad to Indian handlers via WhatsApp. The FIR also claims he received financial compensation in return for the information.

Officials allege that Jahangir continued to share “sensitive data and details of key installations” with Indian intelligence. A case has been registered under the Official Secrets Act, and he remains in custody in Muzaffarabad.

Local residents of Khai Galla told reporters that the accused maintained links with the proscribed militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (Jamaat-ud-Dawa). They alleged that his uncle, Shaukat (son of Samandar), is a known figure in the banned outfit and serves as a caretaker of a Jamaat-ud-Dawa mosque. Community members also noted that the family originally migrated from Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir before settling in Khai Galla.

This is not the first such case. In March this year, another man, Saqib Ghani, said to be associated with Jamaat-ud-Dawa, was detained on accusations of having ties with the banned Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). At the time, Pakistani authorities claimed that Indian agencies were backing such networks to destabilize the region.

The latest arrest has reignited debate in AJK about cross-border intelligence operations, the role of banned outfits, and the continuing security challenges in the territory.

Meanwhile, a separate controversy has emerged after an AJK minister, just days before renewed tensions between India and Pakistan, gave an interview near a mosque in which he reportedly pointed out a specific Google Maps location. While some critics claim the minister disclosed sensitive information, others argue that such data is already publicly accessible, raising questions about the motive behind the statement.

Social media users have accused the minister of carelessness, warning that highlighting such locations could be misused as a political tool against the people of Kashmir amid growing regional hostilities.

JK Joint Awami Action Committee, the 12 Migrant Seats, UN Resolutions, AJK Politics and Constitutional Questions

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JK Joint Awami Action Committee, the 12 Migrant Seats, UN Resolutions, AJK Politics and Constitutional Questions

Muzaffarabad, AJK, August 6, 2025 — The Azadi Investigation Desk: In Pakistan-administered Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), the political landscape has shifted dramatically following the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee’s (JKJAAC) call for abolishing 12 reserved seats for Kashmiri migrants in the Legislative Assembly. From the Prime Minister’s tours to Assembly debates, government figures have lined up to defend these seats while criticising the JKJAAC.

But at the heart of the storm lies a fundamental question:

Where did these 12 seats for migrants from Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir originate? And do United Nations resolutions on Kashmir make any reference to them?

The answer touches not only constitutional law but also Kashmir’s political identity. Yet, strikingly, nearly three-quarters of AJK’s 4.5 million residents admit they do not even know what the UN resolutions actually say. This investigation traces the origins of the migrant seats, their legal framework, and the controversies surrounding them.

UN Resolutions on Kashmir (1947–1950)

Kashmir has long been debated at the United Nations. But the earliest resolutions, from 1947 to 1950, remain foundational. AJK politicians frequently cite them, especially now when almost every Assembly member links the migrant seats to the “freedom struggle.” But do the resolutions really mention them?

Resolution 38 (January 17, 1948): Called on India and Pakistan to reduce tensions and avoid steps that would worsen the conflict.

Resolution 39 (January 20, 1948): Established the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate and mediate.

Resolution 47 (April 21, 1948): Demanded Pakistan withdraw tribesmen and troops; urged India to reduce its forces. Called for a UN-supervised plebiscite to determine Kashmir’s future and recommended an interim administration with representation from all parties.

Resolution S/1196/Rev.1 (August 13, 1948): Proposed a complete ceasefire, Pakistani withdrawal, Indian troop reduction, and UN-supervised plebiscite.

Resolution S/1430/Rev.2 (January 5, 1949): Accepted by both India and Pakistan, affirming that the future of Jammu and Kashmir would be determined by “the will of the people.”

Resolution 80 / S/1469 (March 14, 1950): Reaffirmed earlier pledges, appointed Sir Owen Dixon as mediator, and once again stressed a plebiscite.

Across all these documents, there is no mention of reserved legislative seats for migrants. Migrants are only indirectly included as part of “the people” whose will must be determined through a plebiscite.

Constitutional Origins: From Interim Rules to 1974

For more than two decades after 1947, Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) functioned without a formal constitution. Governance ran through executive councils and ad hoc arrangements, reflecting the uncertainty of Kashmir’s unresolved status.

In 1970, the AJK Interim Constitution Act introduced a basic structure, and by 1974, the Interim Constitution was formally enacted. It was here that 12 reserved seats for Kashmiri migrants were written into law.

The seats were divided equally:

  • 6 for Jammu migrants, settled mainly in Punjab and other parts of Pakistan.

  • 6 for Kashmir Valley migrants, residing in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and nearby regions.

The intent was to give a political voice to those displaced during the 1947–48 war. On paper, it looked like a gesture of inclusion. In practice, however, these seats soon became decisive in AJK politics — often determining the survival or fall of governments.

What began as representation for refugees gradually turned into a power lever, shaping political dynamics in ways far beyond their original purpose.

Before the Migrant Seats

Between 1947 and 1970, Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) was governed through a State Council, composed exclusively of representatives from areas physically under AJK’s control. During this period, migrants from Indian‑administered Jammu and Kashmir had no reserved political representation.

That changed with the constitutional reforms of the early 1970s. The introduction of 12 reserved migrant seats in 1970 — and their formal entrenchment in the 1974 Interim Constitution — permanently altered AJK’s political landscape.

From that point onward, migrants were no longer outside the system. Their votes and representatives became pivotal players, shifting the balance of power in ways that continue to shape AJK politics today.

The UN and Representation

Do the UN resolutions permit or require migrant seats?

The clear answer is no. The UN never prescribed a political structure for AJK. It simply demanded that the “will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir from all parts of the state” be ascertained.

Resolutions such as S/1196 and S/1430 mention this principle, but they do not explain whether it should be through assemblies, constituencies, or direct plebiscite.

Thus, the 12 migrant seats are a purely local constitutional invention — not an international requirement.

Political Controversy

Over the decades, the 12 migrant seats have become a lightning rod for political debate in Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

Electoral imbalance: Migrant constituencies often contain far larger pools of voters than many AJK constituencies, producing serious questions about whether the system respects the principle of “one person, one vote.”

State Subject Rule: The criteria for who qualifies as a “state subject” — and thus eligible to vote on these seats — has been applied inconsistently, fueling accusations of manipulation.

Power politics: In practice, the 12 seats frequently serve as kingmakers. With AJK’s slim parliamentary margins, migrant representatives have often determined whether governments stand or fall.

Beyond technical concerns, the debate is also deeply political. Several AJK-based parties and activists refuse to even recognise these representatives as “genuine migrants.” They argue that many families have long since settled into permanent lives in Pakistan, far from refugee conditions. As a result, the seats, they claim, function less as a voice for displaced Kashmiris and more as instruments of electoral engineering — detached from the lived struggles of actual displacement.

Local Mechanism, Not Freedom Struggle

If examined neutrally, the migrant seats have no direct link to the freedom struggle or UN resolutions. They are a domestic political arrangement born of the 1970 and 1974 laws.

They were designed to represent displaced populations but have since become entangled in local power struggles. Until a UN-supervised plebiscite resolves the status of Jammu and Kashmir, these seats remain a temporary political device. Their future — abolition, reform, or continuation — depends on political consensus or judicial interpretation within AJK.

The 12 migrant seats in AJK’s Assembly are not grounded in UN resolutions, nor in international law. They are a local constitutional arrangement, introduced decades after partition to accommodate refugees but later co-opted into the power politics of Muzaffarabad.

As the Joint Awami Action Committee revives debate around their legitimacy, the migrant seats are once again at the centre of controversy. But the evidence is clear: they are not a pillar of the freedom struggle, but rather a domestic political mechanism whose relevance is being increasingly questioned.

Six Years After Article 370: Kashmir’s Unfinished Struggle for Self‑Determination

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Six Years After Article 370: Kashmir’s Unfinished Struggle for Self‑Determination

On August 5, 2019, the Government of India revoked Article 370 and 35A of its constitution, dissolving Jammu and Kashmir’s semi‑autonomous status and splitting the region into two federally governed union territories. The move was presented by New Delhi as an act of national integration.

For many Kashmiris, however, it was experienced as a rupture a unilateral decision that erased political identity and deepened a decades‑long conflict already shaped by wars, militarisation, and broken promises.

Six years on, August 5 remains one of the most contested dates in South Asia’s political calendar. While India celebrates it as a “new dawn,” Pakistan observes it as “Youm‑e‑Istehsal” — the “Day of Exploitation.” In between, ordinary Kashmiris remain caught in competing narratives, still waiting for the fulfilment of a promise made to them by the international community: the right to self‑determination under United Nations resolutions.

What Was Article 370 and 35A, and Why Did It Matter?

To understand the resonance of August 5, it is important to grasp what Article 370 and Article 35A represented.

Article 370 was written into the Indian constitution in 1949. It granted Jammu and Kashmir its own constitution, separate flag, and autonomy over all matters except defence, foreign affairs, finance, and communications. In practical terms, it meant that laws passed by the Indian parliament did not automatically apply to the region unless approved by the state legislature. The provision formalised the terms of Kashmir’s accession to India in 1947, which was described as temporary and conditional until a final settlement of the dispute.

Article 35A, introduced in 1954 through a presidential order, gave the J&K legislature the power to define who qualified as a “permanent resident.” This definition carried significant implications: only permanent residents could own property, secure government employment, or access certain scholarships and welfare benefits.

For many Kashmiris, these provisions were more than legal arrangements — they were seen as a fragile shield protecting the region’s demography, land ownership, and cultural identity from outside influence. Supporters viewed them as the minimum guarantee of political and social security within the Indian Union.

Critics in India, however, described them as outdated privileges that encouraged separatism, blocked investment, and hindered full integration. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had long campaigned for their abrogation, calling Article 370 a “temporary” provision that needed to go.

On August 5, 2019, India’s parliament passed a resolution and presidential order that revoked both Article 370 and 35A. Jammu and Kashmir was reorganised into two federally governed union territories: Jammu & Kashmir, and Ladakh.

But for many Kashmiris, the decision carried consequences far beyond constitutional changes. Critics argue that the abrogation was not only a blow to autonomy, but also a deliberate tactic to divert attention from the real and unresolved issue: the right to self‑determination under United Nations resolutions.

Scholars and activists warn that by focusing the debate on special status, both India and Pakistan have managed to sideline the central question of Kashmir’s political future. As one Kashmiri historian put it: “Article 370 gave us autonomy, but it never gave us freedom. Its removal may have hurt us, but the larger denial remains the same — the denial of our right to decide.”

Political Reactions: Black Day vs. Celebration

The anniversary of August 5 continues to expose the stark political divide over Kashmir.

In Indian‑administered Kashmir, mainstream opposition parties such as the National Conference (NC), the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) observe the day as a “Black Day.” Their leaders argue that the 2019 decision to revoke Article 370 was carried out unconstitutionally and without the consent of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. They describe it as a “betrayal of trust” that violated the terms of accession agreed upon in 1947.

NC leader Omar Abdullah has repeatedly insisted that the abrogation stripped Kashmiris of dignity, while PDP’s Mehbooba Mufti has warned that the move has pushed the region into deeper political alienation. Smaller regional groups echo these concerns, calling the anniversary a painful reminder of broken promises.

Across the Line of Control, in Pakistan‑administered Kashmir and throughout Pakistan, the day is commemorated as “Youm‑e‑Istehsal” (Day of Exploitation). The government and civil society hold rallies, speeches, and seminars condemning India’s actions, with officials calling for international pressure on New Delhi to reverse its decision. Politicians in Islamabad describe August 5 as the day when “Kashmir was robbed of its identity,” and resolutions are passed in Pakistan’s parliament to reaffirm support for Kashmiri self‑determination.

Meanwhile, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in New Delhi frames August 5 in starkly different terms. For the ruling party, the day marks the beginning of a “new Jammu and Kashmir” — one that is fully integrated into the Indian Union. The government highlights infrastructure projects, new business investments, and a boom in tourism as proof that abrogation has brought peace and development. Senior BJP leaders argue that removing Article 370 has ended a “temporary” provision that only fostered separatism.

But beneath these opposing commemorations lies a shared criticism from many ordinary Kashmiris: both narratives bypass their real aspirations. For them, August 5 is not simply about statehood or integration. It is about the absence of their own voice in decisions that shape their future.

The Silence on Self‑Determination

Since 1948, the United Nations Security Council has passed multiple resolutions affirming the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to decide their future through a plebiscite.

Seventy‑five years later, that vote has never been held.

Instead, the issue has been reframed through the lens of constitutional provisions like Article 370, bilateral agreements, or statehood debates. Yet, for many Kashmiris, these are side issues.

“Restoring Article 370 may bring autonomy,” explains a Kashmiri academic, “but it will not bring freedom of choice. The real issue is the right to self‑determination.”

Pakistan’s Own Contradictions

While Pakistan positions itself internationally as a defender of Kashmiri rights, pro‑self‑determination groups inside Kashmir argue that Islamabad’s own record is far from clean.

On March 2, 1949, Pakistan separated Gilgit‑Baltistan from the wider state of Jammu and Kashmir, placing it under a federal‑appointed administration. Over time, Gilgit‑Baltistan was treated as a de facto semi‑province, despite being part of the territory recognised under UN resolutions.

For critics, this mirrors the unilateralism Pakistan condemns in India. Both states, they argue, have altered the map of Kashmir without the consent of its people.

This is why independent Kashmiri voices stress: the conflict is not simply India versus Pakistan — it is Kashmir versus the denial of its people’s right to decide their own destiny.

Atmosphere on Both Sides of the Ceasefire Line

Every year on August 5, the contrast is visible across the ceasefire line.

In Srinagar, heavy security deployment blankets the city. Political leaders are often placed under house arrest, rallies are restricted, and commemorations take place indoors with black flags and press statements.

In Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan‑administered Kashmir, thousands pour into the streets waving Kashmiri flags, chanting slogans, and calling for UN intervention.

Media coverage mirrors the divide. Indian media emphasises development projects, rising tourism numbers, and investment opportunities. Pakistani media highlights human rights concerns, militarisation, and demographic engineering.

For many ordinary Kashmiris, these narratives feel distant from daily realities of unemployment, restricted freedoms, and uncertainty about the future.

Will Restoring Article 370 Solve the Issue?

This question continues to dominate political debate inside Indian‑administered Kashmir. For mainstream opposition parties, including the National Conference and the PDP, the restoration of Article 370 and 35A has become the central demand. They argue that the 2019 move was unconstitutional, carried out without consultation, and represented the erosion of a political compact that existed between New Delhi and Srinagar since 1947. For them, bringing Article 370 back is the first step toward rebuilding trust and dignity.

But analysts caution that even if these provisions were reinstated, the larger dispute would remain unresolved. Autonomy within India does not address the central question that has haunted the region for more than seven decades: Do the people of Jammu and Kashmir get to decide their own political future?

“Article 370 is a constitutional issue, not a political solution,” says a Srinagar‑based lawyer. “The conflict is about whether Kashmiris get to decide their political future. Until that question is answered, constitutional fixes will only scratch the surface.”

Many young Kashmiris also share this view. For them, debates about 370 and 35A feel like distractions from the bigger picture — the right to self‑determination promised under United Nations resolutions. Restoring autonomy might restore limited protections, but it does not equate to freedom of choice.

As one university student in Muzaffarabad put it during a rally: “Whether it is Article 370, 35A, or even statehood, these are administrative matters. They do not answer our real question: who decides the future of Kashmir — India, Pakistan, or the Kashmiri people themselves?”

International Law and the Forgotten Plebiscite

The call for self‑determination in Kashmir is not just rhetoric — it is rooted in United Nations resolutions.

In 1948, the UN Security Council’s Resolution 47 called for a plebiscite after troop withdrawals, allowing Kashmiris to decide between India and Pakistan. Subsequent resolutions reaffirmed this, but disagreements over demilitarisation stalled implementation.

Over time, the issue slipped off the global agenda. Today, the international community largely frames Kashmir through bilateral talks, development, or counter‑terrorism, rarely mentioning the promised plebiscite.

For Kashmiris who still believe in that pledge, this silence feels like betrayal. As one activist put it: “The world remembers Kashmir when there is conflict, but forgets us when it comes to our rights.”

Kashmir’s Generational Shift

Perhaps the most significant change since August 5, 2019, is among Kashmir’s younger generation.

Many young Kashmiris, both in Srinagar and Muzaffarabad, express frustration at being caught in a conflict where their voices are peripheral. They argue that both India and Pakistan claim to speak for them, but neither allows genuine space for their aspirations.

Social media has amplified these voices. Campaigns emphasising “Kashmir belongs to Kashmiris” are gaining traction among students, activists, and diaspora groups worldwide.

This generational shift is redefining the conflict: less about integration with India or Pakistan, and more about independence of choice.

The Role of Gilgit‑Baltistan

Gilgit‑Baltistan’s story remains crucial to understanding Kashmir’s complexity. Its formal separation from the rest of Jammu and Kashmir in 1949 set a precedent for unilateral decisions about the region’s political future. Today, Gilgit‑Baltistan residents face their own struggles for constitutional rights and representation, even as their status remains undefined under international law.

For Kashmiri activists, GB stands as proof that both India and Pakistan have altered the region’s map without Kashmiri consent. Yet despite the absence of a clear constitutional or administrative link between Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and GB, an unusual relationship persists.

Over the past decade, parallel trends have emerged on both sides. In AJK and GB, grassroots groups such as Awami Action Committees have risen in response to local grievances, reflecting similar public anger over electricity shortages, taxation, and resource control. Political figures from GB have also engaged with Kashmiri leaders, reinforcing these cross‑border connections. Just last month, former AJK Prime Minister Sardar Attique Ahmed Khan visited Gilgit and paid respects at the grave of Amna Ullah Khan, founder of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) — a symbolic act highlighting shared histories of struggle.

Social media has further amplified these links. Platforms have allowed activists, students, and journalists from AJK and GB to exchange ideas, campaign together, and highlight each other’s movements in real time.

Even at the organisational level, cooperation is increasing. The Joint Awami Action Committee of Jammu and Kashmir recently added the demand for the construction of the Shoonter Tunnel — a vital project that would physically connect AJK and GB — to its charter. Calls are also growing for opening natural routes between the two regions, emphasising that any serious discussion of Kashmir’s future cannot exclude Gilgit‑Baltistan.

For many activists, this evolving relationship is a reminder that despite political boundaries imposed by states, the lived experiences of Kashmiris and Gilgit‑Baltistanis remain intertwined

What Lies Ahead?

The Supreme Court of India upheld the abrogation of Article 370 in 2023 but directed the government to restore statehood and conduct elections. As of August 2025, elections remain pending, and a new petition is set to be heard this week.

In Pakistan, political instability and economic crisis have limited space for meaningful engagement with Kashmir, leaving the issue primarily symbolic.

Internationally, Kashmir rarely dominates headlines, surfacing only during border skirmishes or human rights reports.

For Kashmiris, this neglect reinforces a sense of abandonment.

Conclusion:

The Unfinished Question

Six years after August 5, 2019, Kashmir continues to stand at a crossroads.

For India, the abrogation of Article 370 is framed as the moment of “final integration” — a decisive step to bind Jammu and Kashmir irreversibly to the Indian Union. For Pakistan, the same date is remembered as a day of “exploitation”, used to mobilise rallies, resolutions, and diplomatic appeals.

But for many Kashmiris, August 5 is neither integration nor exploitation. It is a reminder of promises unkept, voices unheard, and futures denied.

The demand is not simply about the restoration of Article 370 or 35A, nor about rhetorical solidarity offered from distant capitals. At its core, it is about the recognition of a fundamental and universal right: the right to self‑determination.

That right has been pledged in international law, repeated in UN resolutions, and echoed across generations — yet it remains unrealised. For young Kashmiris who have grown up in an environment of militarisation, censorship, and uncertainty, August 5 has come to symbolise not progress but paralysis.

Until the question of self‑determination is addressed — honestly, internationally, and with Kashmiris themselves at the centre of the conversation — the anniversary will remain less a celebration or a day of mourning than a stark symbol of unfinished history.

Gilgit-Baltistan: Floods Expose a Region Left to Struggle Alone

Editorial Staff
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Gilgit-Baltistan: Floods Expose a Region Left to Struggle Alone

Gilgit Baltistan, (PaJK): High in the Himalayas, Gilgit-Baltistan part of the wider Kashmir region, is facing one of its worst environmental disasters in recent memory. Unprecedented glacier melt, heavy monsoon rains, landslides and glacial lake outburst floods have left behind a trail of destruction: homes washed away, roads cut off, bridges collapsed, and families displaced.

For residents, however, the devastation is compounded by something even more painful the absence of state support.

In Ghizer’s Khaltikhutum valley, a key section of the main highway was swallowed by floods and landslides. No government agency arrived. Instead, villagers — more than 500 of them — began clearing debris and building an alternative path with their own hands.

Such scenes have become common across Gilgit-Baltistan: ordinary people stepping in where authorities failed.

Scale of the Crisis

  • 500+ homes destroyed or damaged

  • 27+ bridges, roads, irrigation channels swept away

  • Dozens dead, many missing

  • Shortages of food, drinking water and medicines

  • Thousands forced into makeshift shelters

Districts across Gilgit, Ghizer, Diamer, Skardu, Shigar, Kharmang, Ghanche and Nagar have reported severe losses. Entire villages remain cut off, awaiting assistance that has yet to arrive.

Local voices are increasingly critical of what they describe as a “puppet administration” in Gilgit-Baltistan. Despite repeated warnings from climate scientists about the risks of glacier melt and flash floods, residents say there was no preparedness plan, no effective disaster response unit, and no early warning systems.

One community elder told Azadi Times:
“People here are burying their dead, rebuilding roads, and feeding each other. Officials appear only in photographs and press releases.”

Gilgit-Baltistan, often treated as a peripheral zone despite its strategic significance, is once again caught between geography and politics. The region is part of disputed Kashmir, yet in moments of crisis it finds itself on the margins of both governance and policy.

Analysts caution that neglecting Gilgit-Baltistan not only deepens humanitarian suffering but also fuels feelings of political abandonment in a population already sidelined.

Experts and activists have called for:

  • Transparent and immediate relief operations

  • Independent audits of disaster funds

  • Permanent disaster response units in each district

  • Restoration of communication networks

  • Active presence of public representatives on the ground

Gilgit-Baltistan’s people have once again shown resilience. But their question is simple: When disaster strikes, why must the region always be left to fend for itself?

Until that question is answered, the floods will remain not just a story of climate crisis — but a stark reminder of political failure in Kashmir’s northernmost region.

Khuiratta in Shock: Community Rises After 6‑Year‑Old Tasmiya Found Dead

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Khuiratta in Shock: Community Rises After 6‑Year‑Old Tasmiya Found Dead

Khuiratta, (PaJK) | The Azadi Times: The quiet town of Khuiratta in Azad Kashmir was shaken after the body of six‑year‑old Tasmiya Suhail, missing for three days, was found in agricultural fields late Saturday night. According to family sources, the area had already been searched “dozens of times,” raising suspicions that the child’s body was placed there deliberately after her death.

Tasmiya’s body was later transferred to THQ Khuiratta Hospital for post‑mortem examination.

The killing triggered one of the largest protests in recent memory in Banah Valley. Thousands of residents poured into the streets, blocking major chowks and demanding justice. Markets in Khuiratta remained completely shut as a mark of protest.

Community leaders declared: “We want justice for Tasmiya. The culprits must be hanged in the very chowk where this crime shocked us all.”

Demonstrators described the protest as a “historic moment” for the people of Banah, portraying it as proof that the valley’s residents are conscious, united, and unwilling to remain silent in the face of injustice.

Local administration faced intense criticism during the demonstrations. Protesters accused authorities of failing to ensure safety for children and demanded an impartial investigation into the case.

Several residents alleged that the discovery of Tasmiya’s body in an already searched field suggests a cover‑up or negligence. “This was not just an accident. Someone placed her body there later,” a family member told Kashmir Digital on condition of anonymity, citing safety concerns.

The tragedy has deeply shaken KhoiRatta, where residents describe Tasmiya as a lively child from Syedpur Peelan village. Her disappearance three days ago had already created anxiety, but the discovery of her body transformed sorrow into anger.

In Hajira and other nearby towns, solidarity protests erupted, with crowds blocking Siraari Chowk for hours before police attempted to disperse them.

Activists and locals are demanding swift action to bring the perpetrators to justice. Many argue that political instability in Pakistan has spilled over into Kashmir, leaving institutions weak and unable to provide security to vulnerable groups, particularly women and children.

“This is not just about one child. It is about the safety of every Kashmiri girl,” one rights activist said. “If justice is not delivered quickly, public anger will only grow.”

The case has highlighted not only the fragility of law and order in Azad Kashmir but also the deepening public distrust of state institutions. The scale of the protests indicates that the community sees this as more than an isolated tragedy — it is viewed as a test of whether justice and accountability can prevail in Kashmir without external political interference.

Former AJK Prime Minister and PTI President Sardar Abdul Qayyum Niazi Arrested in Bhimber

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Former AJK Prime Minister and PTI President Sardar Abdul Qayyum Niazi Arrested in Bhimber

Bhimber, AJK (Pakistan-administered Kashmir: Former Prime Minister of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and President of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) AJK, Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan Niazi, was arrested in Bhimber on Saturday, intensifying the already fragile political atmosphere in the region.

According to local sources, Niazi was taken into custody while on his way from Samahni to Bhimber, where he was scheduled to lead rallies and attend political conventions. Witnesses say his arrest came under direct orders from AJK’s current Prime Minister Chaudhry Anwarul Haq, whose home district is Bhimber.

Eyewitnesses reported that a heavy police contingent intercepted Niazi’s convoy near Samahni Jandi Chontra, and swiftly moved him to Mirpur. Local political activists described the scene as “harassment of a senior politician under the presence of an overwhelming police force.”

In Bhimber, Niazi was scheduled to address PTI’s district convention. “The timing of the arrest was designed to suppress political mobilization,” one activist alleged, speaking to Kashmir Digital on condition of anonymity due to safety concerns.

Sardar Abdul Qayyum Niazi is facing over 11 cases registered against him in Rawalpindi, Islamabad, and other cities. Warrants had already been issued two days before his arrest, particularly linked to the events of May 9, when widespread protests shook Pakistan after the arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan.

An anti-terrorism court in Islamabad had also ordered his arrest in connection with those cases. Following Saturday’s detention, officials confirmed he will likely be handed over to Islamabad police.

The arrest has triggered immediate protests in parts of Azad Kashmir. In Hajira, demonstrators blocked the Siraari Chowk for hours, raising slogans against what they termed “politically motivated actions.” Police later moved in to disperse the crowds, but tensions remain high.

Observers note that these developments are further evidence of how Pakistan’s internal political struggles are spilling over into Azad Kashmir. “The same politicians who came to power on Imran Khan’s ticket are now orchestrating arrests of PTI leaders in Kashmir. It shows the depth of opportunism in our politics,” a political commentator from Muzaffarabad told Kashmir Digital.

Analysts argue that the arrest of Niazi highlights how Kashmir’s fragile democratic space is being shaped and often destabilized by power struggles in Pakistan. While pro-Kashmir voices call for a politics centered on self-determination and local accountability, the prevailing trend suggests that Islamabad’s political battles continue to dominate the discourse in Azad Kashmir.

“This is not about justice or rule of law. It’s about who controls the narrative,” said one Kashmiri rights advocate, speaking anonymously. “Such actions silence independent voices and weaken the idea of an autonomous Kashmiri political identity.”

With PTI having announced nationwide protests for August 5 — a symbolic date for Kashmir — Niazi was expected to lead demonstrations in AJK. His arrest not only prevents him from doing so but also signals the possibility of more arrests of political leaders in the coming days.

For many in Azad Kashmir, the developments are another reminder of how local aspirations are overshadowed by Pakistan’s divisive power politics. Whether this crackdown will further alienate Kashmiri voters or consolidate control for the current government remains to be seen.

Commander of Banned Outfit Faces Public Backlash in Rawalakot

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Commander of Banned Outfit Faces Public Backlash in Rawalakot

In the village of Koiyaan, located near the town of Khai Gulla in Poonch district of Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir, a commander of a banned militant organization and his associates faced intense public backlash on Wednesday. According to local sources, the commander fled the scene along with his armed companions.

The local population, in response to the incident, has announced plans to hold a public jirga (community assembly) in the coming days to formulate a collective stance against militant recruitment and activities in the region.

A few days earlier, reports had gone viral on social media claiming that a young man named Habib Tahir, alias Chhoto, from Koiyaan village, had been killed by the Indian army in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. A funeral in absentia (ghaybana namaz-e-janaza) was held for Habib Tahir in his native village on Wednesday. However, in the wake of the news about his death, there was a noticeable wave of anger among the local community against militant organizations. As a result, Habib Tahir’s family had explicitly barred members of the militant group from attending his funeral.

According to local residents, Habib Tahir had been recruited and trained by the banned militant group Jamaat-ud-Dawa (formerly known as Lashkar-e-Taiba) and was then sent across the Ceasefire line Line of Control (LoC), where he was ultimately killed by Indian forces.

Despite the family’s clear instructions, a covert local commander of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, Rizwan Hanif, and a public leader of the political front formed under its new name, United Movement, attended the funeral along with his three brothers and a nephew. Local sources stated that two of the individuals accompanying Rizwan Hanif were armed bodyguards.

When Habib Tahir’s family members began questioning Rizwan Hanif regarding the circumstances, his nephew allegedly attempted to intimidate them by brandishing a weapon. This provoked the family members and others present at the funeral to confront the armed men physically. It is noteworthy that Rizwan Hanif has reportedly designated his own brother and nephew as bodyguards, keeping all related expenses and salaries within the family.

As Rizwan Hanif and his armed associates exited the premises, they were reportedly chased and verbally condemned by Habib Tahir’s friends and other villagers. They pursued the fleeing group for quite a distance.

This is the second such incident in the Khai Gulla area in which the local community has actively opposed the activities of banned militant outfits. In April this year, residents of Barming village also reacted strongly during a funeral and memorial conference held after a young man was killed by Indian forces in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir.

A shift in the state’s policy also appears to be emerging after a long silence. On July 26, in the Khara Butt area of the Harighel tehsil of Bagh district, the banned militant organization Jaish-e-Muhammad had announced a conference. However, law enforcement intervened following the imposition of Section 144 by the District Magistrate of Bagh. A heavy contingent of police arrived at the location and prevented the event from taking place.

Over the past two years, there had been a noticeable surge in the public activities of banned militant organizations, often under state patronage. However, following heightened military tensions between Pakistan and India, a subtle yet significant shift in the situation has been observed. There has been a marked decline in militant activities, and if any are still occurring, efforts are being made to ensure that photos and videos do not reach the public domain.

Ultimately, the only sustainable way to protect the youth of this region from the dangers of militant exploitation is to impose a complete ban on organizations, recruitment centers, and training facilities that promote militancy. The policy of using young people as fodder for this imperialist conflict must be fully abandoned.

Note: The information in this report has been gathered from verified social media accounts, official documents, and credible local journalists based in the region.

Tension in Bajaur: Restricted Movement in Mamund as Targeted Military Operations Continue

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Tension in Bajaur: Restricted Movement in Mamund as Targeted Military Operations Continue

For the second consecutive day, strict movement restrictions remain in place across 16 villages of Mamund tehsil in Pakistan’s Bajaur district, bordering Afghanistan. These curbs were imposed by local authorities in support of ongoing “targeted operations” against suspected militant groups.

While Tuesday (the first day of restrictions) witnessed intense gunfire and the presence of military helicopters, residents report that Wednesday has been comparatively calmer — with no aerial surveillance or explosions heard so far.

Local journalist Bilal Yasir told The Azadi Times that Tuesday’s operations caused panic among civilians, prompting several families to flee the area. He added that a protest is currently underway at Umari Chowk — the main route leading to Mamund — where demonstrators, holding copies of the Quran, are voicing opposition to the military operation. The protest is reportedly being led by former PTI lawmaker Gul Zafar Khan.

Three-Day Curfew and Lack of Official Clarity

On July 29, the Deputy Commissioner’s office in Bajaur issued a notification enforcing a complete restriction on civilian movement in the specified villages until 5:00 PM on July 31. The directive cited security reasons, stressing the need to safeguard lives during the anti-militant operations, as recommended by the District Intelligence Coordination Committee.

However, no official statement has been released by the military’s media wing, ISPR, regarding the operation.

While some locals allege that several people were killed in the first day of the crackdown, no official confirmation has been provided by hospitals or government representatives. Attempts by media outlets to contact Bajaur’s Deputy Commissioner and District Police Officer have so far gone unanswered.

Dr. Hayat, the Medical Superintendent of Bajaur Hospital, stated that all casualty-related data has been submitted to the DC’s office, where media inquiries should be directed.

Government Response and Political Reactions

In a video message following a parliamentary meeting of PTI’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa chapter, Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur expressed regret over the reported loss of innocent lives. His office announced financial compensation of PKR 10 million for each deceased civilian or security personnel, and PKR 2.5 million for those injured.

However, the exact number of casualties was not disclosed.

Chief Minister Gandapur further instructed all deputy commissioners to refrain from imposing curfews or Section 144 without prior approval from the provincial Home Department — hinting at possible concerns over unauthorized enforcement.

Multiple political parties have also voiced concerns over the situation. ANP President Aimal Wali Khan posted on X (formerly Twitter), calling for an immediate halt to civilian casualties. A spokesperson for Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-F condemned the operation, warning that past military campaigns have failed to bring lasting peace to the region.

Why Mamund Matters

Mamund is Bajaur’s largest tehsil, strategically positioned along the Afghan border. It directly connects to Kunar province in Afghanistan, which has historically been a hotbed for various extremist factions, including ISIS-Khorasan.

Security analysts say the porous border has allowed armed militants to cross freely between Afghanistan and Pakistan, using Bajaur as a staging ground. Notably, Bajaur has seen increased militant activity in recent months, particularly from Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Earlier this month, a deadly roadside bomb in the region claimed the lives of an Assistant Commissioner, a local tehsildar, and two police officers. Weeks before that, ANP leader Maulana Khan Zeb was assassinated while preparing for a tribal peace gathering.

A Growing Insurgency

Experts suggest that TTP has been steadily attempting to re-establish its influence across tribal areas since the start of 2025. Video footage shared on social media reportedly shows armed militants openly patrolling roads, setting up temporary checkpoints, and moving freely through civilian areas.

Abdul Sayed, a specialist on extremist movements in Pakistan, notes that while the TTP avoids formally claiming control over any region, their increased visibility is concerning. “They know they can’t hold territory for long in the presence of military forces,” he explained.

As tensions mount in Bajaur, calls for transparency, civilian protection, and long-term peace are growing louder. But with a complex web of cross-border militancy and local unrest, restoring stability in Mamund and beyond remains a formidable challenge for the Pakistani state.

Note:
This report includes some information sourced from BBC Urdu, adapted and rewritten by The Azadi Times for clarity and originality.

10 Kashmiri Leaders Still Fighting for Independence in 20245 – Their Shocking Stories

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10 Kashmiri Leaders Still Fighting for Independence in 20245 – Their Shocking Stories

The snow-capped peaks of the Pir Panjal mountains have witnessed seven decades of geopolitical struggle. As India and Pakistan continue their bitter dispute over Kashmir, a quieter but persistent movement refuses to align with either nuclear-armed neighbor. Their demand? Complete independence for all of historic Kashmir, including Gilgit-Baltistan, free from Indian, Pakistani, and Chinese control.

In dimly lit homes across Srinagar, in the refugee camps of Muzaffarabad, and among the diaspora in London, a network of activists, scholars, and former militants keeps alive what may be the most radical idea in South Asia: that Kashmir should belong only to Kashmiris.

The Lifetime Prisoner: Yasin Malik’s Unbroken Will

The most famous face of this movement sits in Delhi’s Tihar Jail, serving a life sentence. Yasin Malik, the 57-year-old chairman of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), has become the symbol of Kashmiri resistance—and its evolution.

Once a militant commander who crossed the Line of Control (LoC) with an AK-47, Malik renounced violence in 1994, declaring that “guns had brought Kashmir to ruins.” His transformation mirrored South Africa’s ANC or Ireland’s Sinn Féin—armed struggle giving way to political activism.

But India never recognized this shift. In May 2022, Malik was convicted under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) for allegedly funding militancy—charges he denies. From prison, his handwritten notes circulate among supporters, arguing that Kashmir’s distinct identity—where Muslims, Pandits and Sikhs once coexisted—predates both India and Pakistan.

“Yasin Sahib’s message is simple,” explains a young law student in Srinagar who asked to remain anonymous. “We are not Indians who need to become Pakistanis, nor Pakistanis who should become Indians. We were Kashmiris before these countries existed.”

The Mandela of Kashmir: Shabir Shah‘s 35-Year Resistance

If Malik represents the movement’s public face, 70-year-old Shabir Shah is its moral conscience. Jailed since 2017—and spending over half his life in Indian prisons—the founder of the Jammu & Kashmir Democratic Freedom Party (DFP) is often compared to Nelson Mandela.

His crime? Consistently advocating for Kashmir’s right to self-determination through nonviolent means. Court documents show prosecutors arguing that even Shah’s calls for UN-monitored plebiscites constitute “sedition.”

“Shabir Shah makes Delhi uncomfortable because he exposes the contradiction,” says London-based human rights lawyer Barrister Aamir Rana. “India claims Kashmir is integral, yet arrests those who want to test that claim democratically.”

The Diaspora Voice: Shabir Choudhry’s Legal Crusade

3,000 miles away in a modest office in South London, 68-year-old Shabir Choudhry keeps the flame alive through legal channels. The UK-based founder of the Kashmir National Party has spent decades presenting Kashmir’s case at the UN and European Parliament.

His 2023 legal analysis went viral in activist circles—it highlighted how Pakistan’s own Constitution (Article 257) implicitly acknowledges Kashmir’s special status, while India’s revocation of Article 370 violated the Simla Agreement.

“Kashmir isn’t real estate to be divided between two quarrelsome brothers,” Choudhry tells me over mint tea. “The third option—independence—was on the table in 1947, 1948, 1957 and 1994. It remains the only just solution.”

The Gilgit-Baltistan Factor: China’s Shadow

The independence movement faces its most complex challenge in the snowbound valleys of Gilgit-Baltistan (GB)—territory administered by Pakistan but claimed by India, where China has made deep economic inroads through the $65 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Here, 76-year-old Abdul Hamid Khan of the Balawaristan National Front (BNF) wages a lonely battle. Exiled to Sweden for years, he returned in 2019 to protest CPEC projects that he says are “colonizing” the region.

“First the British, then Pakistan, now China—all treat us as a territory, not a people,” Khan said in a rare 2023 interview before being detained again. His movement documents how GB’s population has changed from 98% locals in 1947 to under 60% today—a demographic shift mirroring concerns in Indian-administered Kashmir.

The Youth Movement: Digital Resistance

In the absence of established leaders—many jailed or exiled—a new generation employs technology to bypass censorship.

  • The GB United Movement runs anonymous Instagram accounts documenting land acquisitions

  • JKNSF Youth in Muzaffarabad and Poonch uses Signal to coordinate protests

  • “Kashmir Third Option” podcasts discuss independence models from Montenegro to Timor-Leste

“They’ve criminalized our political parties, so we become the party,” says a 24-year-old female activist in Srinagar who organizes through encrypted apps.

While India and Pakistan dominate headlines with their competing claims over Kashmir, a quieter but resolute camp insists on an alternative path: full independence from all three powers—India, Pakistan, and China. From Srinagar’s prisons to Gilgit-Baltistan’s mountain valleys and the diaspora hubs of London, a generation of Kashmiri and GB leaders have kept alive the vision of Azadi in its truest sense. Their journeys—marked by imprisonment, exile, and relentless advocacy—highlight not just political defiance, but the enduring belief that Kashmiris deserve to decide their own future. The following figures represent some of the most prominent voices in this movement.

Key Figures of the Independence Movement

LeaderRegion / BaseBelief / Political Stance
Yasin MalikSrinagar (JKLF Chairman)Advocates complete independence of Jammu & Kashmir, rejected militancy since 1994, jailed for life in India.
Shabir ShahSrinagar (DFP Founder)Calls for UN‑monitored plebiscite, refuses merger with either India or Pakistan, 35+ years imprisoned.
Shabir ChoudhryUK (Diaspora / KNP)Legal voice of the movement, promotes “Third Option” – full independence under international law.
Dr. Toqeer GilaniAJK / Gilgit-Baltistan (JKLF AJK President)Campaigns against Indian, Pakistani, and Chinese control, led major “Azadi March” in 2019.
Abdul Hamid KhanGilgit-Baltistan (BNF Founder)Opposes Pakistani rule and Chinese CPEC influence, demands sovereignty for GB.
Nawaz Khan NajiGilgit-Baltistan (BNF‑Naji Group)Only elected GB leader calling openly for independence, stresses cultural and political autonomy.
Hashim QureshiSrinagar (JKDLP Chairman)Early JKLF co‑founder, now advocates nonviolent struggle for a unified, independent Kashmir.
Masroor Abbas AnsariSrinagar (JKIM / APHC)Shia cleric promoting sectarian unity and self‑determination beyond India‑Pakistan binaries.
JKNSF Youth LeadersAJK & GB grassroots movementMobilize digitally for Azadi marches, reject both Indian and Pakistani sovereignty.
GBUM Youth ActivistsGilgit-BaltistanDemand self‑rule, oppose Pakistan’s constitutional absorption, highlight 1947’s independent GB history.

Why This Matters Beyond Kashmir

The independence movement in Jammu, Kashmir, and Gilgit-Baltistan is not just a regional dispute. It raises deeper questions about how borders are drawn, how people are governed, and whether international law still has space for genuine self-determination.

It challenges the assumption that the partitions of the 20th century were final. It reminds the world that Kashmir remains one of the last disputes still listed on the United Nations agenda. And it forces global powers to consider how an independent Kashmir—positioned at the crossroads of South and Central Asia—would affect projects like China’s Belt and Road and America’s Indo-Pacific strategy.

As veteran journalist Ahmed Rashid observes: “Kashmir’s independence struggle is the ghost at the feast of India-Pakistan relations. However much both states try to ignore it, the idea refuses to die.”

The Road Ahead

The space for peaceful activism is narrowing. In Indian-administered Kashmir, counterinsurgency operations and strict laws silence dissent. In Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan clamps down on pro-independence voices, particularly those who oppose Chinese-backed development projects.

Yet despite repression, the idea of azadi persists. Families continue to honor the sacrifices of leaders like Yasin Malik. Shabir Shah’s writings smuggled from prison circulate quietly among young activists. Diaspora groups in London, Brussels, and New York keep the issue alive in international forums. And digitally savvy Kashmiri youth find new ways to connect their struggle with other global independence movements.

For its supporters, independence is no longer just a slogan of the past. It is a living political vision—a demand for dignity, recognition, and the right to self-determination. As long as these voices endure, the dream of a free Kashmir—beyond India, Pakistan, and China—will continue to survive.

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