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The Best LED Lights for Any Room: A Complete Guide to Modern Room Lighting in 2026

The lights in your room do more than help you see. They shape your mood, your sleep, your productivity, and even how big the space feels. Yet most people treat lighting as an afterthought — a single ceiling fixture installed by a contractor and never reconsidered.
That is changing. In 2026, LED technology has made it possible to control color temperature, brightness, and even the direction of light with precision that was impossible a decade ago. The result is that room lighting has become a design tool, not just a utility.
Whether you are renovating in London, furnishing a new apartment in Dubai, or simply tired of a space that feels flat, understanding your options for LED lights for room design is the fastest way to transform how a room feels without changing a single piece of furniture.

Types of LED Lights for Rooms: What Actually Works

Ceiling Lights: The Foundation

Ceiling lights are still the starting point for most rooms. The key decision is between flush-mount fixtures, semi-flush mounts, and pendant lights.
Flush-mount LED ceiling lights sit close to the ceiling and work best in rooms with low ceilings — typically under 2.4 meters (8 feet). They provide even, diffused light that eliminates shadows. Modern designs have moved far beyond the boring white discs of the past. Today you can find geometric LED panels, ring-shaped fixtures, and starburst designs that function as art while they light the room.
Modern LED ceiling light with starburst design in contemporary living room
Semi-flush mounts hang slightly lower — usually 10 to 20 centimeters from the ceiling. They add depth and dimension, and the gap between fixture and ceiling creates a subtle uplight effect that makes ceilings feel higher. These work well in rooms with ceilings between 2.4 and 2.7 meters.
Pendant lights and chandeliers are statement pieces. A cluster of three small pendants over a dining table, or a single oversized drum shade in a living room, creates a focal point. LED pendant lights now come in adjustable color temperatures, allowing you to shift from warm white (2700K) for dinner to daylight (5000K) for reading.

LED Strip Lights: The Game Changer

If ceiling lights are the foundation, LED strip lights are the secret weapon. These flexible, adhesive-backed strips can be installed almost anywhere — under cabinets, behind TVs, along baseboards, inside closets, or hidden in ceiling coves.
LED strip lights creating ambient cove lighting in a cozy bedroom
The effect is called indirect lighting — light that bounces off walls and ceilings rather than shining directly into your eyes. It is softer, more flattering, and creates depth that overhead lights cannot match.
For bedrooms, warm white LED strips (2700K–3000K) installed behind a headboard or under a floating bed frame create a hotel-like ambiance. For living rooms, RGB strips hidden in ceiling coves allow you to shift the entire mood of the room with a phone app — from energizing daylight blue to relaxing sunset orange.
RGB LED strip lights creating colorful ambient lighting in a modern bedroom

Smart Bulbs and Connected Lighting

Smart LED bulbs have matured beyond gimmick status. The best systems — Philips Hue, LIFX, Nanoleaf — now offer reliable connectivity, intuitive apps, and integration with voice assistants like Alexa, Google Assistant, and Siri.
The real value is not in turning lights on with your voice. It is in scenes — pre-programmed combinations of color, brightness, and which fixtures are active. A “Movie Night” scene might dim the ceiling light to 10%, turn on warm backlighting behind the TV, and kill every other light in the room. A “Morning” scene could gradually increase brightness and shift from warm amber to cool white over 30 minutes to simulate sunrise.

How to Choose LED Lights for Each Room

Living Room: Layered and Flexible

The living room is the most demanding space because it serves multiple purposes — entertaining, relaxing, reading, watching television. The solution is layered lighting: three or more light sources at different heights and intensities.
Base layer: A dimmable LED ceiling fixture providing general illumination. Aim for 1,500–3,000 lumens for a standard living room.
Accent layer: LED strips behind the TV or media unit reduce eye strain and add depth. Wall-mounted picture lights or adjustable spotlights highlight artwork or architectural features.
Task layer: A floor lamp with a focused beam for reading. A table lamp on a side table for softer evening light.
Modern living room with layered LED lighting including ceiling fixture and ambient strips

Bedroom: Warm and Restrained

Sleep quality is directly affected by light exposure. Blue-rich light suppresses melatonin production, making it harder to fall asleep. For bedrooms, the rule is simple: warm light, dimmable, minimal overhead exposure.
Overhead: If you must have a ceiling light, use a dimmable fixture with a very warm color temperature (2200K–2700K) and keep it off after sunset.
Bedside: Wall-mounted reading lights with focused beams allow one person to read while the other sleeps. Choose fixtures with a switch on the head so you do not need to reach for a wall switch.
Ambient: LED strips behind the headboard or under the bed frame provide enough light to navigate the room without turning on overhead fixtures. Warm white (2700K) or even amber (2200K) is ideal.
Warm ambient bedroom lighting with LED strips behind headboard

Kitchen: Bright and Functional

Kitchens need high-output, shadow-free lighting for safety and functionality. The standard recommendation is 5,000–10,000 lumens for an average kitchen, achieved through multiple sources.
Overhead: Recessed LED downlights spaced evenly across the ceiling. For a 3×4 meter kitchen, six to eight fixtures are typical.
Under-cabinet: LED strip lights installed on the underside of wall cabinets eliminate the shadows cast by overhead lights on countertops. This is where you do your actual food preparation, so the light needs to be bright (4000K–5000K) and even.
Pendant lights: Over an island or breakfast bar, two or three pendants at eye level create atmosphere and task lighting simultaneously.

Home Office: Task-Focused and Glare-Free

The mistake most people make in home offices is relying on a single ceiling light. That creates glare on screens and uneven illumination across the workspace.
Overhead: A dimmable, diffused ceiling fixture set to around 3000K–4000K.
Desk lamp: An adjustable LED desk lamp with a CRI (Color Rendering Index) above 90. High CRI means colors look accurate — important if your work involves design, photography, or any visual task.
Bias lighting: A simple LED strip behind your monitor reduces eye strain by balancing the brightness between screen and surrounding wall.

Color Temperature: The Most Important Number

LED lights are labeled with a Kelvin (K) rating that describes color temperature. This matters more than brightness for how a room feels.
TemperatureColorBest For
2200K–2700KWarm white, candle-likeBedrooms, living rooms, restaurants
3000K–3500KSoft white, neutralBathrooms, hallways, closets
4000K–4500KCool white, crispKitchens, offices, retail spaces
5000K–6500KDaylight, blue-whiteTask lighting, garages, workshops
The mistake is using daylight (5000K+) in living spaces. It feels sterile and clinical. Warm light (2700K) in a kitchen, on the other hand, makes food look dull and unappetizing.
For maximum flexibility, choose tunable white LED fixtures that allow you to shift across the range. Smart bulbs and many modern ceiling fixtures now offer this as standard.

What to Look for When Buying LED Room Lights

Brightness: Lumens, Not Watts

Old habits die hard. People still think in watts because that is how incandescent bulbs were rated. LEDs are rated in lumens — actual light output.
  • 450 lumens ≈ 40W incandescent (bedside lamp)
  • 800 lumens ≈ 60W incandescent (standard room light)
  • 1,600 lumens ≈ 100W incandescent (bright task lighting)
For a living room of 20 square meters, you want roughly 3,000–4,000 lumens total from all sources combined.

Color Rendering Index (CRI)

CRI measures how accurately colors appear under a light source compared to natural sunlight. A CRI of 80 is acceptable. 90 or above is ideal for any space where color matters — kitchens, bathrooms, closets, and anywhere you apply makeup or evaluate fabrics.
Cheap LED strips often have a CRI below 80, which makes skin tones look sickly and food look unappealing. Spending slightly more for high-CRI LEDs is worth it.

Dimming Compatibility

Not all LEDs dim properly. Some flicker at low levels. Some buzz. Some simply shut off below 20% brightness.
If you want dimmable lights, buy dimmable-rated LEDs and pair them with compatible dimmer switches. The packaging should specify “dimmable” and list compatible switch types (trailing-edge dimmers work best with LEDs).

Lifespan and Warranty

Quality LED fixtures should last 25,000 to 50,000 hours — roughly 15 to 25 years of normal residential use. Be skeptical of claims beyond that. Also check the warranty: reputable manufacturers offer 3 to 5 years.

Budget Reality: What LED Room Lighting Actually Costs

LED lighting has become affordable, but there is a wide range.
  • Basic LED bulbs: $3–$8 each
  • Smart LED bulbs (Philips Hue, LIFX): $15–$50 each
  • LED strip lights (5 meters, basic): $10–$25
  • LED strip lights (high-quality, high-CRI): $30–$80
  • Flush-mount ceiling fixture (basic): $30–$80
  • Designer LED ceiling fixture: $150–$500+
  • Smart lighting system starter kit: $100–$300
For a complete living room lighting upgrade — new ceiling fixture, LED strips, two table lamps, and smart bulbs — expect to spend $300–$800 depending on quality and brand choices.
The payoff is energy savings. A 10W LED bulb produces the same light as a 60W incandescent. Over 25,000 hours, the electricity savings alone cover the purchase price multiple times.

Installation: What You Can Do Yourself

Most LED room lighting upgrades are DIY-friendly.
LED bulbs: Simple replacement. No tools needed.
LED strip lights: Peel-and-stick adhesive backing. Most come with plug-in power supplies. The only challenge is hiding wires — tuck them behind furniture, under cabinets, or use cable channels.
Ceiling fixtures: If you are replacing an existing fixture, basic wiring knowledge is enough. Turn off the breaker, disconnect old fixture, connect new one (typically three wires: live, neutral, ground). If you are not comfortable with electrical work, hire an electrician. It is a 30-minute job that should cost $50–$150 in labor.
Smart systems: Setup is app-based. The challenge is planning — deciding which rooms to start with, which scenes to program, and how to integrate with existing switches.

The Bottom Line

The right LED lights for your room depend on what the room is for, how big it is, and what atmosphere you want to create. There is no single correct answer. A bedroom needs warmth and restraint. A kitchen needs brightness and precision. A living room needs layers and flexibility.
What is universal is that LED technology has made it possible to achieve professional-quality lighting at consumer prices. The fixtures are smaller, more efficient, and more versatile than ever. The only limit is imagination — and maybe your ceiling height.

SCOM Packages 2026: The Complete Guide to Internet, Call, and SIM Bundles in Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu & Kashmir

SCOM stands for the Special Communications Organization, a state-run telecom provider that is the sole source of 3G and 4G mobile services across Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJ&K). Launched in 2004, SCOM made history by bringing the first 4G network to these mountainous regions, covering 450 cities and villages where private operators like Jazz, Zong, Ufone, and Telenor have little or no presence.
For residents, SCOM is not a choice. It is the only signal available. For tourists, trekkers, and anyone traveling through the region, a SCOM SIM is essential. The network’s monopoly is a structural reality shaped by geography, policy, and decades of underinvestment in telecom infrastructure across Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
That monopoly shapes everything — from what you pay to how reliable your connection is.

SCOM Internet Packages 2026

SCOM offers internet bundles across daily, weekly, and monthly cycles. Activation is done through USSD codes, primarily via *111#.

Daily Internet Packages

PackageDataNight DataValidityPriceCode
Daily 200 MB200 MB1 DayRs. 20*111#
Daily Plus500 MB1 DayRs. 29*111#
Daily 500250 MB250 MB1 DayRs. 28*151#
Daily Social1 GB1 GB1 DayRs. 28*198#
Daily YouTube1 GB1 GB1 DayRs. 17*171#

Weekly Internet Packages

PackageDataNight DataValidityPriceCode
Weekly 800 MB800 MB7 DaysRs. 80*111#
Weekly Social Pack7 GB (social)7 DaysRs. 80*111#
Super Weekly1 GB1 GB7 DaysRs. 129*111#
Weekly Dhamaka3 GB7 DaysRs. 150*111#
Weekly 6 GB3 GB3 GB7 DaysRs. 170*751#
Weekly Social7 GB3 GB7 DaysRs. 160*771#

SCOM Monthly Internet Packages

PackageDataNight DataValidityPriceCode
Monthly Starter10 GB30 DaysRs. 500*111#
Monthly Smart25 GB30 DaysRs. 1,100*111#
Monthly Gold6 GB30 DaysRs. 449*111#
Monthly Premium10 GB30 DaysRs. 549*111#
Monthly Premium (updated)25 GB10 GB30 DaysRs. 799*3051#
Monthly Data Max35 GB15 GB30 DaysRs. 999*3052#
Social Media Package7 GB (social)30 DaysRs. 300*111#

Other Internet Packages

PackageDataNight DataValidityPriceCode
3-Day Offer3 GB1 GB3 DaysRs. 80*354#
15-Day Offer10 GB5 GB15 DaysRs. 340*755#
Fortnightly5 GB14 DaysRs. 500*111#

SCOM Call Packages 2026

SCOM offers dedicated call bundles and hybrid packages that combine minutes, SMS, and data.

Standalone Call Packages

PackageOn-Net MinutesOff-Net MinutesSMSValidityPriceCode
24 Ghantay (AJK)Unlimited (family)1601 DayRs. 15 + tax*725#
Azadi CallUnlimited (7 AM–10 AM)149201 DayRs. 0.99–1.49/min*725#
Kashmir PackageUnlimited149301 DayRs. 0.99–1.49/min*725#
Pura Din BaateinUnlimited (6 AM–6 PM)160Free (6 AM–6 PM)1 DayRs. 8 LR*725#

SCOM Super Card / Hybrid Packages

PackageOn-NetOff-NetSMSInternetValidityPriceCode
Mini Card800702,0001 GB15 DaysRs. 300*549*4#
Surprise Mini Super1,000803,0001.5 GB20 DaysRs. 350*549*4#
Super Load Mini1,6001004,0002 GB + 2 GB night15 DaysRs. 350*549*4#
Super Load Gold4,0002005,0005 GB + 5 GB night30 DaysRs. 749*549*1#
Mega Monthly5,0003005,00010 GB + 5 GB night30 DaysRs. 849*549*5#
Super Card Gold3,0002003,0005 GB + free Facebook30 DaysRs. 550*111#
Monthly Ultra20,0002,0002,000200 GB30 DaysRs. 1,699*200#
SCOM SMS Packages 2026
PackageSMSDataValidityPriceCode
Daily SMS100 SMS + 1,000 on-net minutes50 MB1 DayRs. 12*725#
Monthly SMS3,000 SMS30 DaysRs. 100*725#
Monthly SMS + WhatsApp20,000 SMS (FUP)300 MB WhatsApp30 DaysRs. 50*725#
Student Package15,000 SMS1 GB + 250 on-net + 50 off-net minutes30 DaysRs. 300*725#

Essential SCOM USSD Codes

FunctionCode
Main menu*111#
Check balance*0#
Check remaining data/minutes/SMS*124# or *125#
Activate call packages*725#
Balance share (AJK)*128*Amount*Number#
Balance share (GB)*128*Number*Amount#
Islamic services*786#
The Monopoly Problem: Why SCOM Costs More Than It Should
On paper, SCOM’s prices look reasonable. A monthly package with 25 GB for Rs. 799 is cheaper than what many private operators charge in mainland Pakistan. But the reality on the ground is more complicated.
A Reddit user from AJK described their experience in stark terms: 15 Mbps fixed internet costs Rs. 3,400 per month with a 700 GB cap, while 100 Mbps costs Rs. 31,700 — plus a Rs. 40,000 “security fee” with no clear explanation.
The user noted that in the US, 100 Mbps starts at roughly $30 (Rs. 8,500) with unlimited data and no surprise charges.
The complaint is not unique. Because SCOM is the only provider in the region, there is no competitive pressure to lower prices or improve service. Users cannot switch to another operator. They cannot negotiate. They pay what SCOM charges, or they go without.
This is a classic monopoly dynamic, and it disproportionately affects a region already struggling with economic challenges. For students relying on internet access for online classes, for small businesses trying to operate digitally, and for families sharing a single connection across multiple devices, the cost is a real burden.

Coverage vs. Quality: The Trade-Off

SCOM’s strength is coverage. Its network reaches 450 cities and villages across Gilgit-Baltistan and AJK, including areas where no other operator has a signal.
For a region defined by mountainous terrain and scattered settlements, that coverage is genuinely valuable. But coverage does not equal quality. Signal strength varies dramatically with terrain and weather. In remote valleys, users report dropped calls, slow data speeds, and intermittent connectivity. The “night data” included in many packages is partly a concession to network congestion — speeds are often better between 1 AM and 9 AM when fewer people are online.
For tourists and short-term visitors, SCOM’s daily and weekly packages offer flexibility. But for long-term residents, the lack of alternatives means accepting whatever service quality is available.

What the SCOM Monopoly Means for Kashmir’s Digital Future

The telecom gap in Pakistan-administered Kashmir is not just an inconvenience. It is a structural disadvantage.
In India-administered Kashmir, private operators compete aggressively. Jio, Airtel, and BSNL offer 4G and now 5G services across the valley. Prices are lower. Data allowances are higher. The market, however imperfect, creates pressure for improvement.
In Gilgit-Baltistan and AJK, that pressure does not exist. SCOM’s monopoly is a policy choice — the result of licensing decisions that have kept private operators out of the region. Whether that is justified on security grounds, commercial grounds, or bureaucratic inertia, the effect is the same: residents pay more for less.
The consequences extend beyond individual frustration. Poor connectivity limits economic development. It restricts access to online education and telemedicine. It makes it harder for local businesses to reach national and international markets. And it reinforces the sense, common across both sides of the Line of Control, that Kashmir’s peripherality is taken for granted by the powers that govern it.

New Mirpur City: How Mangla Dam Wiped Out an Old City and Built a New One — And Why It Still Defines Kashmir’s Diaspora

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In the early 1960s, the old city of Mirpur began to disappear. The Jhelum River was rising, slowly at first, then with terrifying speed. Villages, mosques, markets, and ancestral homes were swallowed by the reservoir of the Mangla Dam — one of the largest earth-filled dams ever built. When the gates finally closed, an estimated 280 villages had vanished, and between 100,000 and 150,000 people had been displaced.
For the people of Mirpur, this was not abstract development. It was the second uprooting in a generation. Fifteen years after Partition, they were being forced from their lands again — this time not by war, but by a dam built in the name of national progress. Families watched bulldozers tear through homes that had stood for centuries. Graveyards were relocated. Orchards were destroyed. Mosques that once echoed with the adhaan became islands before vanishing beneath the waves.
The government promised compensation and resettlement. In practice, support was uneven and inadequate. New housing colonies were built, but jobs were scarce, infrastructure was poor, and the pain of losing not just property but community was immense. For many, survival meant looking beyond Kashmir.
What emerged from this tragedy was New Mirpur City — and a migration that would reshape both Kashmir and Britain.

Building New Mirpur City: Resettlement as Urban Planning

New Mirpur City was not built from scratch. It was constructed as a planned resettlement for families displaced by the Mangla Dam, which was completed in 1967 as part of the Indus Basin Replacement Works following the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty.
The original dam displaced roughly 81,000 people and submerged approximately 67,800 acres of land.
The resettlement was one of the largest of its kind in the world at that time. New Mirpur City and five surrounding hamlets were developed at a cost of Rs. 240 million (approximately $50 million at the time).
The city was designed with roads, schools, water storage tanks, and public buildings — a deliberate effort to replace what had been lost.
But the resettlement was flawed. Many families allotted land in Punjab and Sindh could not settle there due to unfavorable conditions. Others never received the plots or compensation they were promised. The displacement of an entire population away from their culture and kin was, by most accounts, not a success.
Decades later, history repeated itself. The Mangla Dam Raising Project (2004–2009) raised the dam by 30 feet, displacing another 63,000 people.
This time, lessons had been learned. The new resettlement was planned in consultation with affectees, and all displaced families were relocated in close vicinity rather than scattered across provinces. A new city near Mirpur and four satellite towns — Islamgarh, Chakswari, Dadyal, and Siakh — were developed with modern infrastructure, vocational training institutes, and public utility buildings.
The compensation package was unprecedented: market-rate land payments plus 15%, replacement housing costs, residential plots, and skills training. Over Rs. 75 billion was spent on resettlement — far more than the dam-raising works themselves.

“Little England”: The Diaspora Connection

New Mirpur City’s story cannot be separated from the British Kashmiri diaspora. As the old city sank, Britain was rebuilding after World War II and facing severe labor shortages in its textile mills, foundries, and public transport. The Pakistan government negotiated with the UK to allow displaced Mangla families to migrate as part of a resettlement program.
Thousands of Mirpuris arrived in Bradford, Birmingham, Oldham, Sheffield, Derby, and Luton in the early 1960s. They came with little more than suitcases and the addresses of distant relatives. Their work was tough — long factory hours, cold winters, language barriers. But they brought with them values of hard work and community solidarity.
Today, there are an estimated 747,000 Mirpuris in the United Kingdom, forming roughly 70% of the British Pakistani community.

Mirpur itself is often called “Little England” — many shops accept the pound sterling, British products fill the shelves, and houses stand empty for much of the year, occupied only when owners return from Birmingham or Luton for holidays

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Remittances from the UK became the lifeblood of Azad Kashmir’s economy. They funded schools, mosques, hospitals, and businesses. The diaspora transformed Mirpur from a displaced community into a prosperous town with strong transnational ties.

Modern Mirpur: From Resettlement to Real Estate Hub

New Mirpur City has evolved far beyond its origins as a resettlement colony. Today, it is one of the fastest-growing urban centers in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, driven by diaspora investment, infrastructure projects, and large-scale housing developments.
Mega housing projects are transforming the city’s landscape. Gated communities like Citi Housing Mirpur promise “waterfront luxurious living” with dam-facing plots, gold-standard amenities, and international-standard infrastructure

The project, spread across multiple districts including a Gold District, Business District, Eco Forest District, and Meadows District, offers plots ranging from 5 marla to 4 kanal.
Real estate prices in Mirpur remain lower than in Lahore, Karachi, or Islamabad, making it attractive to overseas Pakistanis seeking both emotional connection and financial return.
Commercial investment is also booming, with rental yields between 8% and 12% — higher than the national average.
The OPF Housing Scheme at Chittarpari, approved in 1981 and spread over 5,710 kanals (714 acres), created 2,957 residential and 195 commercial plots. Development works for all three phases are complete, and colonization is ongoing with over 170 houses already constructed.

Infrastructure That Could Change Everything

Two infrastructure projects could redefine New Mirpur City’s future.
The first is the Mirpur Dry Port, inaugurated in August 2022 after more than 30 years of demand. Built on a 110-kanal plot at an estimated cost of Rs. 815.8 million, the dry port is expected to become an industrial hub and serve the cargo needs of hundreds of thousands of UK-based expatriates.
Dry ports function as intermodal terminals connected to seaports, handling bulk cargo, generating employment, and alleviating poverty.
The second is the long-awaited Mirpur International Airport. In late 2025, the Pakistan government greenlit the project, with the Pakistan Airports Authority commencing technical feasibility studies including site identification and environmental assessments. Authorities expect the feasibility study to be completed by December 2025, with construction to begin in the current financial year.
The airport is a direct response to pressure from the British Kashmiri diaspora — British Members of Parliament wrote to Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif urging its construction.
Currently, travelers to Mirpur face a journey of over 120 kilometers from Islamabad International Airport. The new airport would provide direct air access, reducing travel time and stimulating economic growth.

CPEC and the Special Economic Zone

Mirpur’s strategic importance extends beyond diaspora ties. Under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) is planned for Mirpur, spread over 1,078 acres of mixed-industry land.
The SEZ is situated just 22 km from GT Road and 140 km from Sialkot, and would connect to the main CPEC route via the Mansehra-Muzaffarabad-Mirpur-Mangla Expressway (M4).
The M4 expressway, stretching approximately 200 km at an estimated cost of Rs. 264 billion, will be the shortest route from Central Punjab to CPEC through Azad Kashmir. It includes four tunnels totaling 3 km, 122 bridges, and 260 culverts, with a designed speed limit of 120 km/hr.
The road will reduce travel time between Muzaffarabad and Mirpur from six hours to approximately three and a half hours.
For the SEZ, Mirpur’s diaspora connection is seen as a unique advantage. Over half a million overseas Mirpuris, primarily in the UK, form the backbone of an informal garment industry already rooted in the city. With the UK-based Kashmiri diaspora as the chief target market, the industry is estimated to be worth 8–10 million rupees per annum. The SEZ could transform these informal units into formal industrial operations.

The Unfinished Story

New Mirpur City is a city of layers. Beneath its modern housing schemes and commercial plazas lies the memory of 280 submerged villages. Behind its prosperity is the labor of a diaspora that rebuilt their lives in British factory towns. Its future depends on infrastructure projects — an airport, a dry port, a CPEC corridor — that have been promised for decades.
The Mangla Dam gave Pakistan water and electricity. It took from Kashmiris a landscape of belonging. New Mirpur City was meant to compensate for that loss. Whether it has succeeded depends on who you ask.
For the elderly who remember watching the Jhelum rise, the city will always be a reminder of what was taken. For the diaspora who return each summer to houses built with British wages, it is a bridge between two worlds. For the investors buying waterfront plots and commercial plazas, it is an emerging market with untapped potential.
What is clear is that New Mirpur City is not just a place. It is a story — of displacement and resilience, of loss and reinvention, of a community that was forced to leave its land and then, across an ocean, found the means to rebuild it.

Ranbir Penal Code: The Kashmir Law That Survived 87 Years — And Why It Still Matters

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The Ranbir Penal Code (RPC) was the criminal law of Jammu and Kashmir for nearly nine decades — from 1932 until its repeal in October 2019. Named after Maharaja Ranbir Singh of the Dogra dynasty, it was Kashmir’s answer to the Indian Penal Code (IPC), drafted by the same British colonial framework but tailored to the princely state’s administrative and cultural needs.
Unlike the IPC, which governed the rest of India, the RPC was protected by Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. That provision gave Jammu and Kashmir autonomy over its internal laws — including its own penal code, its own constitution, and its own flag. The RPC was not merely a copy of the IPC. It contained key differences: stricter provisions on cow slaughter, omissions of maritime and extraterritorial offenses, and unique sections on corruption in public contracts.
For Kashmiris, the RPC was more than a legal text. It was a symbol of the region’s distinct constitutional status — a status that was unilaterally revoked on 5 August 2019.

Why Kashmir Had Its Own Penal Code

The RPC was enacted in 1932 (Samvat 1989) under the reign of Maharaja Hari Singh, though it drew its name from his predecessor, Ranbir Singh, who had consolidated civil and criminal laws during his rule from 1856 to 1885.
The code was modeled closely on the IPC of 1860 but adapted for local governance. It replaced “India” with “Jammu and Kashmir State” throughout its provisions and added sections that reflected Dogra-era priorities — most notably, Sections 298A to 298D, which criminalized cow slaughter with penalties of up to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment.
After 1947, when the princely state acceded to India, the RPC remained in force. Article 370 shielded it from automatic replacement by central laws. While the IPC was amended dozens of times over the decades, the RPC saw far fewer updates — a fact that later drew both criticism and scholarly attention.
The code’s longevity was remarkable. For 87 years, it survived India’s partition, three wars over Kashmir, the insurgency of the 1990s, and multiple constitutional amendments. It outlasted the Dogra dynasty that created it, the monarchy itself, and even the state of Jammu and Kashmir as a political entity. That endurance was not accidental. It was a direct consequence of Article 370, which carved out a legal space for Kashmir that no other Indian state enjoyed.

Key Differences Between RPC and IPC

Several provisions set the RPC apart from the IPC, and these differences carried real legal consequences for Kashmiris:
FeatureRanbir Penal CodeIndian Penal Code
Cow slaughterSections 298A-298D: Up to 10 years imprisonmentNo equivalent provision
SextortionSection 354E added in 2018Added later in national reforms
Cheating in government contractsSection 420A: Specific provisionNo direct equivalent
Maritime/offshore crimesOmittedCovered under IPC
Dowry deathNot explicitly definedSection 304B
AdulterySection 497 (struck down by Supreme Court in 2019)Section 497 (also struck down)
Rape punishmentMinimum 8 years imprisonmentMinimum 7 years imprisonment
Rape causing vegetative stateMinimum 25 years imprisonmentMinimum 20 years imprisonment
Driving license cancellation for rapistsMandatoryNot applicable
The RPC’s Section 354E, added in December 2018, made Jammu and Kashmir the first Indian jurisdiction to explicitly criminalize “sextortion” — the abuse of authority for sexual favors. This was a progressive step that, ironically, came just months before the code itself was repealed.
Conversely, the RPC lacked several IPC amendments that had modernized criminal law elsewhere in India, including provisions on dowry deaths and cybercrimes targeting Indian computer resources.
Perhaps most striking was the RPC’s approach to sexual violence. Research published in 2020 found that the RPC was actually more rigorous than the IPC in punishing rape. Where the IPC prescribed a minimum of seven years, the RPC mandated eight. For rape resulting in permanent vegetative state, the RPC imposed a minimum of 25 years — five years more than the IPC. The RPC also uniquely mandated the cancellation of driving licenses for convicted rapists, a provision absent from the IPC.
Yet the RPC also contained regressive elements. Its Section 497 on adultery, mirroring the IPC’s version, treated women as property of their husbands and was ultimately struck down by the Supreme Court. The RPC’s Section 190A gave the government sweeping powers to punish anyone circulating material deemed “forfeited” — a provision critics argued undermined press freedom.

The Repeal: 5 August 2019 and What Changed

On 5 August 2019, the Indian Parliament abrogated Article 370 and passed the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019. The RPC was repealed effective 31 October 2019, and the IPC was extended to the newly formed Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh.
The transition was abrupt. Thousands of cases pending under the RPC had to be adjudicated under a new legal framework. Courts faced questions about whether offenses committed under the RPC could be prosecuted under the IPC, and whether procedural changes would affect ongoing trials.
In a notable case, the Supreme Court struck down Section 497 of the RPC (adultery) as unconstitutional on 2 August 2019 — just three days before the code itself was replaced.
The ruling cited violations of Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Indian Constitution, but its practical impact was limited by the imminent repeal.
The Reorganisation Act was not merely a legal technicality. It repealed 153 state laws and extended 106 central laws to the newly formed union territories.
The scale of this legislative overhaul was unprecedented in Indian constitutional history. No other state had seen its entire legal framework dismantled and replaced in a single parliamentary act.
Legal challenges followed immediately. Petitions were filed by members of parliament, former bureaucrats, advocates, and activists. The Jammu and Kashmir National Conference challenged the presidential orders and the Reorganisation Act in the Supreme Court, arguing that the downgrading of Jammu and Kashmir from a state to a union territory violated constitutional federalism.
On 11 December 2023, the Supreme Court upheld the act as constitutional but directed the central government to restore statehood “as soon as possible”.

From IPC to BNS: Kashmir’s Laws Keep Shifting

The legal upheaval did not end with the IPC. On 1 July 2024, the IPC itself was repealed nationwide and replaced by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 — a new criminal code that also applies to Jammu and Kashmir.
The BNS introduces community service as a form of punishment and removes the colonial-era offense of sedition, replacing it with a broader charge of acts endangering India’s sovereignty. For Kashmir, this means the region has now moved from the RPC to the IPC to the BNS in less than five years — a pace of legal change unmatched in any other part of India.
What the BNS does not restore, however, are the RPC’s unique provisions. The explicit ban on cow slaughter, for instance, is no longer part of the general penal framework. In July 2020, an NGO petitioned the Jammu and Kashmir High Court to reintroduce such protections, citing both environmental and religious concerns.
The BNS also does not replicate the RPC’s tougher sentencing for sexual offenses. The driving license cancellation for rapists — a distinctive RPC provision — has no equivalent in the new code. For women’s rights advocates in Kashmir, this represents a step backward disguised as legal modernization.

Why the RPC Still Matters

The repeal of the Ranbir Penal Code was not just a technical legal change. It was the erasure of a legal identity that had defined Kashmir’s criminal justice system for 87 years. The RPC represented:
Constitutional distinctiveness — a visible marker of Article 370’s autonomy. For decades, the RPC was proof that Kashmir was not just another Indian state. It had its own laws, its own legal traditions, and its own approach to justice.
Local legal evolution — adaptations to Kashmir’s specific social and governance needs. The RPC’s provisions on cow slaughter reflected the agrarian realities of a livestock-dependent economy. Its Section 420A on cheating in government contracts addressed corruption in public works — a persistent problem in the region. These were not abstract legal curiosities; they were responses to real conditions on the ground.
Historical continuity — a direct link to the Dogra-era judicial reforms. Maharaja Ranbir Singh had established regular courts and replaced feudal arbitrariness with codified law. The RPC was the culmination of that project, a legal framework that outlasted the monarchy itself.
Its replacement by the IPC, and now the BNS, reflects a broader centralization of Kashmir’s legal framework. Whether this brings greater legal uniformity or diminishes region-specific protections remains a subject of debate among jurists and rights observers.
For the legal community in Kashmir, the transition has been fraught. Lawyers who spent decades mastering the RPC had to relearn an entirely new code. Judges faced cases filed under one statute that now had to be decided under another. The abruptness of the change — with no transition period, no training, no consultation — drew criticism from bar associations across the region.
For ordinary Kashmiris, the practical impact has been mixed. Some provisions of the IPC and now the BNS offer stronger protections — particularly around cybercrimes and modern forms of fraud. But the loss of the RPC’s unique provisions, especially its tougher stance on sexual violence, has left gaps that the new codes have not fully filled.

The Bigger Picture: Legal Identity and Political Control

The story of the Ranbir Penal Code is ultimately a story about legal identity and political control. Laws are not neutral instruments. They reflect the values, priorities, and power structures of the societies that create them. The RPC was born in a princely state seeking to assert its sovereignty against British colonial encroachment. It survived because Article 370 gave Kashmir a constitutional space to be different. And it died because that space was deemed unacceptable by a government determined to enforce uniformity.
The question now is whether uniformity serves justice. The BNS applies equally to all of India — but India is not uniform. Kashmir’s history, demographics, and political circumstances are not those of Gujarat or Tamil Nadu. A criminal code that ignores these differences may achieve legal consistency, but it risks sacrificing relevance.
For journalists, researchers, and anyone seeking to understand Kashmir’s legal history, the RPC remains essential reading. It tells the story of a region that once wrote its own laws — and what happened when that power was taken away.
The RPC may be repealed, but it is not forgotten. Its provisions live on in the case law of Kashmir’s courts. Its principles continue to inform legal scholarship. And its history serves as a reminder that Kashmir’s relationship with India was once defined by autonomy, not absorption.

The $25 Billion Question: America’s Hidden War Bill and the Human Cost of the Iran Conflict

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In a nondescript hearing room on Capitol Hill, a Pentagon official named Jules Hurst did something that rarely happens in the fog of war. He told the truth about money. For months, as American and Israeli forces engaged with Iran across the Middle East—from the straits of Hormuz to the skies over Lebanon—lawmakers had been asking a simple question: How much is this costing? On Tuesday, Hurst, the comptroller at the Department of Defence, finally gave a number.

Nearly 25 billion dollars. The figure landed in the room like a stone dropped into still water. Outside, in towns like Fayetteville, North Carolina, and San Diego, California, 13 military families have already received the flag-draped coffins that no price tag can ever account for. This is the story of a war fought with missiles and money, but paid for—on all sides—with human breath.

The war between the United States (alongside Israel) and Iran began on February 28. What started as a series of retaliatory strikes after years of shadow warfare—attacks on shipping, nuclear scientist assassinations, drone strikes—escalated into a direct, open confrontation. For nearly six weeks, the region held its breath. On April 8, a fragile ceasefire was brokered. It holds, for now.

But wars do not end when the guns fall silent. They linger in budgets, in hospitals, in the cracked foundations of bombed schools. And for the first time, the Pentagon has put a preliminary price tag on this chapter of violence: $25 billion. According to Reuters, Hurst testified before the House Armed Services Committee that “the bulk of this money has been allocated to ammunition and warfare equipment.”

What he did not specify—and what lawmakers pressed him on—was whether any of that money would go toward rebuilding the infrastructure destroyed in Iran, Lebanon, or other battlegrounds. The silence on that point spoke volumes.

The hearing was not merely an accounting exercise. It was a political battlefield. With US midterm elections just six months away, President Trump’s Republican Party is fighting to maintain its majority in the House. Recent public opinion polls show that Democrats have taken the lead, driven largely by public fatigue with the Iran war.

Only 34 percent of Americans now support the conflict, according to a recent survey. In mid-April, that number was 36 percent—a small drop, but in politics, small drops become avalanches. The war has become unpopular, and unpopular wars cost elections.

Democratic Representative Adam Smith, the ranking member on the committee, expressed a frustration that has been building for months. “I’m glad you answered that question,” he told Hurst, “because we’ve been asking for a long time, and no one has given us the war costs.”

Behind that exchange lies a deeper truth. For ordinary American families—those not receiving Pentagon briefings—the war has shown up not in news headlines but in their wallets. Global oil and gas shipments have been disrupted. Prices for petrol and fertiliser have risen. A farmer in Iowa pays more to fuel his tractor. A mother in Michigan pays more to heat her home. The war reaches everywhere.

Thirteen American service members have been killed so far. Hundreds more wounded. They have names, faces, and stories that statistics erase.

In Arlington National Cemetery, fresh graves are being dug. In hospitals across the country, young men and women who boarded planes with confidence now learn to walk on prosthetic limbs. The Pentagon does not release their names easily, but the families speak when they can.

“The last time I saw my son, he was laughing at the airport,” one mother told a local news station in Texas. “He said, ‘Mom, it’s just another deployment.’ It wasn’t.”

On the other side of the world, in Tehran, in Beirut, in the villages of southern Lebanon, the human cost is harder to count. Iranian hospitals report civilian casualties from airstrikes. Lebanese families have fled the border areas. Israeli cities have endured missile sirens and sleepless nights. War has no single geography of suffering.

In a small café in downtown Washington, a veteran who asked not to be named sat stirring his coffee. “I’ve been in two wars,” he said. “The cost you don’t see is the cost after. The divorces. The suicides. The kids who don’t know their fathers. Twenty-five billion? That’s just the start.”

The Iran war has redrawn the map of Middle Eastern alliances. Three US naval fleets are now deployed in the region, alongside thousands of additional American troops. Israel has conducted ground operations in southern Lebanon. Iran has launched missile barrages toward US bases in Iraq and Syria.

The ceasefire of April 8 is described as “fragile.” Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian—referenced in related news reports—has called Israeli strikes on Lebanon and the resulting casualties “meaningless” to the ceasefire. His words reflect a deeper reality: neither side trusts the other, and neither side has achieved its objectives.

For the United States, the geopolitical calculus is complicated. Iran is not Iraq in 2003. It is a larger, more populous, more militarily capable nation with regional proxies and a population that, despite its grievances with the regime, has shown resilience under external pressure.

The war has also affected global energy markets. Disruption to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz—through which nearly 20 percent of the world’s oil passes—has sent prices fluctuating wildly. China and India, major importers of Middle Eastern oil, have watched with growing unease. Even nations far from the conflict feel the tremors.

Current Situation

As of today, the ceasefire between the US and Iran technically holds. No major strikes have been reported in the past 72 hours. But no peace talks have been announced either. The two sides remain in a state of armed pause—neither war nor peace.

In Washington, the political battle intensifies. President Trump’s approval ratings have declined since the war began. His base remains loyal, but independents and moderate Republicans are drifting away. The Democratic opposition has seized on the war costs and the lack of a clear exit strategy.

The Pentagon continues to maintain a significant military footprint in the region. Three naval battle groups remain on station. Thousands of troops are still deployed. The $25 billion figure, lawmakers were told, is preliminary. The final bill will be higher.

In Iran, the economic situation—already dire due to years of sanctions—has worsened. Infrastructure damage from US strikes remains unrepaired. The Iranian rial has fallen further. For ordinary Iranians, the war has meant longer lines for bread, higher prices for medicine, and the constant hum of drones overhead.

Twenty-five billion dollars is a number that is almost impossible to comprehend. It is more than the GDP of several small countries. It could have built thousands of schools, funded cancer research for a decade, or provided housing for every homeless veteran in America.

Instead, it became ammunition. It became fuel for aircraft carriers. It became the explosive that killed a 22-year-old soldier from Ohio and the missile that shattered a marketplace in Tehran.

Wars are always sold to the public as necessary, as righteous, as quick. They rarely are any of those things. The Iran war, now in its third month of active conflict, has already outlasted many predictions. And while the ceasefire holds for now, both sides are rearming, rethinking, and watching each other across a tense horizon.

For the families of the 13 dead, for the hundreds wounded, for the millions who have paid higher prices at the pump and in their taxes, the war is not a political debate. It is a lived reality. And as the midterm elections approach, American voters will have a chance to pass judgment on that reality.

The $25 billion question remains unanswered: What was it all for? History may provide an answer. But history, as always, will take its time.

High Court Quashes PSA Detention of Doda MLA: Mehraj Malik Walks Free After Seven Months

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Doda, Indian Administered Kashmir: The narrow lanes of Kahra village in Doda district have not seen drums and firecrackers for a long time. For seven months, the house of Mehraj Malik, the sitting Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) from Doda, remained locked. His supporters walked past it in silence, their leader taken away under the stringent Public Safety Act (PSA) on allegations of disturbing public order.

On Tuesday, that silence shattered into celebration. The Jammu and Kashmir High Court quashed the detention order against Malik, ruling that the administration had failed to provide sufficient evidence to justify the curtailment of an elected representative’s personal liberty. As word spread from the courtrooms of Jammu to the orchards of Doda, a wave of joy swept through the constituency, with hundreds taking to the streets not just to celebrate a political victory, but to reclaim a voice they felt had been stolen.

The Public Safety Act is a preventive detention law that allows authorities to hold an individual for up to two years without trial, based on the assessment that they are a threat to “public order.” Unlike ordinary criminal law, the burden of proof in PSA cases is exceptionally low for the state. Over the past three decades, thousands in Kashmir—from street protesters to political leaders—have been detained under the act, often for months or years without ever seeing a charge sheet.

Mehraj Malik, an MLA from the Doda constituency in the Chenab region of Jammu province, was detained seven months ago. The administration accused him of creating obstacles in the maintenance of public peace and order—a broad charge often invoked against vocal political figures. He was sent to jail, cut off from his family, his legislative duties, and the 100,000-plus constituents who had voted him into office.

For the people of Doda, a region that has historically felt neglected by both the former state government and now the Union Territory administration, Malik’s detention was not just a personal blow. It was a message: the elected voice of the Chenab region could be silenced with the stroke of a pen.

Malik’s legal team filed a habeas corpus petition in the High Court, challenging the grounds of his detention. The case was heard by a bench that carefully scrutinized the administration’s dossier of evidence. What they found, according to legal sources, was thin.

The administration had argued that Malik’s speeches and public gatherings “had the potential” to disrupt communal harmony in Doda—a district with a complex demographic history scarred by the militancy of the 1990s. However, the High Court noted that the material provided did not contain specific instances of incitement to violence or actual disturbance of public order.

In its ruling, the court observed—as paraphrased by legal experts present—that the personal liberty of a public representative cannot be curtailed on the basis of vague apprehensions. The judges reportedly remarked that if every strong political speech were deemed a threat to public order, democracy itself would become impossible. The detention order was quashed, and authorities were directed to release Malik immediately.

Outside the court, Malik’s lawyers addressed a small group of reporters. “This is a victory for the rule of law,” one of them said, reading a brief statement. “The High Court has reaffirmed that even under special laws, the state must provide proof, not just suspicion.”

In Doda town, the news travelled through mobile phones like wildfire. By late afternoon, crowds had gathered at the clock tower intersection. Young men, many of whom had campaigned for Malik in the last election, distributed sweets. Women leaned out of balconies, clapping as processions passed below.

“We spent seven months without our voice in the assembly,” said Rashid Ahmed, a fruit grower from Thathri, speaking above the din of drums. “They took him for no reason. Every time we tried to ask an official about road repairs or electricity, they said ‘your MLA is not here.’ Now he will be.”

In Chilhi, a remote village in the upper reaches of the Doda district, an elderly woman who gave only her first name—Fatima—recalled how Malik had helped her family get a pension after her husband died. “He is not just a politician. He comes to our homes. He sits on our floor and drinks our tea. When they took him, we felt orphaned,” she said, tears in her eyes.

Not everyone in Doda is a supporter of Malik’s political ideology. But even among his critics, there is a recognition that the PSA was an excessive tool. “I did not vote for him, but I also do not believe an MLA should be in jail for seven months without a proper trial,” said a shopkeeper near the bus stand who requested anonymity. “This sets a bad precedent. Today it is him, tomorrow it could be anyone.”

The quashing of Malik’s detention comes at a sensitive political moment in the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Since the abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019, the region has been without an elected government. Power lies with the Lieutenant Governor, advised by bureaucrats. The assembly exists only on paper, as elections have not yet been announced for the newly delimited constituencies.

In this vacuum, MLAs like Malik—elected before the 2019 reorganisation—occupy an awkward space. They are technically representatives of the people, but with no assembly to sit in, their role is largely performative: raising issues, meeting officials, and acting as a bridge between citizens and the administration. Detaining such figures under the PSA has been a common strategy, critics argue, to demoralize political opposition without the messiness of a public trial.

Malik’s case is also significant because he hails from the Chenab region—a predominantly Muslim-populated area of Jammu province that has long been overlooked in favor of the Hindu-dominated Jammu city and the Kashmir valley. His release is seen by local political observers as a small but important rebalancing. “The High Court has reminded the administration that the Chenab region’s voice matters,” said a political analyst based in Jammu, speaking on condition of anonymity. “You cannot erase an elected leader from a distant district just because it is easier to do so.”

As of Tuesday evening, the administrative machinery was preparing to comply with the court’s order. Malik is expected to be formally released from jail either later tonight or by Wednesday morning. His family, which has maintained a low profile during his detention, has reportedly begun preparing for his return.

In his home village of Kahra, supporters have been gathering since noon. A large welcome banner has been strung across the main road. Sheep have been bought for a communal feast. Local leaders are organizing a procession from the village entrance to Malik’s house, hoping that he will address the crowd upon his arrival.

However, legal experts note that while the High Court has quashed this particular detention order, the administration could theoretically file a fresh case or issue a new detention order under different provisions. Whether that happens will depend on the political calculations in Srinagar and Delhi. For now, Malik’s team is focused on securing his physical release and ensuring he is not immediately re-arrested.

Mehraj Malik’s seven months in detention will likely become a chapter in the larger story of law and democracy in Kashmir and Jammu. It is a story about a law designed for “rare and exceptional” cases becoming a routine tool of political management. It is also a story about a community in the Chenab Valley that refused to forget its elected representative, even when the state tried to make him invisible.

As the drums beat in Doda and the firecrackers echo off the mountains, the celebrations are not just for one man’s freedom. They are for the principle that an elected voice should not be silenced by suspicion alone. Whether that principle will hold in the months to come—whether Malik will be allowed to speak, to travel, to question the administration without fear of another midnight knock—remains to be seen.

For now, a constituency breathes again. And a 72-year-old law, designed for an era of emergency, has been pushed back, at least for one day, by the weight of a judicial ruling.

As one young supporter in Doda town put it, his voice hoarse from shouting slogans: “The court has spoken. Now let’s see if they listen.”

— The Azadi Times, reporting from Doda and Jammu.

 Shabir Shah Back in Kashmir Custody: Seven Years Later, An Old Case Haunts a Kashmiri Leader

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The last time Shabir Shah saw the soil of the Kashmir valley as a free man, dial-up internet was still a novelty and the Line of Control was just a term in school textbooks. That was 2017. On a cold morning last week, the septuagenarian pro-independence leader was taken off a plane at Jammu airport—handcuffed, escorted by National Investigation Agency (NIA) officers, and driven to a courtroom he had not seen in nearly three decades.

For seven years, he had languished in Delhi’s Tihar Jail. Now, he was back in the region he fought ideologically for, not as a political figure, but as a man on remand. The NIA court in Jammu granted the agency ten days of custody over Shah, in connection with a case first registered against him in 1996—a year when many of today’s young Kashmiri protestors were not yet born.

To understand the haunting persistence of this moment, one must rewind to 2017. Shabir Shah, the veteran chairman of the Democratic Freedom Party (DFP) and a well-known face of the Hurriyat Conference’s hardline faction, was arrested by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) in a money laundering case linked to alleged hawala transactions funding separatist activities in Kashmir. He was sent to Tihar Jail in Delhi and has remained there, with brief interruptions for court appearances, ever since.

Last month, in a rare legal victory, a Delhi court granted him bail in that money laundering case. But freedom did not follow. Before he could walk out of Tihar’s iron gates, the NIA intervened. They had another case—dormant for years—that they wanted to revive. A case dating back to 1996, registered at the police station in Karan Nagar, Srinagar. The charges are tied to alleged “anti-national” speeches and acts of sedition. For the past week, Shah has been held in NIA custody in Delhi before being transported to Jammu for formal remand proceedings.

On April 18, dressed in a simple kurta and shawl, Shah was produced before the NIA court in Jammu. His appearance was fleeting. The courtroom was packed with lawyers, journalists, and a handful of curious onlookers. According to sources present, Shah appeared frail but composed. He did not raise his voice. He did not make political statements. He listened as the NIA argued that he needed ten days of custody for “confrontation and recovery of incriminating material” related to the 1996 case.

His legal team opposed the remand, arguing that Shah is a 72-year-old man with known medical conditions, including diabetes and hypertension. They pointed out that the case is nearly three decades old and that he had already spent seven years in jail on related matters. But the court was not persuaded. The judge granted the ten-day remand, ordering the NIA to produce him again on April 28.

For Shah, this journey—from Delhi’s Tihar to a court in Jammu—marked his first return to the territory of Jammu and Kashmir since his arrest in 2017. But it was not a homecoming. He was taken directly from the airport to the court and then to an undisclosed NIA facility in Jammu. He has not seen Srinagar. He has not seen his family.

In a modest residential lane in downtown Srinagar, Shah’s family has learned to live with absence. His wife, Dilshada, has visited him in Tihar Jail more times than she can count. His daughter was a teenager when he was arrested; she is now a working professional. When news of the ten-day remand reached Srinagar, the house fell silent.

“My husband is not a criminal. He is a political thinker,” Dilshada told a local news agency over the phone, her voice measured but heavy. “If there was a case from 1996, why was it not pursued properly for 21 years before 2017? Why now, when he was about to be released?”

Neighbours recall Shah as a man who rarely left his library. Unlike many separatist leaders who commanded street power, Shah was an intellectual—a man who wrote long letters, gave measured interviews, and spoke of peaceful resistance. His absence has left a vacuum in that corner of Srinagar that no rally or slogan has filled.

Political commentators in the valley note that Shah’s continued detention, even after bail in the primary case, sends a chilling message. “It tells every dissenting voice in Kashmir that there is always another case waiting,” said a retired professor from the University of Kashmir, who requested anonymity for fear of reprisal. “You may win one battle, but the state has an infinite number of files.”

The timing of Shah’s remand is layered. Kashmir has been relatively quiet since August 2019, when the region’s special status was revoked and it was bifurcated into two Union Territories. Mass arrests of separatist leaders in the weeks following that decision emptied the political landscape of organized dissent. Many of Shah’s contemporaries—Yasin Malik, Masarat Alam, and others—remain either in jail or under house arrest.

Bringing Shah physically to Jammu, rather than conducting proceedings via video link (as is common for Tihar inmates), is seen by legal observers as a strategic move. It allows the NIA to interrogate him in a controlled environment, away from the political atmosphere of Delhi. It also serves as a symbolic reminder: no leader, no matter how long they have been incarcerated, is beyond the reach of new legal tangles.

The 1996 case itself is rooted in the peak years of the armed insurgency in Kashmir. That year saw some of the highest levels of violence. By reviving a case from that era, the state is effectively arguing that the ideological battle Shah waged then is legally indistinguishable from actions requiring custody today.

As of today, Shabir Shah is in a secure NIA guesthouse in Jammu, flanked by armed officers. His legal team is preparing a bail application for the 1996 case, but given the remand order, that process will take at least another two weeks. The NIA has not disclosed the specifics of what they hope to recover during the ten-day custody, nor have they named any other individuals they intend to confront Shah with.

In Tihar Jail, his cell remains empty. His personal belongings—books, a prayer mat, some medicines—still sit on the shelf. Whether he will return to Delhi to collect them is uncertain.

In Srinagar, life continues its uneasy rhythm. Shops open late and close early. Security forces patrol the streets. And in the Shah household, the telephone rings frequently—friends, former colleagues, and activists calling to offer support, but careful not to say too much over the line.

Shabir Shah’s journey from Tihar to Jammu is a story about the elasticity of the law in conflict zones. It is not a tale of innocence or guilt—that is for the courts to decide. It is, rather, a portrait of how time bends differently for political prisoners in Kashmir. A case from 1996 can feel like yesterday when the state decides to revive it. A seven-year sentence can become indefinite when one legal proceeding folds seamlessly into the next.

For the man himself, now in his 70s, the fight is no longer about street power or political relevance. It is about breathing air that does not smell of prison disinfectant. It is about seeing the mountains of his homeland from a window that is not barred.

As his wife put it, before hanging up the phone: “He wanted to come home. Not to politics. Just home. I don’t know when that will happen now.”

— The Azadi Times, reporting from Jammu and Srinagar.

Five New Districts in Ladakh: A Historic Shift or a Promise Left Unfinished?

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A cold wind was whipping through the narrow lanes of Drass—the second coldest inhabited place on earth—when Mohammad Hussain, a middle-aged hotelier, heard the news over a crackling radio. For decades, he had watched politicians come and go, promising development. For decades, he had travelled nearly 150 kilometres on treacherous roads just to file a single land document in the district headquarters of Kargil. On Monday, that journey ended.

Ladakh’s Lieutenant Governor, B.D. Mishra (not Vinai Kumar Saxena—correction for accuracy: The LD is B.D. Mishra), approved the creation of five new districts: Nubra, Sham, Changthang, Zanskar, and Drass. “I never thought I would see this day,” Hussain whispered, pulling his woollen pheran tighter. “For us, the mountain has become a little closer to the government.”

For decades, the vast, windswept landscape of Ladakh—historically part of the greater Kashmir region, sharing cultural and trade ties with Gilgit-Baltistan before the lines of 1947 and 1971 were drawn—has suffered a peculiar administrative paradox. While it is India’s largest Union Territory by area (nearly 60,000 square miles), it was serviced by only two districts: Leh and Kargil.

To put that in perspective: a farmer in Changthang, near the Tibetan border, is technically a resident of Leh district, but reaching the deputy commissioner’s office could take two days. A student in Zanskar, cut off from the world for seven months of winter due to the closure of the Pensi La pass, had to migrant to Kargil town just to access a scholarship form. This was not merely a matter of geography; it was a matter of human dignity.

The demand for smaller, more accessible administrative units is not new. For nearly thirty years, local panchayats and the Kargil Democratic Alliance had lobbied for the creation of new districts. The argument was simple: Good governance cannot be delivered by helicopter or on a once-a-season visit.

On Monday, LG B.D. Mishra issued the notification, effectively tearing up the old map. The new districts are not random creations. They represent the distinct cultural and geographical basins of Ladakh.

  • Nubra: Once a vital artery on the old Silk Route, famous for its Bactrian camels and proximity to the Siachen Glacier.

  • Sham: The lower Indus valley region, the “gateway” to Ladakh.

  • Changthang: The high-altitude plateau home to the nomadic Changpa community and their Pashmina goats.

  • Zanskar: The remote Buddhist kingdom nestled deep within the Himalayan folds.

  • Drass: The Muslim-majority region famous for its fierce independence and the Kargil War memorial.

The decision, according to an official statement, aims to “strengthen grassroots governance and ensure faster delivery of public services.” However, the timing is critical. This move comes years after the abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019, when Ladakh was carved out of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir and made a separate Union Territory without a legislature.

To understand the weight of this news, one must stand on the frozen Zanskar river in February. Tsering Dolma, a 22-year-old college student, remembers watching her father walk for six days to Kargil town to renew a gun license for their livestock guardian dogs. “He came back with frostbite on two toes,” she told The Azadi Times via a satellite phone call. “Now, with Zanskar as a district? Perhaps a bank branch that stays open past October? Perhaps a hospital that doesn’t run out of suture thread?”

In Nubra, former soldier Tsering Norboo sees economic potential. “We are tired of just being a photo-op for tourists,” he said. “With a district headquarters in Diskit, we can finally process our own leases, our own business licenses. We don’t have to beg officials in Leh who have never even seen the flooding in our valley.”

Yet, there is a shadow. In Kargil town, some locals worry that the creation of Drass and Zanskar as separate districts might dilute the political weight of the Shia Muslim majority in the region. “We are a minority within India,” said a community elder who requested anonymity. “In a UT without an assembly, where our voice in Parliament is one of two MPs, fracturing our districts might make us administratively weaker, not stronger.”

Ladakh shares a volatile border with China and a tense Line of Control with Pakistan-administered Gilgit-Baltistan. Historically, Leh and Kargil were the nerve centers of Indian military logistics. By creating districts like Changthang (which borders the Tibetan Autonomous Region) and Nubra (near the Siachen Glacier), New Delhi is paradoxically doing two things.

First, it is deepening its administrative footprint in a region Beijing claims as part of the “Southern Xinjiang” and “Aksai Chin” dispute. Having a civilian district magistrate in remote areas consolidates India’s claim on the ground.

Second, it is an answer to the long-standing demand for Statehood for Ladakh. By offering more districts, the central government is saying, “We are giving you local power,” without granting the legislative assembly that political parties like the Leh Apex Body and Kargil Democratic Alliance have been demanding since 2019.

As of today, the notification has been signed, but the physical infrastructure for these new districts—the circuit houses, the police stations, the tehsil offices—does not exist yet. Civil servants will have to be recruited, maps redrawn, and budgets allocated.

In Drass, excitement is tempered by realism. “We have a signboard now,” said Hussain, the hotelier. “But the roads are still broken. The internet is still 2G. We have a ‘district’ on paper, but we still don’t have a college. Let’s see if the officer who sits in the new building actually has the power to decide our fate.”

The Ladakh Hill councils, which have been demanding restoration of special powers, have remained cautiously optimistic, noting that while districts are welcome, they are no substitute for constitutional safeguards regarding land and jobs for the local population—safeguards that were removed in 2019.

For the farmer in Changthang, the student in Zanskar, and the veteran in Nubra, Monday was a day of quiet validation. It proved that the isolation they feel is not invisible to the capital, 1,000 kilometres away. The creation of the five new districts is an undeniable logistical victory—a promise of emergency ambulances that don’t take 48 hours and a bureaucratic desk that is a walk, not an expedition, away.

However, the history of Kashmir and its surrounding regions is one of administrative promises that run cold in winter. Whether Drass becomes a vibrant hub or just a distant outpost of Leh will depend not on maps, but on the will of the men who sit behind those new desks.

As Dolma in Zanskar put it before hanging up, “We have the name now. Next winter, we will see if the government actually stays open for us when the snow is ten feet high. That is the real test of governance.”

— The Azadi Times, reporting from the ground in Jammu and Kashmir.

Jamia Siraj-ul-Uloom: Anatomy of a UAPA Ban in Indian-Administered Kashmir

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SHOPIAN, Indian-Administered Kashmir — The heavy iron gates of Darul Uloom Jamia Siraj-ul-Uloom were locked from the outside on the morning of April 28, 2026. For the 814 students and 102 staff members who called this campus home, the seminary in Imam Sahib village — a sprawling institution that has operated since 1992 — was suddenly, officially, no longer theirs to enter.

The previous evening, the Jammu and Kashmir administration had declared the institution an “unlawful entity” under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA). The two-page order, issued by Kashmir Divisional Commissioner Anshul Garg, cited “sustained and covert linkages” with Jamaat-e-Islami — a religious and political organisation banned by the Government of India in 2019 — along with allegations of radicalisation, financial irregularities, and questionable land acquisition.

The decision has drawn sharp criticism from political leaders across Indian-administered Kashmir, raised questions about due process under India’s stringent counter-terrorism laws, and highlighted a broader pattern of civil society constriction in the region since 2019.

What the Administration Says

The administrative action traces back to March 24, 2026, when the Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) for Shopian district submitted a confidential dossier to the Divisional Commissioner’s office. The dossier, according to the official order, alleged that an institution appearing on the surface to be a conventional religious educational establishment was allegedly harbouring “something more sinister beneath.”

The Divisional Commissioner’s order, issued under Section 8(1) of the UAPA, outlined four specific allegations:

Legal and Administrative Irregularities: The institution allegedly lacked mandatory registration with competent authorities and made “deliberate attempts to evade statutory oversight.” The order pointed to “questionable land acquisition” — a particularly sensitive issue in the region since the 2019 revocation of Article 370, which previously restricted non-resident land ownership.

Financial Opacity: The administration cited “lack of transparency in financial transactions” and “objectionable fund arrangements” as evidence that the institution’s monetary flows warranted scrutiny.

Alleged Militant Links: Perhaps the most serious charge concerned the institution’s alumni. The order stated that “a number of former students have been found involved in militant activities and acts prejudicial to national security,” suggesting that the seminary had “fostered an environment conducive to radicalisation.”

Jamaat-e-Islami Connections: The order referenced “credible inputs and evidence on record” indicating “sustained and covert linkages” with Jamaat-e-Islami, which was proscribed under the UAPA in February 2019 following the Pulwama attack that killed 40 Central Reserve Police Force personnel.

The institution’s chairman, Mohammad Shafi Lone, was issued a show-cause notice on March 31, 2026. He submitted a detailed response, but the SSP for Shopian, on April 21, 2026, dismissed the objections as “misconceived, factually untenable, and devoid of legal merit.” Four days later, the ban was formalised.

What Jamia Siraj-ul-Uloom Says

Jamia Siraj-ul-Uloom is not an obscure madrasa operating in the shadows. Established in 1992 as a society and commencing operations in 2000, it has grown into one of the more prominent religious educational institutions in south Kashmir — a region that has borne a disproportionate share of the Kashmir conflict’s violence over the past three decades.

The institution offers both religious and modern education. According to Chairman Lone, the school is affiliated with the School Federation of Kashmir, recognised by the Jammu and Kashmir Board of School Education, and its college is affiliated with the University of Kashmir — credentials that suggest a degree of official legitimacy and integration into the state’s educational framework.

The institution has also made public efforts to demonstrate its loyalty to the Indian state. In August 2025, teachers and students held a tricolour rally to express their patriotic allegiance — a move widely interpreted as an attempt to distance the seminary from separatist associations in an increasingly polarised environment.

Lone has consistently denied any links with Jamaat-e-Islami. Following the ban, he told media persons: “We are not involved in any unlawful activity and are following all government rules and regulations. We have no affiliation with Jamaat-e-Islami. The property belongs to a Sufi saint.” He expressed surprise at the sudden announcement, noting that he had already submitted a detailed response to the show-cause notice.

Political Reaction: ‘Flagrant Injustice’

The ban has drawn sharp criticism from across the political spectrum in Indian-administered Kashmir, most notably from former Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti, who called the move “a flagrant injustice to the poor underprivileged sections of society.”

In a strongly worded statement, Mufti argued: “This institution served as a beacon of quality education for students unable to afford expensive schooling. It has produced reputed doctors and professionals who served this nation with dedication. Banning these altruistic institutions without any solid evidence of anti-national activity shows a deep-seated prejudice and ill intention.”

Her critique touches on a broader concern that has grown since 2019: that the space for civil society, religious expression, and even educational autonomy in Indian-administered Kashmir has been systematically constricted under the guise of security measures.

The Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and various civil society organisations have questioned the evidentiary basis for the ban and the procedural fairness of the UAPA process, which allows for detention and property seizure with limited judicial oversight.

The Broader Security Context

To understand the Jamia Siraj-ul-Uloom ban, one must place it within the broader architecture of counter-terrorism measures that have reshaped civil society in Indian-administered Kashmir since 2019.

The proscription of Jamaat-e-Islami in February 2019 was a watershed moment. Founded in 1945, the organisation had long operated as a religious, social, and political force, running schools, orphanages, and welfare programmes alongside its political activities. The government accused it of supporting militancy and acting as an “overground worker” for terrorist groups — allegations the organisation consistently denied.

Following the ban, dozens of Jamaat-e-Islami members were arrested, its assets frozen, and its vast network of educational and charitable institutions came under intense scrutiny. The organisation’s bank accounts were seized, and its properties across the region were attached or sealed.

The 2019 crackdown was followed by the revocation of Article 370 in August of that year, which stripped Jammu and Kashmir of its special autonomous status and bifurcated the state into two union territories. The move was accompanied by a massive security deployment, communications blackouts, and the detention of thousands of political leaders, activists, and civil society figures.

Since then, the administration has pursued a dual strategy: heavy security measures to suppress militancy, alongside efforts to integrate the region more fully into the Indian Union through economic development, tourism promotion, and political restructuring. But critics argue that this approach has come at the cost of civil liberties, political dissent, and the autonomy of religious and educational institutions.

UAPA Explained: India’s Counter-Terrorism Law

The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, is among India’s most stringent counter-terrorism laws. Amended multiple times — most significantly in 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2019 — it grants the state extraordinary powers to designate individuals and organisations as “terrorists,” seize properties, and detain suspects without the procedural safeguards available under ordinary criminal law.

Section 8(1) of the UAPA empowers the central or state government to declare an association “unlawful” if it believes the organisation is involved in activities “prejudicial to the sovereignty and integrity of India.” Once declared unlawful, the organisation’s offices can be sealed, its assets frozen, and its members subject to criminal prosecution.

Critics — including human rights organisations, legal scholars, and opposition parties — have raised serious concerns about the UAPA’s broad definitions, its reversal of the presumption of innocence, and the difficulty of challenging designations in court. The law has been described by some legal experts as creating a “reverse burden of proof,” where the accused must demonstrate their innocence rather than the state proving guilt.

In Kashmir, where the UAPA has been invoked against journalists, activists, students, and now educational institutions, these concerns carry particular weight. According to data from the National Crime Records Bureau, thousands of individuals have been detained under the UAPA in Jammu and Kashmir since 2019, though conviction rates remain relatively low — a pattern that has drawn scrutiny from legal observers.

The Human Cost: 814 Students and 102 Staff

Beyond the legal and political dimensions, the Jamia Siraj-ul-Uloom ban has immediate, tangible consequences for hundreds of families in one of the region’s most impoverished districts.

The 814 students enrolled at the institution — many from poor, rural backgrounds for whom the seminary represented a rare pathway to education — now face uncertainty. Where will they continue their studies? Will their academic records be recognised? Will their families, already struggling with the economic devastation of decades of conflict, be able to afford alternative schooling?

The 102 staff members — teachers, administrators, support workers — have lost their livelihoods overnight. In a region where formal employment is scarce and the private sector is underdeveloped, the loss of even a modest salary can push families into crisis.

For the community of Imam Sahib and the surrounding villages, the seminary functioned as more than a school. It was a social institution, a gathering place, a symbol of religious and cultural continuity. Its closure sends a message that extends far beyond its walls.

The most serious charge against Jamia Siraj-ul-Uloom — that some of its former students became involved in militant activities — is also the most difficult to verify independently.

The administration has not publicly released the names of the alleged militants, the specific incidents they were involved in, or the evidentiary basis for linking their activities to the seminary. Without this information, external observers cannot assess whether the institution actively fostered radicalisation, whether individual students were radicalised independently, or whether the alleged links exist at all.

This opacity is characteristic of UAPA cases, where much of the evidence is classified and subject to limited judicial review. It is also reflective of the broader challenge of counter-terrorism in Kashmir, where the lines between political dissent, religious expression, and militant activity are often blurred.

What is clear is that south Kashmir, and Shopian district in particular, has been a persistent hotspot for militancy. The district has seen numerous encounters between security forces and militants, and a significant number of local youth have joined militant ranks over the past decade. Whether educational institutions have contributed to this trend — or have simply existed in an environment where radicalisation occurs through multiple channels — remains an open question.

One of the more intriguing aspects of the case involves the institution’s property. Chairman Lone has asserted that the land belongs to a Sufi saint — a claim that, if verified, would complicate the administration’s narrative of “questionable land acquisition.”

Sufism has deep roots in Kashmir, where the Rishi tradition — exemplified by the 14th-century mystic Sheikh Noor-ud-Din Noorani, known as Nund Rishi — has historically provided a spiritual counterweight to more rigid forms of religious expression. Sufi shrines dot the Kashmiri landscape, and many educational and charitable institutions are associated with saintly lineages.

If Jamia Siraj-ul-Uloom’s property is indeed tied to a Sufi heritage, the administration’s allegations of irregular land acquisition would require careful scrutiny. Conversely, if the institution has encroached upon or misrepresented the ownership of religious property, that would raise its own set of ethical and legal questions.

The land issue also connects to broader anxieties in post-2019 Kashmir. The revocation of Article 370 removed restrictions on land ownership by non-residents, sparking fears — particularly among Kashmiri Muslims — that outsiders would buy up property and alter the region’s demographic and cultural character.

The Jamia Siraj-ul-Uloom ban occurs against a backdrop of global debate about the balance between religious freedom and counter-terrorism.

India has faced criticism from international human rights organisations — including the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch — for what they describe as a pattern of restricting religious and civil liberties, particularly for Muslims. The UAPA has been singled out as a tool that enables arbitrary detention and suppresses dissent.

The Indian government has consistently rejected these criticisms, arguing that its counter-terrorism measures are necessary to protect national security in a region that has experienced decades of cross-border militancy. Officials point to Pakistan’s role in supporting militant groups and argue that stringent laws are required to prevent the radicalisation of youth.

This tension — between security imperatives and civil liberties, between state sovereignty and international human rights norms — is not unique to India. Similar debates have unfolded in the United States (the PATRIOT Act), the United Kingdom (Prevent strategy), France, and numerous other countries grappling with the threat of terrorism.

Legal Recourse and Potential Outcomes

Chairman Lone has indicated that he intends to challenge the ban in court. Under the UAPA, any designation as an “unlawful association” can be appealed to a tribunal constituted by the government under Section 5 of the Act. The tribunal, composed of a High Court judge, has the power to review the evidence and confirm or set aside the declaration.

However, legal experts note that UAPA tribunals have historically rarely overturned government designations. The burden of proof lies with the accused organisation to demonstrate that it is not unlawful — a reversal of the normal criminal standard that many legal scholars argue violates fundamental due process rights.

If the case proceeds to judicial review, the key questions will likely include: the nature and credibility of the evidence linking the seminary to Jamaat-e-Islami; whether alleged militant activities by former students can be attributed to the institution itself; and whether the administration has followed the procedural requirements of the UAPA.

A Locked Gate and an Open Question

The heavy iron gates of Jamia Siraj-ul-Uloom, sealed by administrative order on April 28, 2026, are a physical manifestation of a deeper reality: the shrinking space for civil society, religious expression, and educational autonomy in Indian-administered Kashmir.

Whether that shrinkage is a necessary price for security, or an overreach that risks alienating the very population the state seeks to integrate, depends on one’s perspective — and on the evidence that the administration has yet to make public.

For the 814 students who once walked those halls, for the 102 staff members who once taught and served there, and for the community that once gathered within its walls, the locked gate is not an abstraction. It is a daily reminder that in Kashmir, even education is political — and that the line between security and suppression is drawn not in law alone, but in the lived experience of those who must navigate it.

As Chairman Lone maintains his innocence and former Chief Minister Mufti decries the “flagrant injustice,” the case of Jamia Siraj-ul-Uloom will likely wind its way through India’s courts — where the burden of proof, reversed by the UAPA, will test the limits of justice in a region where justice has long been in short supply.

Until then, the gates remain locked. And the questions remain open.

A Coffin on the Riverbank: When Kashmir’s Line of Control Becomes a Final Goodbye

On a crisp Saturday afternoon in late April 2026, mourners gathered on both banks of the Kishanganga River — known as the Neelum across the border — in the remote Keran sector of north Kashmir. They had come not to celebrate, but to bid farewell to a man they could not touch.
Raja Liyaqat Ali Khan, a 50-year-old revenue official serving as Naib Tehsildar in Ganderbal district, had died of cardiac arrest after four days of treatment at Srinagar’s Sher-i-Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences. His body was brought home to Keran, a village split in two by one of the world’s most heavily militarised boundaries: the 740-kilometre Line of Control (LoC) that divides Kashmir between India and Pakistan.
What unfolded next was not merely a funeral. It was a stark, visceral reminder of how political borders sever the most fundamental human bonds — and how, even in death, families remain prisoners of geography.

The Scene

As Khan’s coffin was carried to the river’s edge, relatives on the opposite bank — in Pakistan-administered Kashmir — stood just a few hundred yards away, close enough to see his face when mourners uncovered it for a final glimpse, yet too far to offer a shoulder, to whisper a prayer, or to place a kiss upon his forehead.
Shagufta Bano, Khan’s sister, who had migrated to Pakistan-administered Kashmir in 1990 and now lives in a refugee camp in Muzaffarabad, spoke through tears: “What kind of division is this? I could not even kiss my brother’s forehead, and he left this world.”
Her brother, Raja Nisar Khan, added: “My brother’s funeral procession was coming from across the river, and we stood on this side, crying and wailing. I could not give him a shoulder. I could not see his face one last time. We are tired of seeing this pain, this separation. The world must resolve this issue so that sons can meet fathers, daughters can embrace mothers, and sisters can reunite with brothers.”

The coffin was raised high on a traditional cot so those across the water could see. On the Pakistan-administered side, mourners gathered at the Dak Bungalow lawns, wailing as the funeral prayers were offered around 6 PM PST on the Indian-administered side — visible, audible, yet unreachable.

A Family Torn by History

Khan’s story is not unique in Keran. It is, tragically, representative of thousands of families along the LoC whose lives were permanently altered by the armed unrest that swept through Kashmir in the early 1990s.
When militancy erupted in 1990, Khan’s father, Raja Izhar Khan, along with one of his two wives and eleven children, migrated to Pakistan-administered Kashmir — like hundreds of other families fleeing the violence in border areas. Liyaqat and his mother remained behind. He was raised by his uncle, Raja Sharafat Khan, a retired additional deputy commissioner, completed his education, joined the revenue department, and built a life on the Indian-administered side.
Khan is survived by his wife and four children, the eldest currently pursuing a bachelor’s degree. Almost all his maternal and paternal relatives — including three brothers and two sisters from his mother, and six brothers from his father’s second marriage — now live across the LoC. His mother, uncle, and stepbrothers are among the few relatives who remain on the Indian-administered side.

The village of Keran, home to approximately 4,000 people, is a microcosm of this division. Nearly every family here has been split by the LoC. Wajahat Khan, a resident, told reporters that around 300 families migrated from Keran in 1990 and settled in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, leaving behind relatives who have not seen them in decades.

The Line of Control

The Line of Control is not merely a military boundary. It is, as Kashmiri commentators have described it, “an unhealed human wound” — a 740-kilometre scar that runs through homes, fields, ancestral graves, and kinship networks.
Unlike most international borders, the LoC was never intended to be permanent. It emerged from the 1949 ceasefire line following the first India-Pakistan war over Kashmir, and was redesignated as the Line of Control after the 1971 war and the Simla Agreement. For decades, there has been a lingering sense among Kashmiris that this line was never meant to solidify into a permanent division.
Keran occupies a particularly poignant position in this geography. The Kishanganga River, narrow enough in places to shout across, serves as the de facto border. For years after the 2003 ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan, divided families would gather along these riverbanks to exchange news, wave to one another, shout across the waters, and even toss letters and small parcels tied to stones — a fragile, absurd, yet deeply human bridge across an imposed divide.
Raja Basharat, another of Khan’s brothers who now lives in Muzaffarabad, recalled those earlier years: “We would only sit by the river and look at each other. When we heard of our brother’s death, we immediately left for Keran. We knew we could not join the funeral, but we were desperate for one last glimpse.”
He added: “When the funeral was happening on the other side, our sisters were beating their heads against stones, crying. Our mother was crying on that side, but she could not embrace her sons… At the very least, there should be a right to be together after death.”

The Silence After 2019

Those informal contacts have largely disappeared since August 2019, when India revoked Article 370 — which had granted special autonomous status to Jammu and Kashmir — and reorganised the region into two union territories. The move was accompanied by a security crackdown, communications blackouts, and a deepening chill in India-Pakistan relations.
The cross-LoC bus service, known as Karwaan-e-Aman, which began in 2005 as a rare humanitarian bridge, has been suspended. Cross-LoC trade, initiated in 2008 along routes including Uri–Muzaffarabad and Poonch–Rawalakot, was halted in 2019 over allegations of misuse for smuggling.

A 2021 study by the Bureau of Research on Industry and Economic Fundamentals (BRIEF) found that 4,229 families — including traders, truckers, labourers, and service providers — were severely affected by the trade suspension.

Today, even waving across the river is avoided. “You cannot imagine the level of fear that prevails there now. People avoid even waving hands, fearing they may later be questioned by security agencies,” said Raja Arif, a cousin of the deceased.
Muhammad Yasir, another relative, explained the bureaucratic impossibility of crossing: “There were some crossing points, but they required LoC permits. The process is extremely lengthy and complicated, involving extensive verification. When someone dies, you can wait a maximum of 24 hours — and obtaining a permit in that time is impossible.”

For years, families relied on letters tied to stones thrown across the river. Social media and WhatsApp have since provided a digital lifeline — but they cannot replace physical presence at life’s most consequential moments: births, marriages, illnesses, and deaths.

A Humanitarian Crisis in Plain Sight

The Keran funeral resonated far beyond the riverbank. On social media, the images triggered an outpouring of grief and reflection. Asif Maqbool, a resident of Kupwara, wrote on X: “The grieving family, separated by a few metres of border, saw their loved one’s coffin but could not see his face. In divided Jammu and Kashmir, not only families are divided — grief and last rites are divided too.”

Prime Minister of Pakistan-administered Kashmir, Faisal Mumtaz Rathore, described the incident as “yet another reminder of the humanitarian crisis that has afflicted Kashmiris since 1947,” adding that “this dividing line does not just cut through land; it separates families and deepens human suffering.”

Renowned Kashmiri analyst Naila Altaf Kayani echoed these sentiments: “The coffin was brought to the river not for a final embrace, but for a final glimpse. Some borders do not just divide land — they break hearts.”

A poster shared by a Muzaffarabad-based group captured the accumulated weight of decades: “It wasn’t just a dead body that arrived today; it was thirty-seven years of separation, helplessness, and silent screams standing at the ceasefire line.”

The Broader Context: A Region on Edge

The Keran funeral occurs against a backdrop of renewed tensions between India and Pakistan. In April 2025, the Pahalgam massacre — in which 26 tourists were killed in a terror attack in south Kashmir’s Baisaran Valley — triggered a military escalation. Operation Sindoor, launched by India on May 7, 2025, resulted in intense artillery exchanges along the LoC, killing at least 21 Indian civilians, including 12-year-old twins in Poonch, and injuring dozens more.
The aftermath saw India revoke visas for Pakistani nationals, including long-term spousal permits, leading to midnight raids and deportations of Pakistani-origin women who had lived in Kashmir for decades — some for 40 years or more.
The Indus Waters Treaty was put in abeyance by India; Pakistan threatened to suspend all bilateral agreements, including the Simla Agreement.
In this climate, the already limited mechanisms for cross-LoC humanitarian contact have been further eroded. What remains is a silence broken only by artillery fire, drone surveillance, and the occasional, unbearable spectacle of a family waving goodbye to a coffin they cannot touch.

The Unanswered Question

The Keran funeral raises a fundamental question that neither New Delhi nor Islamabad has adequately addressed: If the people on either side of the LoC are claimed as citizens — India continues to reserve 24 assembly seats for Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and has even proposed a Lok Sabha seat for the region — how can they be denied the most basic right to connect, communicate, and grieve together?

As one commentator noted: “How can a state claim political representation over a population while denying them the basic right to connect, communicate, and engage with the rest of the polity?”

For the families of Keran, this is not an abstract constitutional debate. It is the reality of watching a brother’s coffin from across a river, of mothers who cannot embrace their sons, of sisters who cannot kiss their brother’s forehead one final time.

The River Remains

Raja Liyaqat Ali Khan was laid to rest in his ancestral village graveyard, a few hundred yards from the river that had defined his family’s separation. His relatives on the other side watched until the funeral was over, until the body was taken for burial, until the last glimpse was exhausted.
The Kishanganga or Neelum River will continue to flow through Keran, as it has for millennia. The LoC will remain, as it has for nearly eight decades. And the families divided by both will continue to age, to marry, to die — and, when they can, to gather on opposite banks, shouting across the water, waving at silhouettes, throwing letters tied to stones, and, when fate is most cruel, watching coffins they cannot touch.
In an age of global connectivity, where video calls span continents in seconds, Kashmir remains a painful contradiction. The technology exists to bridge any distance — except the one that politics insists must remain.
As Raja Basharat put it: “This is not the Line of Control. It is a dagger that has been plunged into our hearts for decades.”